COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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PREFACE

Comparative Administration is relatively speaking, a new field in the study of public administration. Public administration is itself a scientific area of enquiry and research in the field of social sciences and derives its perspectives and strength from many other disciplines. Public administration as activity is almost as old as the beginning of human society. But public administration even as academic discipline has now acquired an identity of its own. As a study of dynamic processes of the governance and management of human affairs, the study of public administration stands to gain through research in comparative and contrasting situations. Public administration, in the ultimate analysis, deals basically with human problems. Whether we conceive of public administration as institutions, constitutional and legal structures, processes and procedures, or intra or inter-relationship between organisations and inter-personal relationship amongst public servants, the goal primarily has to be that of serving human ends In human affairs, there is always a tendency to compare and contrast things, both in terms of time and space in order to see if any improvement can be made. Probably, when the pace of administrative activity was slow and the area of operations delimited, the tendency for comparative study was also intrinsically limited. With the growing complexities of society in social and economic spheres, the expanding nature of public administration also assumes different complexion. The emergence of comparative administration as integral part of the study and research in administration did provide a new elan to the totality of the discipline.

Public administration is conditioned by the social and economic circumstances of the society to which it relates. Public administration is also conditioned by the constitutional milieu and the political form of government. While there are certain common factors and elements which may transcend the political, economical and social context of administration, there are certain important factors which are shaped by, and have also their relevance, in a particular political and social framework. The ethos of public administration does become country or location specific. The importance of comparative administration has increased during the last few decades, firstly, because of nations coming closer together due to scientific advancements as well as increasing international awareness. In the second place, the aspirations for social change in the wake of the liberation of many countries in the world after the Second World War has led to realisation of the need for finding out as to how and where the goals are being achieved more

effectively and if any lessons can be drawn from elsewhere. In many countries, which may have been politically independent in history but economically backward and socially retarded, the intensity of desire on the part of the people and the anxiety on the part of the leadership to accelerate the tempo of development have led to the same query.

Many of the technical assistance and cooperation programmes, whether on bilateral basis or through international agencies, had also naturally a built-in anxiety as to how the goal and processes of socio-economic change could be adequately accomplished. A number of sociological and anthropological studies of different kinds of programmes or institutions by academic experts also raised many questions and added to the need for the study of public administration in a wider and comparative context. In a way, development administration and comparative administration seem to have something common in both their genesis as well as in their subsequent orientation; but it has to be realised that the focus of development administration, though deep, is in a way limited. The coverage and the frontiers of comparative administration are much wider. In countries where public administration was deemed to be primarily concerned with laws and legal structure, the comparative historical perspectives were brought to bear on the analysis of issues by specialists. Similarly, when public administration was looked at from the angle of rules and procedures or institutional arrangements, both horizontal and vertical, attempt was made quite often to analyse their rationality and effectiveness in comparative context. The interdisciplinary nature of the subject also does become quite pronounced in the study of comparative administration. It has always been felt that comparative administration should not only lend greater element of realism to our understanding of public administration but also unfold fresh vistas for study and action.

Public administration becomes a matter of growing concern when there is a feeling among the people that administrative capability does not exist in the administration, commensurate either with aspirations of the people or with the emerging new tasks that administration is expected to tackle. Apart from the sociological as well as economic compulsions, the imperatives of scientific and technological advances underscore the social significance of comparative administration and the need for continuing administrative innovations and reforms. During the last three decades or so, comparative public administration, as a movement as well as an area of study and research, has had intellectually a chequered career. In the attempt to identify its loci and work out its parameters, different approaches have been adopted. New conceptual framework has been devised and various studies of operating situations made. All this is reflected in the growing literature in public administration. This trend is also visible in the present compilation of the

select articles from the *Indian Journal of Public Administration* during the first 25 years of its existence. In their perceptive and analytical introduction, Verma and Sharma have tried to outline briefly the different schemes and developments in the study and growth of what has commonly come to be known as comparative public administration. The intricacies of the situation in both developed and developing countries do get reflected in the presentation of the editors.

Questions such as need for rethinking of the goals as well as the roles of administration; the harmonisation between the conventional tasks and the emerging tasks for public administration; the representativeness of bureaucratic systems; the adequacy and relationships of varied organisations in the process of developing processes itself; the problems of personnel management to optimise human resources; the standards and indicators for performance; the issues relating to control and accountability in administration; the responsiveness of bureaucracy to the citizens and community as well as the changing environment; citizen participation and similar problems do become, in some way or the other, matters of common concern to a varying degree all over the world. This is much too evident in the treatment of the different facets of administrative system, administrative behaviour or administrative working that has been made by the distinguished contributors. The editors have also tried to indicate the main thrust of the approaches and the viewpoint on the subjects covered by the authors in the different articles. The introduction by Prof. S.P. Verma and Prof. S.K. Sharma provides not only a bird's eye-view of the nature of comparative administration but also a thematic unity to the articles written by the authors at different times and from different standpoints.

I shall like to express my gratitude to Prof. S.P. Verma and Prof. S.K. Sharma for the pains they have taken in the preparation of this volume. I am indeed thankful to the eminent authors whose contributions comprise this volume. I shall also like to thank Shri M.K. Gaur for seeing the volume in the press and the Library staff of the IIPA for making a select bibliography relating to different facets of comparative administration and which enhances the usefulness of the volume. It is in the fitness of things that I acknowledge the pioneering work that was done by Shri N.R. Gopalakrishnan who was the Assistant Editor when we had worked out the conception as well as the programmatic details bringing out the IIPA Silver Jubilee volumes in public administration. Shri P.R. Dubhashi, the Director of IIPA, has always extended his willing support in our effort.

I do hope that this volume will be of interest and value not only to the students of public administration in universities and colleges or elsewhere but also to public functionaries who are directly involved in administration at different levels. Even those who have to shoulder

responsibility of policy making, as and when they want to have not only a considerable factual information on different problems and different kinds but also about different countries, this volume will serve as a handy reference work. It may also help to provide new approaches and new strategies as also refreshing insights in their own endeavours for competent, responsive, responsible and socially sensitive administration in our developmental context.

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T.N. CHATURVEDI

INTRODUCTION

Immediately after World War II, there was a illusion that an administrative state would triumph giving rise to a new society, new frontiers, global development through technical cooperation and a new type of ethos. Development aid and new technology were to become mechanisms to combat poverty, underdevelopment and political instability.[1] Events in Asia specially in the early fifties when many countries were in the process of shedding colonial past led to an assumption that unless economic growth by diffusion of Western capital, technology and institutions take place, chaos and revolutions would be the natural outcome. The philosophy behind the Marshall Plan, the First and Second UN Development Decades was nothing else but a Western-manipulated centre and the 'periphery' model.[2]

Decades have passed but administration continues to be in a state of flux. Deeply ingrained attitudes and long held concepts are being questioned, more frequently and with greater vigour than ever before. Countries developing as well as developed or in-between—generally suffer from a serious lack of administrative capability to achieve significant progress.[3] The current administrative situation, on a global perspective has changed considerably adding a variety of dimensions and contemporaneous challenges.[4] The unprecedented opportunities offered by scientific and technological advances, the commitment and compulsions regarding administrative reforms, and the rising expecta-

[1]Robert Miewald, *Public Administration: A Critical Perspective*, New York, McGraw, 1978, pp. 21-22. Also Garth N. Jones, "Frontiermen in Search for the Lost Horizon", *Public Administration*, Vol. XXXVI, 1976, p. 99. Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative Public Administration*, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1967, pp. 3-6.

[2]Eugena Stamley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries, Political Implications of Economic Development*, New York, Praeger, 1961, pp. 3-4, cf. Walter W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, Harward University Press, 1960. Donald C. Stone, "Tasks, Precedents and Approaches to Education for Development Administration", in Stone (ed.), *Education for Development Administration*, IIAS, Brussels, Maison, 1966, p. 41.

[3]T.N. Chaturvedi, "Management for Investment Promotion". *Occasional Paper*, Training Division, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi.

[4]Benalf Schaffer, "Administrative Legacies and Links in the Post-Colonial State: Preparations, Training and Administrative Reforms". *Development and Change*, Vol. IX, 1978, pp. 175-200. Richard L. Schott, "Professionals and The Public Service: Time for some Second Thoughts", *Midwest Review of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, 1978, pp. 12-18.

tions for improved facilities for education, health, nutrition, housing and social welfare, have made the central role of administration more complex.[5]

Though the utility, need and importance of administrative innovations have been stressed, the resources available and the measures adopted are seldom commensurate with what is minimum necessary. As the complexities unfold, the problems increasingly require interdisciplinary and multi-functional approaches.[6] An important dimension to develop interdisciplinary perception, knowledge and skills would be to expose an increasing number of administrators to a broad spectrum of knowledge. Only by exploring the different conditions faced by different administrators in different countries can experts hope to identify the variety of administrative strategies that are to be adopted to overcome specific conditions of the respective countries.[7] This has led to the encouragement of comparative studies. Two sets of circumstances were additional factors—a growing feeling of the inadequacy of traditional approaches, and the stimulus offered by a host of new concepts and tools for research.[8]

Paul H. Appleby thinks that by comparing administrative systems, there is promotion of the study of public administration all over the world. The United Nations and the galaxy of its specialized organisations have steadily moved in the direction of a fuller realization of the fundamental importance of administration in matters treated earlier exclusively in substantive and technical terms. The United Nations

[5]Robert A. Simmons and E.P. Dvorin, *Public Administration, Values, Policy and Change*, New York, Alfred, 1977, Ch. III. United Nations, *Public Administration in the Second United Nations Development Decade*, New York. United Nations, 1971, p. 3. Also Frederick Lane (ed.), *Current Issues in Public Administration*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

[6]Bernard Shaffer, *The Administrative Factor*, London, Frank Lass, 1973, pp. 244-45. Gevald E. Caiden, *The Dynamics of Public Administration: Guidelines to Current Transformation in Theory and Practice*, New York, Holt, 1971, p. 267. cf. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven. Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 4-6, Gilberto Flores and Winn Crowther, "Public Administrative Problems in Latin America and Solutions from the United States of America", UN, 1970, pp. 16-22.

[7]Donald Brien, "Modernization, Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal", *Journal of Development Studies*, July, 1972, pp. 351-78. Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority*, New York, W.W. Novton, 1969, p. xiii. F. Marini (ed.), *Towards a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective*, Scranton, Chandler, 1971.

[8]Charles T. Goodsell, "The Information Energy Model and Comparative Administration", *Administration and Society*, Vol. IX, 1977, pp. 162-63. John T. Dorsey, "An Information Energy Model", in Hedy and Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1962, pp. 37-57, Peter Savage, "Dismantling the Administrative State: Paradigm Reformulation of Public Administration", *Political Studies*, Vol. XXII, 1974, pp. 147.

itself developed a significant world programme in public administration thus enriching the discipline professionally and academically.[9] In the same vein, R.B. Jain brings out that comparative studies on a cross-national basis, provide vast potentialities for scientific and meaningful research towards the identification of a universal administrative culture, if such a concept has any value in the process of "generalizations on universal plane".

Public Administration, has been marked by a sense of dissatisfaction with controversies of locus and focus and by a growing quest for new approaches. The late sixties were spectacular in the sense that during those years, studies in comparative administration and development administration demonstrated an amazing productivity and their importance grew with the Comparative Administration Group under the leadership of scholars like Fred Riggs.[10] The underlying confidence in the initiation of such efforts was a hope that new advances in the area of organisation theory would be brought to bear fruitfully in the analysis of organisational topics of interest to researches whether at home or abroad.[11] A compounding of tensions and crises in an area of rapid ideological change has accentuated the need for broad sensitivity to the management of public affairs in a comparative perspective.[12]

Comparative public administration as a movement delineates an area of concern and a methodological orientation to study the administrative process and organisation for the purpose of answering common problems and questions. Established analytical categories and institutions are analysed and compared, with an aim towards the development of a body of knowledge so that policy recommendations can be made. The effort is to discover, define and differentiate various approaches or arrangements and to develop criteria of differentiation that are useful

[9]No references have been given for the papers included in this volume but only the authors have been mentioned.

[10]Refer Symposium on "Comparative and Development Administration: Retrospect and Prospect", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 6, 1976, pp. 615-654. Also *Report of the Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, New York, UN, 1972.

[11]Dwight Waldo. "Comparative Public Administration, Prologue, Performance, Problems and Promise", Symposium on Business Policy, 1963, mimeo., pp. 11-12. Fred Riggs, "Three levels in the Theory and Practice of Public Administration", *Korean Journal of Public Administration*, 1969, pp. 161-70.

[12]James L. Marcer and Edwin H. Koester, *Public Management Systems*, New York, Anacom, 1978. Ralph Braibanti, "Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reforms: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues" in Montgomery and Suffin (ed.), *Approaches to Development, Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, McGraw, 1966, p. 133.

in ordering and analysing the issues once they have been identified.[13]

In search of methodologies and a conceptual framework, various typologies and theories and models have been propounded and analysed. The concept of culture, action theory, communication theory, multivariate analysis have all been taken cognizance of. A typical bureaucratic model makes the assumptions such as: (*a*) There is great inequality within the organisation, among participants, in their status, abilities, contributions to the organisation and rewards.[14] (*b*) The technology applied within the organisation in simple and within the reach of a few people. (*c*) The office at the top is assumed to be omniscient and issues all order in the organization. (*d*) These orders are classified downwards by successive levels of subordinates so that there is complete delegation.[15] (*e*) The source of authority being legitimate, conflict is not favoured and thus bargaining coalitions and other conflict-settling activities are illegitimate.[16] In a similar tone Wallace S. Sayre also suggests certain hypotheses, for example, in the building of bureaucratic systems there are many options, each choice having different consequences for the whole system; that is, these options are not merely technical issues in personnel management but more importantly choices affecting the nature of the governing process. Another implication is that the contrasting choices made in constructing two bureaucratic systems were in the main determined by the matrice of the society in which they were each made. According to him, "Bureaucratic models are not packages ready for export or import; they produce illustrations of options and styles for consideration in their separate points, and for adoptions before acceptance in a different context." On the other hand, G. Sivalingam analyses various micro and macro indicators of administrative performance but comes to the conclusion that variables, howsoever well defined and processed, are not able to fully explain all statistical variations and at the most they can state relationships but they cannot establish cause and effect to any reasonable degree of certainty.

[13]Refer F.W. Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXVIII, 1962, p. 9. Dwight Ink and Thomas Murphy, "Organizing Reorganisation", *Bureaucrat*, Vol. VII, 1978, p. 10.

[14]William Delanis, "The Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. VII, 1963, p. 461. B.B Schaffer, "Deadlock in Development Administration" in Collin Leys (ed.), *Policies and Change in Developing Countries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 177.

[15]Michael Cohen, "The Personnel Policy Making Systems" in Robert T. Golembiewski and Michael Cohen (ed.), *People in Public Service*, Ithaca, Peacock, 1978.

[16]Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Chicago, University Press, 1965, p. 37. Peter M. Blau and M.W. Meyer, *Bureaucracies in Modern Society*, New York Random House, 1971. Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratisation of the world*, Berkeley University of California Press, 1973.

Robert K. Brown brings out that government bureauracy, as a public agency, is continually seeking that combination of roles and role assignment that are conducive to directed development. He draws four hypotheses: (*a*) The process of differentiation, integration and legitimation are societal in scope as well as institutional. Bureaucracy is undergoing similar development conflicts as is the general society in which it finds itself. (*b*) Differentiation appears as a sub process of integration working towards a seemingly contradictory end. The former increases specialization, the latter seeks to incorporate and assimilate the specialization process. The greater and more rapid the rate of differentiation, the greater the difficulty in integration. (*c*) The extent of legitimation that occurs within a structure is determined by the degree of a lack of dysfunction that occurs between the ongoing processes of differentiation and integration. (*d*) Legitimation is not a linear process but is cross-institutional and cross-structural support is generated around social institutions in a horizontal manner. The phenomenon suggests that legitimation in a developing democracy is generated around functional offices and roles, it does not proceed automatically downward from the top of the hierarchy. Legitimacy must be aroused, it does not appear to be self-generating.

The role of the higher civil service assumes far more importance in a developing country which has set before it the objective of a planned economic growth. As the development process is intensified, as the hurdles on its way are crossed, new processes build up. The time is over when public officials could afford to sit on the development sidelines, limiting their roles to fixing of general rules and to providing certain basic services and intentions. In the scheme of development bureaucracy, structural refabrication is indeed necessary, so are the methods and procedures of work. Unless both of these are dovetailed and reformed to conform to the new tasks, the modernization of the machine is likely to remain ineffective and useless. The bureaucracy has to be freed from existing conceptual orthodoxies, age-old applications and narrow mental grooves, so as to be the fitting torch-bearer of a new and bright development order. In their anxiety to be modern, Asim Al-Araji thinks that the less advanced countries adopt the more advanced strategies because the possibility of making changes in the goals of administrative system of qualitative and institutionalized characteristics, similar to the more advanced countries, through the same process of administrative development. The failure resulting from this adoption is due to over-estimation of the actual scientific and technological capabilities of the less advanced countries in connection with the requirement of reducing or closing the present gap between the nature and pattern of changes of the more advanced goals and the nature and pattern of the changes of the less advanced goals. He further thinks that

changes of goals of administrative systems are in fact of qualitative and institutionalizational characteristics, similar to those of the more advanced countries. There is even failure here due to the denial of the real difference between the nature and pattern of changes of the goals of the less advanced and the more advanced. E.H. Valson classified development bureaucracy into three categories, Higher, Middle and Lower according to their roles and the special constraints faced by each category in performing its task. On the basis of detailed analysis he makes bold propositions under the detailed description of economic development and its bureaucratic implications as well as the few implied hypotheses of social and political category.[17]

Systems theorists have focused attention on social processes rather than on formally defined institutions, thus providing a framework for analysing the relation between political and other institutions. By focusing upon functions and processes than on institutions, systems theorists promise to provide an intellectually defensible basis for comparative politics, revealing the similarity in processes to be discerned beneath the difficulty in structure.[18] Structural functional analysis aims at gauging the amount of change at the structural level that a system can accommodate without impairing its capacity of fulfilling its basic functional requisites. Starting with agraria and industria as two ideal types of public administration systems, Riggs emphasized in his *Prismatic Model* that similar ideal types could be constructed at various transitional stages between the two extremes. The model sought to relate administrative behaviour to ecological factors, typical of transitional societies.[19] This model helped in understanding the pathology of public administration and focused on the underlying problems of administrative development in transitional societies.[20] However, well conceived the indictment, basically the fact is that such theories failed to win wide acceptance and could not be tested empirically. Savage gives a typical summing-up saying, such work, "displays a melange of idiosyncratic theoretical formulations and organizing perspectives, many of which

[17]Refer Herbert Kanfmarv, "Fear of Bureaucracy: A raging pandemic, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XLI, 1981, pp. 1-9.

[18]Refer Frank T. Fidzerald, "Sociologies of Development", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 11, 1981, pp. 5-18, Also K.R. Hope and Aubrey Armstrong, "Towards the development of administrative and management capability in developing countries", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XLVI, 1980, pp. 315-21.

[19]For details regarding prismatic model, refer F.W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Societies*, Boston, Houghton, 1964. Riggs, "The Sala Model: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Comparative Public Administration", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. VI, 1962, p. 16.

[20]Richard A. Chapman, "Prismatic Theory in Public Administration. A Review of the Theories of Fred. W. Riggs", *Public Administration*, London, 1966, p. 423.

have more to do with academic or personal fancy than with any generally acceptable cumulative purpose".[21]

Discordant voices were heard from various quarters about the utility and goal achievement perspectives without caring that the task was formidable and practically guaranteed nothing but limited success. It is true that this movement did not develop a viable applied aspect in the shape of goal based empirical theories, but the problems were numerous. First, administration is only one aspect of the operation of the political system; therefore, it becomes difficult to treat without linking it with comparative politics. Second, it is large enough to include all dimensions, thus making it too unwieldy. Third, difficulties of conceptualization and jurisdiction exist of relating the universal and the unique in one system. Fourth, the competence in the field of comparative research methodology is lacking, leading to the difficulties of model building which can help in developing a theory of hypothesis around which a generalisation applicable to many administrative systems can be built and tested. Fifth, there are difficulties of quantification that arise, from the range and nature of variables. Sixth, there are also difficulties arising from the interplay and inter-relationship among the norms, structures and behaviour of the administrative systems. Seventh, there is still some vagueness and even ambivalence as to the claim of public administration to be a self-contained academic discipline. In addition, V.A. Pai Panandikar feels that not only administrative policy but also management technology within public agencies has remained static and almost fossilized in Asian countries. Personnel skills required for such policy studies are neither encouraged nor developed. The attitudes of the universities and other academic bodies treating these areas as out of bounds have not been particularly helpful.[22]

The above passing reference to some of the problems of comparative studies should not be taken to mean that all avenues open to research on a comparative basis have been exhausted. Serious studies on a cross national basis provide vast potentialities for scientific and meaningful research towards the identification of a universal administrative plane. Common frameworks can be built up for testing the validity of administrative generalizations through regional comparisons and for determining the overall performance of an administrative system in

[21]Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Administration: A Sojourner's Outlook", Peter Savage, "Optimism and Pessimism in Comparative Administration", Refer *Symposium*.

[22]Refer Stuart S. Nagel (ed.), *Improving Policy Analysis*, Bewerly Hills, Sage, 1980. Dell Gillette Hitchner and Carol Levine, *Comparative Government and Politics*, New York, Harper, 1981.

terms of goal achievement.[23] Jon S.T. Quah suggested eight hypotheses for measuring the effectiveness of Public Service Commissions in the New States of Asia and Africa : *(a)* the faster the speed of localization of the civil service, the greater will be the level of effectiveness of the Public Service Commissions, *(b)* the greater the reliance on achievement criteria in recruitment and selection of personnel by the Public Service Commissions, the greater will be the level of effectiveness, *(c)* Public Service Commission with members who have been trained in interviewing techniques is more effective than a Public Service Commission whose members have not been trained in such techniques, *(d)* the higher the morale of the members and staff of the Public Service Commission, the greater will be its effectiveness, *(e)* the greater the stability of the staff work force of the Public Service Commission, the greater will be its effectiveness; *(f)* the greater the volume of work of the Public Service Commission. the greater will be its effectiveness, *(g)* the higher the prestige of the Public Service Commission, the higher is the level of effectiveness, and *(h)* the smaller the size of the country, the more effective will be the Public Service Commission. R.B. Jain brings out that the three dimensions of comparative research, *viz.*, the vertical comparison—comparison between national administrative phenomena and regional or local administrative phenomena—and the horizontal comparison—analysis of administrative processes over a period of time, and the study of administrative institutions and processes across national boundaries with new orientation and approach have yet to be fully explored by the scholars of comparative public administration in India.

The achievement of higher levels of integration and relevance of administrative concepts is crucial for any significant impact of the comparative approach as well as for the emergence of theory. The existing administrative situation proves that gone are the days when study and research in public administration could be confined within the traditional parochial national boundaries. The comparative perspective has become so inevitable and prominent that understanding of one's own national system of administration will be enhanced by placing it in a cross-cultural setting.[24]

Whatever the exacerbating conditions and inevitable problems, the neglect of value issues, being helpful for problem-solving generated vigorous reactions and over reactions. Neither the proponents nor the

[23]Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton, (ed.) *Making Bureaucracies Work*, Bewerly Hills, Sage, 1980. Frank Fischer, *Politics, values, and public policy: the problem of methodology*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980.

[24]Martin Kriesberg, *Public Administration in Developing Countries*, Washington, The Brookings Institute, 1965. John Garrett, *Managing the Civil Service*, London, Heinemann, 1980.

opponents could, however, ignore the amazing storehouse ef knowledge and proliferation of approaches.[25] It was increasingly realized that the failure of comparative administration rested substantially on a self-imposed failure experience. The goals were unattainable and the vision premature and even dangerous. The focus on development administration corrected some of the imbalances and in spite of all the controversies, public administration as a discipline is increasingly in search of identity. Younger scholars and practitioners have started challenging the established norms. This reaction became known as the *New Public Administration*, the third major new trend in public administration. Its supporters' preference is towards a shift towards the blending of normative and empirical approaches to theory and promotion of an instrumental normative approach to theory, calling for the study of value preferences but eschewing value judgements.[26] They advocate an increasing inter-disciplinary penetration and shift towards analytical approaches especially towards analytical middle range theories. Public policy should become a central focus of future research and attempts at synchronising various complementary activities, multi-dimensionally geared, will substitute univariate functional separation.[27] The motivation is almost similar and effort is made to cash in on the experience of comparative administration and to derive such insights about the developmental feature of new public administration. The major thrust of the new wave is almost identical to the earlier contributions of comparative administration and both the approaches emphasize that, for many purposes, organisations must be viewed as imbedded in specific cultures and potential setting. Further, any proper discipline must complement the pure and applied aspects, even if these aspects are difficult to keep in any reasonable balance.[28] The main weakness of the approaches adopted so far has been that no serious effort was undertaken to develop a perfect model which a politician could apply to solve his dilemma.

[25]Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucracy and Development Administration", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXI, 1967, pp. 105-22. Also Fred W. Riggs, "Three dubious hypothesis: a comment on Heper, Kimand Pai", *Administration and Society*, Vol. XII, 1980, pp. 301-26.

[26]Gerald E. Caiden, "The Challenge to the administrative state", *Politics, Administration and Change*, Vol. V, 1980, pp. 17-27.

[27]Frank Marini (ed.), *A New Public Administratian: The Minnowbrook Perspective*, Scranteon, Chander, 1971. *Public Administration in the Second United Nations Development Decade:* Report of the Second Meeting of Experts, United Nations, New York, 1971. Also Rayburn Barton, "The road to Minnowbrook development of the new public administration in the United States", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 11, 1980, pp. 447-75.

[28]R.T. Golembiewski, "The Ideational Poverty of Two Modes of Coupling Democracy and Administration: Democracy *vs.* Administration", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. III, 1981, pp. 1-66.

In the earlier period, the need for practical application was central but the need later became a very weak urge. The central tragedy of comparative public administration has been that it failed to develop, usually even failed to recognise by and large the need for a methodology of empirical analysis.[29]

In the present volume, however, Kuldeep Mathur investigates the behavioural orientations of the developmental bureaucrats in India with a view to develop a more concrete base for hypothesizing about the bureaucratic failures or success. The capacity of the bureaucrats to develop a working relationship with the new forces of policies serves to grow as exposure to democratic forces increased. He contends that time is an important factor in developing more congenial perceptions towards democracy and greater exposure to politicians will lead to greater adjustment over a period of time.

Of late, comparative administration is being increasingly seen as an integral part of the large field of public administration and it is being realised that the comparative perspective is perhaps the most important avenue for administrative reforms and improving public policies. For example, Donald C. Rowat makes a comparative study of public access to administration information in twelve countries; four in Scandinavia (Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway), four in Western Europe (Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany), two in Eastern Europe (Hungary and Yugoslavia), and two in North America (Canada and the United States). Sydney Verba and associates make a survey of political participation in seven nations—Nigeria, Austria, Japan, India, the Netherlands, Yogoslavia and the United States in which the authors examine the relationship between social, economic and educational factors and political participation.[30] A twenty-two nation study, fifteen developing and seven developed by S.P. Verma and S.K. Sharma deals with the management aspect with special reference to the role of central personnel agencies and suggests a tentative model.[31] Jon S.T. Quah compares the Origins of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore public bureaucracies and con-

[29]Dwight Waldo, "The Administrative State Revisited", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXV, 1965, pp. 16-17, Joseph E. Black, James S. Coleman and L.D. Stifel (ed.), *Education and Training for Public Sector Management in the Developing Countries*, New York, Rockefeller Foundation, 1977.

[30]Donald C. Rowat, *Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries*, London, MacMillan, 1979, Ch. I, Sydney Verba, et al, *Participation and Political Equality A Seven Nation Comparison*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. Also Christa Altenstetter and J.W. Bjorkman, "Planning and Implementation: A Comparative Perspective on Health Policy", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. II, 1981, pp. 11-42.

[31]S.P. Verma and S. K. Sharma, *Managing Public Personnel Systems*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1980.

cludes that the bureaucracies were set up at different times in the ASEAN countries because of the peculiar historical circumstances and environmental influences prevailing in each of these countries. The bureaucracies in these countries were initially not very efficient organisation in terms of preparing their countries for self-government and independence. These institutions were established by the colonial powers for the economic exploitation of the national resources of the colonial territories. As instruments of the colonial powers, the public bureaucracies were subject to their control and policies. These became useful instruments in the nationalistic struggle much later on and after their transformation from an imperial to a national elite as a result of the localisation process.

The relationships between institutions and environments have been receiving disproportionate attention during the last two decades. The areas of comparative politics and comparative public administration have dealt with the problem from a variety of perspectives. In a general way, comparative studies have emphasized a macro-level of analysis. It had been realized that most of the analytical approaches to political and administrative analysis have been generally inadequate to cope with the ongoing process of societal conflict, change and development. For example, Shivaji Ganguly makes a comparison between the Soviet and the Western bureaucratic organisations and shows that bureaucratic organisations in a complex industrial society exhibit certain similar traits or orientations Bureaucratic organisations whether in the West or in the Soviet Union perform some important social functions. Some of the common attributes of these organisations are: hierarchically ordered structure, use of rules and regulations, impersonality of operations, division of labour, complexity of administrative costs, and employment of trained personnel either on a career or programme basis. In spite of the over-simplified view of the soviet system as a huge monolithic structure, it has been brought out how Soviet bureaucratic organisations, like their Western counterparts, do develop pluralism and informal interaction pattern on familial basis.

In many countries, an ethos is emerging due to the fusion of the developing political situations and the socio-economic pressures generated by the process of development and growth and the continuously changing administrative practices. Recent critiques of development models have exposed that single dimensional development is not appropriate for all societies at all times, nor beneficial to all sections of the people in any society. This phenomenon cannot be restricted to the third world alone.[32] Experiences of countries both in the first and the

[32]Refer Milton J. Esman, "Development assistance in public administration: requiem or renewal", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XL, 1980, pp. 426-31.

second World bear equal evidence of dissatisfaction. There is, now a considerable stress on enhancing the capacity of administration to manage development and on building institutions that could help in diffusions borrowed technology with marginal adaptations. In the midst of contradictory demands, the challenge and the awesome task is to find ways to mediate between various demands, to represent the overall interest of the organisation and the make decision that are necessary for the survival of organisations themselves. It is here where the comparative public administration becomes relevant and important.[33]

A continuing programme for administrative development, periodically reviewed and updated in the light of transnational perspective needs to be developed as a framework for meeting management problems on a long-term basis. The challenge posed by the new international and domestic orders—economic, social and political—is monumental and in the shrinking world, an expanding interdependent cooperative work can provide a partial answer. A crisis of social science paradigms, development theory, aid policies, identity of locus and focus has created an impression that comparative public administration has nothing 'tangible' to offer to development planners and administrators. This is a fallacy which must be exposed and the facts must be presented in the right perspective. Who can deny that the resource—poor countries mostly share a common style of administration that is entirely non-western, nor fully explicable in terms of each country's unique culture heritage. This type of administration, on the other hand, has shown enough resilience to render ineffective many externally induced managerial innovations. These weaknesses have, paradoxically, to be identified and rationally cured. At a minimum, a comprehensive understanding *from the inside* of how these systems work may be an essential starting point for future attempts at administrative reforms in third and even fourth world contexts. Obviously, the crisis suffered by the comparative public administration during the last decade both in terms of methodology and the applicability is not severe enough to make it disappear altogether. It might have lost its impetus in recent years, it has still potentiality to remain alive because of its identity though faint in the conceptual range of modern social sciences. It is, now for the scholars, specially of the third world to revive the spirit, the thrust and the impetus.

S.P. VERMA
S.K. SHARMA

[33]Charles T. Goodsell, "The new comparative administration: A proposal", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 3, 1981, pp. 143-55.

CONTENTS

Comparative Public Administration*

Paul H. Appleby

THE PRIMARY focus of the Indian Institute of Public Administration will properly be internal. It is fortunate that the Institute has come into being at a time of new possibilities for enriching the internal view by systematic consideration of public administration in terms of comparing internal processes and values with those of other countries. Public administration everywhere is beginning to seek consciously and extensively enrichment of this sort.

Similar professional organizations in other governmentally advanced states are rather new and just entering a stage of really significant learning. They provide journals and generally stimulate the production of an increasingly useful literature. These organizations are complemented by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, and through common consideration of problems and personal contacts they are trying to promote the study of public administration all over the world.

The United Nations and the galaxy of its specialized organizations have also moved steadily in the direction of a fuller realization of the fundamental importance of administration in matters treated earlier exclusively in substantive and technical terms. The UN itself has developed a significant world programme in public administration.

Cooperative programmes between pairs or groups of nations have increasingly pointed in the same direction. The Colombo Plan and the Technical Assistance missions newly stress administrative development appropriate to new dimensions of public undertakings. Movement of individual persons under sponsorship of their governments or private 'Foundations' involves an emphasis of the same sort. R.G.A. Jackson of the British Treasury, originally an Australian official and intimately acquainted with administrative organization and practice in many areas of the world, is on a regular assignment for overseas consultation and he is only one among many who are making significant contributions of similar sort.

All of these activities reflect and further stimulate international drives toward administrative advancement and increased learning both theoretical and applied.

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1955, pp. 3-7.

Before this movement got under way, the study of comparative government in university classes and in publications throughout the world was very much restricted to constitutional structures and legalistic theory. These as often as not misrepresented the reality, and even distorted it. In any case, they failed to penetrate deeply into the study of processes by which the values sought by public agencies are achieved or lost. On the American continents, for example, great similarities between many of the constitutions in the southern hemisphere and the United States constitution wholly fail to account for greatly divergent practices. The conduct of government, which is the area of public administration, is a highly important part of the means by which governance is achieved, and "the end pre-exists in the means" as philosopher Emerson and philosopher-leader Gandhi were agreed.

Impressed by the great need for numerous and extensive studies in comparative public administration, the American Political Science Association has had a committee at work for more than a year on plans seeking to maximise the usefulness of such studies. A year earlier the establishment of this committee had been foreshadowed by a conference called by the Public Administration Clearing House.

The committee has concentrated its attention chiefly on three concerns. Since it is unlikely that the administrative systems of all states can be sufficiently studied in the near future, some attention has been given to identifying substantial elements of kinship between systems, pointing toward the early selection of areas for study which all together will be somewhat representative of the varieties of administrative species. The committee has attempted also to identify the most essential elements of public administration in order that various studies could be organized so as to present really comparable and significant material. And in dealing with this subject, the committee has felt impelled to take up the third—that of finding or inventing terminology which can have a common application and meaning.

The committee also has recognized the importance of cultural ecology of public administration—the environmental variations afforded by differences in history, *mores*, attitudes and ideologies. Government is inevitably to a large extent a product of culture even though, it, in turn, becomes a factor influencing culture.

Terminological problems are exceedingly difficult. In any nation where public administration has become at all self-conscious as a profession or even well established as a practice, terms have come to have meanings peculiar to the national setting. Even the basic word 'administrative' in British-related systems tends to have a meaning different from the popular among American academicians not long ago. Because the President of the United States is denominated the 'chief executive' in the American Constitution, scholars in our country used

to insist that 'executive' has a higher significance than 'administrative'; while in the British areas because of division of the civil service into a top 'administrative class' and a secondary executive class, the ranking of the two terms was the reverse of the American ranking. 'An official', 'a department', and 'the civil service' are examples of other terms having different meanings in different countries, and sometimes two or more special meanings in a single state. Communication across cultural lines is much impeded when so many technical terms convey different meanings to various listeners or readers.

The value of achieving a somewhat universal and fresh terminological structure, however, goes beyond simply facilitating communication. It points to the central value of the comparative study by opening the way to really fresh thinking about administration. Familiar terms tend to become *cliches,* predetermining the limits of thought by ruling out an examination of assumptions implicit in the terms. *Cliches* tend to become dogmas.

A familiar example is provided in the United States by the phrase 'separation of powers'. Its history begins with Montesquieu who, in a fashion too common among intellectuals in viewing somewhat remotely the British government of his day, misinterpreted it by over-straining a definition of a mild distinction between the parts of that government. Accepting that definition to a degree, the makers of the American government provided for a relatively greater separation of powers than Britain actually had; and American scholars went still further by long insisting on describing the American government as actually characterized by a separation of powers greater than the Constitution had created. Indeed, it may be said that if the reality had conformed to the academic picture thus painted it would long since have failed.

A somewhat different example of the influence of terminology may be offered in the Indian context. It is my own feeling that the use of the word 'class' in identifying different parts of the Indian civil service tends here to carry over into the new age too much of a feudalistic content. At all events, outside of the British-related systems the term has an unnecessarily undemocratic connotation. It is for India to decide whether or not the term colours performance in any undesirable way here, and at least a temporary escape from the term will be necessary for free consideration of the subject.

It is the stimulation to free and imaginative scrutiny of organizational forms and processes that is the end in view, as comparative public administration becomes a focus of world-wide study. Rarely, if ever, will any administrative system find it possible or desirable to copy wholesale structures and practices of another system where history and culture are markedly different. Even under the British colonial rule, Indian government was not a copy of the British system. In many ways

experience here fertilized the United Kingdom government, and in other ways conditions here required much differentiation. This is even more true today. But in varieties of experience the whole world has a great pool of experimental learning which can enrich the practice of each state and which all together can help us point toward the development of a fuller-bodied world community.

Actual social institutions—the organizations of human beings working effectively togother—are and always will be the chief repository of learning about how to conduct such institutions in the real conditions under which they function. But the process of advancing such learning, and the facilitation of its communication, can be greatly expedited by conscious description, analysis and theory, as well as by imaginative anticipation of future conditions and needs.

The situation here is highly favourable to an especially rapid development in learning about public administration, both in current practice and in dynamic theory. The number of persons qualified alike in intellectual attainment and in hard experience is high. Their exposure is already highly international. Their zealous devotion to the democratic aspiration is unsurpassed. The professionalization of public administration here can move with practitioners and scholars fully sharing responsibility for the intellectual achievement ahead; this will keep the academicians from straying too far toward unreality and misunderstanding and the practitioners from too exclusive immersion in day-to-day necessities. In both groups there is also a healthy willingness to seek criticism and to undergo self-criticism. Whenever energies may be spared from the urgency of internal needs, India will be making important contributions to the world study and practice of public administration. Because of her peculiar position in the world, I think that day will mark a new epoch in the history of the advance of democracy. □

Research Methods in Public Administration: A Critical Survey of Important Works in Historical and Comparative Methodology*

R. B. Jain

THE STUDY of public administration in India as a separate discipline and a distinct field is of comparatively recent origin, even though interest in public administration in India has been traced by many writers as far back as the ancient times. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is claimed by many to be one of the important treatises in public administration and is ranked among the classes on the subject. However, a beginning in the study of public administration was made during the 'fifties, but only as a part of the discipline of 'political science' which itself had only recently separated from its parent subject of 'history'. Although a scientific approach to the study of public administration and an empirical enquiry into the various administrative phenomena have just started and have still to gather significant momentum, the study of administrative practices, structures and institutions in historical perspective had been attracting the attention of the historians and civil servants for quite some time in the past since the days of the British. Thus, contrary to the prevalent belief that historical researches on public administration in India had been sparse or meagre, there is quite a rich collection of books and articles dealing with various facets of administrative history particularly relating to the period of the British East India Company and the administration under the British Crown.

This article attempts to examine critically some of those important works in the field of public administration, in which historical and comparative methodology have been used. The purpose is not to present a detailed bibliographical essay on the subject, but to comment upon the methodology adopted and to discover the gaps that still remain to be bridged through further researches. Thus, the article does not attempt to survey the vast literature available in the field of 'Indian administrative history' or in the field of 'comparative public administra-

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1971, pp. 698-725.

tion' with reference to the Indian institutions of public administration, nor does it aim at including an account of the primary material available in these fields. Its objective is very limited, *i.e.*, to present a state of research in the historical and comparative methods in the study of public administration in India.

HISTORICAL METHOD

The historical approach to the study of political and administrative phenomena, in general, centres on the study of the origins and growth of certain institutions. It has also been used to trace the causes or reasons which led to certain political or policy decisions or to understand the existing constitutional and legal set-up in a country. However, according to one student of history, "The aim of history is to interpret human institutions, and to understand the laws which have governed man's progress through the ages, that is to say, to interpret human culture and civilization in its various manifestations . . . Its function is to rationalize, so far as possible, and to trace the life of nations and the development of human genius."[1] A more significant function of historical method of research is "to bring out clearly the bearing of the past experiences and institutions on the present ones and to show a living connexion between them".[2] In India, the social, cultural, and political institutions were so inseparably welded together in a synthesis that, to draw a true picture of the working of the modern institutions, researchers in the field of social sciences could scarcely afford to ignore the historical perspective. In fact, invariably they had to turn to history for the understanding, justification or explanation of a particular institution or a political and social phenomenon. A general survey of the important works relating to the study of political and administrative institutions through the various periods of Indian history indicates that, while many scholars were fairly successful in describing the old institution in the social, cultural and economic perspectives of their own time, they failed "to evolve an analytical scheme within which an antecedent factor is related in terms other than chronological for a particular event or development".

For our present purpose, the most important works in the field may be classified under five distinct periods: ancient India, mediaeval India, Mogul period, British East India Company, and modern period since 1858 till today. The works relating to modern period could further be divided under four sub-categories: (1) general administration, (2) state

[1] P. Saran *The Provincial Government of the Mughals, 1526-1658*, Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1941, Preface.

[2] *Ibid.*

and provincial administration, (3) civil service, and (4) district administration.

Ancient India

Writings of political and administrative institutions of this period are very few. A.S. Altekar's *State and Government in Ancient India* (Benares, 1955) is based on ancient classics and describes the various aspects of the administrative structure and traces their development. However, it does not give a clear picture of the administrative machinery as a whole, nor does it attempt to discuss its procedural aspects. C.P. Bhambhri's study *Hindu Polity* (Meerut, 1969) contains chapters on taxation, inter-State relations and justice in ancient India without attempting a comprehensive analysis of the administrative system. V.R.R. Dikshitar's *Mauryan Polity* (Lahore, 1943) is also on the same lines. V. Subramaniam's thesis on *Sangam Polity* (Bombay, 1966) deals with a survey of Municipal and village government, warfare and military organization, law and justice, revenue and finance and other economic activities. This is a fairly exhaustive account of the administrative system of Sangam Tamils in the second century and also examines the interaction of the social life on the administrative system. A more recent work, *History of Indian Administration, Vol. I, Ancient Period* (Bombay, 1968) by B.N. Puri traces the evolution of the administrative system of India from the Rig Vedic period to 1000 AD including the Mauryan Administration (400-200 BC), the Gupta Administration (300-500 AD) and the Harsha Administration (606-647 AD). The historical methodology followed by the author is an improvement on the other works in the field, inasmuch as he has tried to provide a framework which enables to link one period of history to another and to analyse and compare the characteristics of their respective administrative systems. For example, he concludes that while Gupta administration preserved the official hierarchy of the Kushans, it placed a stress on decentralization. A. Sharma's *Principles of Public Administration in Ancient India* (Ph. D. Thesis, Lucknow) is merely an effort to describe the various political and administrative institutions in ancient India.

Mediaeval India

Some important works on administrative system in mediaeval India suffer from being purely historical and descriptive. U.N Dey's *Administrative System of Delhi Sultanate* (1206-1413 AD) (Allahabad, 1959), A.B. Pandey's *Society and Government in Mediaeval India* (Allahabad, 1965), and I.H. Siddiqi's *Some Aspects of Afghan Disposition in India* (Aligarh, 1969), fall into the same category. However, two works, *viz.*, P.B. Udgaonkar's *The Political Institution and Administration of Northern India During Mediaeval Times* (750-1200) (Delhi, 1969), and

R.P. Tripathi's *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration* (Allahabad, 2nd revised ed., 1956) stand apart. The former is a comprehensive, comparative and a critical account of the political and administrative institutions of the period, and latter, in addition to the description of the various political institutions of mediaeval India up to the advent of Akbar, also deals with certain theoretical aspects like the Muslim theory of sovereignty, the zenith of despotism and so on. He has also attempted to trace the evolution of some of the administrative institutions individually and severally, *e.g.*, the growth of the Vizarat Department, and the Revenue System.

Two articles also deserve to be mentioned in this context. K.N.V. Sastri's "The Administrative History of India", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration* (*IJPA*), Vol. II (1956), pp. 349-358, and D.P. Verma's "Indian Administration Through the Ages", *Research Bulletin of the University of the Panjab*, Vol. 38 (VI), 1962, trace the various characteristics of Indian administrative system since Manu, Kautilya, Ashoka, Muslim period, the British period, right up to independence and after. Although based on secondary sources, both the authors have tried to trace the modern institutions to the ancient times. For example, Sastri points out that the problems of Ashoka are still the problems of Jawaharlal Nehru, and Verma thinks that the modern concept of socialistic society was already prevalent in the olden days.

Moghul Administration

The material available on the administrative history of this period is less satisfactory. Jadunath Sarkar's work *Mughal Administration* (Calcutta, 1921) is still regarded to be among the firsts to give a historical and descriptive account of the working of Moghul administration, particularly the sovereign and departmental heads, the treasury and the household departments, provincial administration, taxation, law and justice, army and navy, city administration, etc. Sarkar's work has, however, come for criticism inasmuch as "it touches few of the fundamental and important problems, much less the highly controversial and complex questions connected with Mughal Government...The author's method of treatment betrays an unfortunate lack of a sympathetic appreciation of the relative value of the mediaeval political institutions and the environment in which they grew."[3] S.R. Sharma's *Moghul Government and Administration* (Bombay, 1951) and U.N. Dey's *The Moghul Government AD* 1556-1707 (New Delhi, 1969) are purely descriptive and chronological. An important work relating to the period, although narrow in scope, is the study of *Provincial Government of the Moghuls* (1526-1658) (Allahabad, 1941) by P. Saran. He has attempted

[3]P. Saran, *op. cit.*

to present a synthetic view of the Moghul institutions and, unlike many other authors, has not treated the administrative apparatus as a mechanical collection of a number of departments, which are generally analysed, dissected and severally criticized but seldom properly assimilated. The author has, with limited success, also attempted to analyse the influence of the men at the helm of affairs on the growth of such institution. B S. Jain's *Administration of Justice in Seventeenth Century India* (Delhi, 1969), is merely an attempt to analyse the salient concept of Moghul justice in historical perspective.

Administration of the East India Company

There are some good works available on the subject. J.W. Kaye's book *The Administration of the East India Company: A History of Indian Progress* (London, 1853) is still supposed to be a classic. However, the book as a historian has commented, is "more a contemporary of certain administrative problems than a scientific study of institutions".[4] As he himself admits, his work is "a series of historical illustrations of Indian government, arranged with some regard to completeness and uniformity of design, but not at all pretending to the dignity either of a perfect history of the internal administration of India or a finished picture of Indian institutions". D.N. Banerjee's studv on *Early Administrative System of the East India Company in Bengal* (Calcutta, 1943) attempts to present a clear story of the central revenue policy and administration covering also the ceded and conquered districts of the Upper Provinces. N. Chatterji's *Bengal under the Diwani Administration* (1765-1772) (Allahabad, 1956) is also a descriptive study of the Diwani administration. However, B.B. Misra's *The Central Administration of East India Company,* 1773-1834 (Manchester, 1959) presents a contrast in the use of historical methodology. Unlike other works, it is a clear historical exposition of the organization of the central government and, therefore, contains an account of the organization of the central secretariat, the departments under the Governor-General, the administration, settlement and collection of revenues, the administration of civil and criminal justice and the civil services. The author has also taken care to analyse the efforts at reforms in eaeh of these aspects of administrative system. It is here that one finds a good use of historical methodology, as the book furnishes an adequate perspective of the enquiry into the causes of the various administrative practices which have been transmitted to modern times. N. Chatterji's *Clive as an Administrator* (Allahabad, 1955) and *Bengal under Diwani Administration,* (1765-1772)

[4]B.B. Misra, *The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773-1834,* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1959.

Allahabad, 1956) are merely descriptive studies of the revenue system and the various facets of the administration of the times of Clive.

Another important work relating to this period is of Niranjan Dhar's *The Administrative System of the East India Company in Bengal*, 1774-1786, Vol. I (Calcutta, 1964) and Vol. II (1966). Based on contemporary manuscript records and parliamentary papers, the author has proceeded on the hypothesis that "the British Administration did not consist in the continued growth of national institutions. Nor did it develop in pursuance of a premeditated plan. The story of this administration is the story of the series of experiments made by foreign rulers in a strange land. These experiments were carried out under various stresses and strains and exhibited a considerable vacillation of purpose too. But still, on the whole, there is steady advance towards the forging out of machinery for "securing justice and legislation".[5] The works, thus, contain a detailed study of the civil, criminal and judicial administration and of the police departments during the period.

Various other works are available relating to this period which describe either one particular aspect of administration or the system of administration under one British civil servant or another. More important of these are : W.K. Firminger's *Historical Introduction to the Bengal Portion of the Fifth Report* (Calcutta, reprint 1962), which is a detailed study of the changes in the organization of the revenue administration during the years 1769 to 1787; K.N.V. Sastri's *The Munro System of British Statesmanship in India* (Mysore, 1939); and T.H. Beaglehole's *Thomas Munro and the Development of Administrative Policy in Madras* 1792-1818 : *The Origins of "The Munro System"* (London, 1966) are all an attempt to describe the development of Ryotwari system of revenue since the days of Cornwallis. D. Bhasin's *History and Administration of the North-Western Provinces (subsequently called the Agra Province)* 1803-1858 (Agra, 1956); and K.N.V. Sastri's *The Administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon* (1834-1861) (London, 1932), are descriptive aud historical account of a province and an Indian State during the period. W.A. Rahim's *Lord Dalhousie's Administration of the Conquered and Annexed States* (Delhi, 1963) is another attempt to describe the system of administration of the Indian States under a particular Governor-General. S. V. Desikachar's study on *Centralized Legislation in British India* 1834-1961 (Ph. D. Thesis, Delhi, 1959), is a work in which historical methodology has been used for analysing the role of an executive agency in law-making. A. K. Ghosal's *Civil Service in India under the East India Company* (Calcutta University, 1944) is a study of the origin and growth of civil

[5]Niranjan Dhar, *The Administrative System of the East India Company in Bengal, 1774-1786*, Calcutta, Eureka, 1964, Vol. I, p. ix.

service from the times of East India Company, and deals with recruitment, training and other aspects of personnel management in a historical setting.

ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA SINCE 1858

General Administration

There are a number of studies relating to this period. Some have attempted to describe the administrative set-up under a particular Viceroy and have invariably touched upon his policies on various aspects of administration. More important of such works are Dharma Pal's *Administration of Sir John Lawrencc in India* (1864-1869) (Simla, 1952); Virendra Pal Singh's *Administratian of India under Lord Northbrook* 1872-1876 (Delhi, Ph.D. Thesis, 1952); Edward C. Moulton's (*Lord Northbrook's Indian Administration* 1872-1876 (Bombay, 1968); Michael Edwardes, *High Noon of Empire: India under Curzon*, (London, 1965) ; Stephen E. Koss's *John Morley at the India Office* 1905-1910 (New Haven, 1969); Stanley A. Wolpert's *Morley and India* 1906-1910 (Berkeley, California, 1967); K.S. Srivastava's *The Administration of India under Lord Mayo* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad, 1948); and Brij Saigal's *Administration of Lord Elgin* I (Ph. D. Thesis, Lucknow University). Y.B. Mathur's *Changes in the Administrative System of the Punjab* 1849-1875, is somewhat different in the sense that it deals with the administrative system of a province during the British Rule over a period of time.

The "Administration of India", as a whole, has been the focus of attention through the method of historical research by many writers. Sir John Strachey's *India, Its Administration and Progress* (London, 1903), is perhaps the first attempt in this direction. B.B. Misra has rendered a yeoman's service to the literature on the background of Indian administration by bringing his book *The Administrative History of India* 1834-1947 : *General Administration* (London, 1970) to cover the period till independence. He has made an attempt "to present in broad perspective the development of modern political and administrative institutions. The study brings out, for example, the gap that often remained between the statutory provisions of a constitution and the practice that had to take into account the exigencies of social, economic and political development". The originality of this work, as claimed by the author, "lies primarily in its attempt to correlate administration to society and to seek in history a comparable body of experience about questions that occur either to practising administrators or to scholars interested in the subject of administrative reforms".[6] His

[6] B.B. Misra, *The Administrative History of India 1834-1948: General Administration*, London, Qxford University Press, 1970, pp. 7-8.

article, "Efforts for Administrative Reforms Before Independence", *IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 311-35, although a very short version of his big volume, provides quite an insight into the ways the administration was sought to be reformed. Sri Ram Sharma's *Evolution of Public Administration in India* (Allahabad, 1965) is also an attempt in this direction but it lacks the depth, penetration, and analysis of the former. G. Anderson's *British Administration in India* (London, 1923), can perhaps be regarded as the first amongst the textbooks on Indian Administrative System. Although much of the contents may be of historical value today, yet an attempt was made by the author to acquaint the students with the administrative set-up of the country in the British India.

H.V.R. Iyengar's *Administration in India: A Historical Review*, is a collection of three lectures delivered by the author at the Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan in 1966. In these lectures, the author has very broadly and superficially dealt with the administration under the Gupta Empire, during the Moghuls, the Mahrattas, the British period and the post-independence period. Of particular interest is his detailed analysis of the intricate and sophisticated machinery of administration set out in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Shriram Maheshwari, on the other hand, has tried to trace it in his *Evolution of the Indian Administration* since 1858 through a chronological linking of the various government reports on administration. It contains summaries of important reports on the Indian administrative system. The author has, however, not made any attempt at a historical analysis of the various stages in the growth of the Indian administration and the impact of one over the other. It is, at best, only a compendium of the summaries of various governmental reports. B.S. Khanna's *Trends in Public Administration since the Transfer of Power* (Hoshiarpur, 1955) is an attempt to study the emerging trends in public administration in India in the perspective of historical development. B. Abraham's *Central Administration in India between* 1906-1958 (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad University, 1965) traces the evolution of Indian administrative system through historical analysis.

The impact of the British Administration on the Indian system has also been a subject of study. This indeed seems to be a very fruitful exercise in the historical methodology. Bernard S. Cohn's *The Development and Impact of British Administration in India: A Bibliographic Essay* (New Delhi, 1961), is an attempt at a detailed review of the literature from the Moghuls to the British India dealing with various aspects of history. M. Ruthnaswamy's *Some Influences that made the British Administrative System in India* (London, 1939), was perhaps the first attempt at a critical examination and analysis of the underlying principles of the administrative system of India by a political scientist. V. Subramaniam's "Indo-British Legacy in Administration: Its Dialectic and Dilemmas", *IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 266-76, is a brief

but a penetrating analysis of the legacy of the Indo-British administrative system, which was fashioned on a cross between the older patchy element of eastern proto-democracy and the western ideas of the British administrators from the early period of East India Company. The author contends that the Indo-British dialectic was the more elaborate and fruitful in regard to administrative evolution. It was of importance for those outside India as its results were either deliberately transplanted or deliberately injected in all British territories of the colonial administrators there. The article is one of the examples of how the historical methodology in research could be fruitfully employed to establish certain theoretical framework and a common plane on which other systems of the same time could also be studied and examined.

Several other works like S. S. Basawanal and K. R. S. Iyengar's *A Handbook of Indian Administration (under the Government of India Act*, 1935) (Bombay, 2nd edn., 1939); M.R. Palande's *Introduction to Indian Administration* (Bombay, 1951); Asok Chanda's *Indian Administration* (London, 1967); and IIPA's *The Organization of Government of India* (Bombay, 1958 and 1971) have also used historical methods to trace the development of certain aspect of administration in India, but are mostly descriptive and written in textbook style. However, N. C. Roy's *A Critical Study of Some Aspects of Public Administration in Bengal* (Calcutta, 1945) is different as it gives us a critical analysis of Rowland's Committee Report on the Administration of Bengal in 1945. Some other works dealing with different aspects of administration are: R.S. Jain's *The Growth and Development of Governor-General's Executive Council*, 1858-1919 (Delhi, 1967); Debidas Roy's *Food Administration in East India* (1939-1950) (Santiniketan, Vishwa Bharti, 1958); and A. S. Gupta's *Police Reforms in India* 1857-1957 (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad, 1965).

State and Provincial Administration

Administration of Indian states before independence has also been the theme of various writers. Happily, many of these who undertook the studies were not historians but students of political science who had some knowledge of the structure and processes of administration. *Mysore Administration* (1922-1926): *A Review in Eleven Chapters*, written by anonymous author in journalistic style gives an idea of the system of those days. K. N. V. Sastri's *An Introduction to the History of the Administration of Mysore* (Mysore, Vasley Press, 1937), is a much better work on the same subject attempted by a reputed scholar. P.N. Masaldan's *Provincial Autonomy and its Working in the United Provinces* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1942), was an attempt at an analysis of the working of provincial autonomy in the UP in historical perspective. Harnam Singh's *Government and Administration of Jammu and*

Kashmir State (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1943), was the first, which set up a model, for the study of state administrations for other researchers. A student of political science rather than of history, the author has made good use of the historical method for an analysis of the background for the development of various administrative institutions and has tried to analyse the relationships of various structures of government and administration. Subsequently, I. D. Sharma, C.A. Perumal and R.M. Joshi undertook the studies on *Government and Administration of Baroda* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1948), *Some Aspects of Administration of Travancore-Cochin* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1961), and *Administrative Set-up in Rajasthan* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1963), respectively. Mention may also be made of N.V. Rajkumar's *Education and Working of the Government in Travancore* (1940), K. C. Markandan's *Administration of the North-Western Frontier Province* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad University, 1950), R.C. Verma's *Provincial Administration in India* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad University, 1951); S.P. Bhargava's *Some Aspects of the Administration of C. P. and Berar* 1861-1930) (Ph.D. Thesis, Nagpur University, 1951), P.D. Kashliwal's *Administrative System of Jaipur Since* 1800 (Ph.D. Thesis, Jaipur University, 1951), T. V. Mahalingam's *Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagar* (Ph.D. Thesis, Madras University, 1955), Narender K. Lackanpal's *The Governor of Punjab from* 1937 *to* 1947 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Punjab) K.B.L. Gupta's *The Evolution of Administration of the Former Bharatpur State*, 1722-1947 (Ph.D. Thesis, Rajasthan University, 1961), B. P. Gupta's *Growth of Administration in Bikaner State*, 1818-1947 (Ph.D. Thesis, Rajasthan University, 1961), and N.R. Visalakshi's *Growth of Public Services in Madras State* (Ph.D. Thesis, Madras University, 1962). M. Zaheer and Jagdeo Gupta's *The Organization of the Governmen of Uttar Pradesh: A Study of State Administration* (Delhi, 1970), though regarded as a descriptive study of the present structure of administration in the State, has an additional value inasmuch as the authors have used the historical method in tracing the evolution of each of the departments of the state administration. The first section of the first chapter is an account of the administrative history of the UP Government since the death of Aurangzeb. E.N. Mangat Rai's *Civil Administration in the Punjab* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) is an analytical account of the state administration in India in which the author, a member of the Indian Civil Service, has raised a number of problems common to states in India and has discussed them from the point of view of an administrator. The first chapter in this volume gives a historical account of the development of administration in Punjab. G.S. Halappa's edited volume on *Studies in Administration* contains two essays on "Administrative Evolution in Karnataka" and "History of Recruitment in Mysore", which have used

the historical method, and R.J. Rebello's 'Mysore Secretariat' contains a very brief description of its evolution.

Historical methodology has also been used by many others who have been concerned with the study of individual aspects or institutions of the present-day Indian administration, but have thought it proper to trace the growth of such institutions in their historical perspectives. Thus, H.N. Kak's "Decentralization of Police Administration", *IJPA*, Vol. VIII (1962), pp. 40-51; N. Srinivasan's "Changes in Central Ministries and Departments Since Independence", *IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 384-395; A.R. Tyagi's *Rights and Obligations of Civil Servants in India* (Delhi, 1961); Vidya Bhushan's *Prison Administration in India (with Special Reference to Uttar Pradesh)* (Delhi 1970); C. P. Bhambri's *Parliamentary Control over State Enterprises in India* (Delhi 1960); T. R. Sharma's *The Working of State Enterprises in India* (Bombay 1961); A. Premchand's *The Control of Public Expenditure in India* (New Delhi, 1963); R.K. Jain's *Management of State Enterprises in India : A Study of the Organization and Management of Public Sector Enterprises in Indian Setting* (Bombay, 1967); S. Bhattacharya's *Financial Foundations of the British Raj* (Simla, 1970) and many others fall in the same category. In the last mentioned work, the author has used the historical method to study the people and ideas "whose interactions produced the financial policies with which the British unpinned their raj in an era of reconstruction and consolidation after the upheavals of 1857". Its backbone is an investigation of the structure of public finance, as remodelled by Wilson (the first Finance Member of the Viceroy's Council appointed in 1859) and his successors, an analysi of government revenue and expenditure, and a summary of contemporary Indian and British attitudes to India's economic state. Amba Prasad's *Indian Railways: A Study in Public Utility Administration* (Bombay, 1960), is, however, distinct. Although it is mainly an attempt to study the Indian railway administration and its history and progress during the modern times, "the history has been presented in the light of sound principles of public utility administration and with a view to studying the record of performance of the various systems of management which prevailed in India during the period, especially state management and company management and of the administration as a whole...Taking into consideration the lesson of the past history of railway administration in India, its present requirements and possible future developments, the kind of reorganization needed has been suggested. The study is thus a two-fold attempt at analysis of the different phases of organization and operation and also of interpretation."[7]

[7]Amba Prasad, *Indian Railways: A Study in Public Utility Administration*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. vii.

Civil Service

An administrative institution that has received a much wider and a deeper attention at the hands of historians, civil servants and political scientists is the Indian Civil Service. All the writers have used the historical methodology in the treatment of their themes though with varied emphasis and different objectives. L. S. S. O'Malley's *The Indian Civil Service* 1601-1930 (London, 1931) is a historical account of the development of the Indian Civil Service during 1601-1930. It has touched almost all the aspects relating to selection, training and attempts and effects of Indianization on the civil services. Sir Edward Blunt's *The Indian Civil Service* (London, 1937); Sir Evan Maconocochie's *Life in Indian Civil Service* (London 1929); and C.A. Kincaid's *Forty-Four Years A Public Servant* (Edinburgh, 1934) are all written by ex-civil servants. Their attempt has been to describe the stresses and strains, joys and sorrows, the aura of authority surrounding the civil servants of the British Government in India, as also to depict the prevailing social conditions of India of that period. The two works in the field, which are regarded as classics are by Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders* (London, 1953) and *The Guardians* (London, 1954). The author has made use of the historical method to analyse the nature, the qualities and the character of the men, who ruled India from under the Moghuls (1600-1751), the Revolution (1751-1798), the Golden Age (1798-1858), and the British Crown in India (1858-1909). The author has in these volumes traced the story of the administrators of the British Crown against a background of political change and of growing complexity in the business of government in the following words: "a caste of Guardians who had been amateur despots expert in nothing or everything, answerable in practice mainly to themselves, foreign to the country they ruled—transformed themselves into a modern civil service, indigenous and answerable to a legislature. While they did this, they used to carry on a surreptitious, intermittent and undeclared civil war with the people to whom they were handing over power and whom they were supposed to be training for responsibility. At the same time they could never lose sight of their first main task, which was to preserve order, to keep chaos at bay." Here is an example of how historical method can be used to describe vividly the character and influence of a whole class of personnel in the changing perspectives of the times.

H.N. Kunzru's *The Public Service in India* (Allahabad, 1917); R. Dwarkadas' *Role of Higher Civil Service in India* (Bombay. 1958); N. C. Roy's *The Civil Service in India* (Calcutta, 1958); G.P. Srivastava's *The Indian Civil Service : A Study in Administrative Personnel* (Delhi, 1965); V.M. Sinha's *The Problem of Re-organization of Superior Civil Service in India* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sagar, 1957); K. M.

Panikkar's *Civil Services, History and Problems* (Bombay, 1955) and R.N. Thakur's *All India Services : A Study of Their Origin and Growth* (Muzaffarpur, 1963), are some other works in which the use of historical method has been made by Indian authors to analyse the role, the structure, the recruitment and training of the ICS in India, Kewal L. Panjabi's *The Civil Servant in India* (Bombay, 1965) is the first collection of memoirs of 20 members of the Indian Civil Service, which depicts the various kinds of experiences that the Indian members of the ICS had to encounter during their career. N.B. Bonarjee's *Under Two Masters* (Calcutta, 1970) is an account of the experiences of an Indian civil servant who served both the British Government and the Government of Independent India and has very aptly brought out the differences in the approach and attitude of the officials during the times of the British and after independence. He has also dealt with the interaction of politics and bureaucracy after independence, although it may be said to be a highly personalized and a subjective account. Terence Greagh Coen's *The Indian Political Service* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1971), is a very good study undertaken through historical and analytical method to trace the origin and growth of a select band of specialized body of about 150 British officers during 1783-1947, who were responsible to safeguard the British interests in the Indian states. It is indeed a penetrating analysis of the system of 'Indirect Rule' in India through the historical analysis of the structure, role and the background of the members of this band of officials.

District Administration

Besides the civil service, another administrative institution which has received the greatest attention at the hands of the researchers is district administration in India with particular reference to the role of the collector. Almost all the works on the subject have made use of the historical method either to trace the evolution of the administrative system since the time of its inception to the present day or to make a contrast in the role of the district officer of the olden times and the modern times. S.S. Khera's *District Administration in India* (Bombay, 1962), and other works on the subject had the same approach. A recent study by S. K. Sharma on *Deputy Commissioner in Punjab* (New Delhi, 1971), has also included a full chapter on the historical development of the office of the Deputy Commissioner right from the times of the Vedas. However, his approach has been purely descriptive and provides some sort of historical perspective to the present-day operations of the Deputy Commissioner. A good number of articles, some based on primary and others on secondary sources, have also appeared in various journals, M.P. Pai's "The Emerging Role of the Collector", *IJPA*, Vol. VIII (1962), pp. 478-488; D.P. Verma's "The

Changing Role of the District Officer, 1864-1960", *The Research Bulletin of the University of Panjab*, Vol. 43, 1963; A. Avasthi's "The Changing Role of the Collectors/Deputy Commissioners", in A. Avasthi and S.N. Verma (*eds.*), *Aspects of Administration* (New Delhi, 1964) are all based on secondary sources. B.B. Misra's "The Evolution of the Office of Collector 1770-1947", *IJPA*, Vol. XI (1965), pp. 345-375; Chittaranjan Sinha's "Evaluation of Judicial Functions of the Collectors in Bengal Presidency", *IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 875-897; Henry Maddick's "The Present and Future Role of the Collectors in India", *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1963), pp. 75-87: and Haridwar Rai, "The Changing Role of the the District Officer", *IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 238-257, have all utilized primary source material to discuss the changing role of one of the most important officers in the British administrative system with a view to analysing his future role in the context of independence and changing circumstances. The historical method has also been utilized in some writings to interpret the various facets of the administration of a district in India in the perspective of modern administrative principles and terminology. Haridwar Rai's following articles: "The District Officer in India Today", *Journal of Administration Overseas* (London), Vol. 6, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 13-27;"Dual Control of Law and Order Administration in India: A Study in Magistracy and Police Relationship" *IJPA*, Vol. XIII (1967), pp. 43-64; "District Magistrate and Police Superintendent in India: The Controversy of Dual Control", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 1967), pp. 192-99; "Helping the District Officer in India", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1969), pp. 26-37; "Paternalism in Indian Administration: The Non-Regulation System of Field Administration under the British", *IJPA*, Vol. XV (1969), pp. 193-211; "Politico-Administrative Bases of Indian Field Administration", *IJPA*, Vol. XVI (1970), pp. 457-486; and "Areas of Fied Administration in India" in K.R. Bombwall and L. P. Choudhry's (eds.), *Aspects of Democratic Government and Politics in India* (Delhi, 1968); and A.K. Ghosal's "Changing Patterns of District Administration" in India, in Bombwall and Choudhry's above mentioned book, are all indicative of the trend of establishing institutional functional relationship in historical perspective.

AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY

This brief survey of the literature on Indian public administration, based on historical methods leads us to various conclusions. While there seems to be no dearth of primary sources and research material on Indian administration, particularly relating to the British period, it appears (barring a few exceptions) that the material has been utilized

primarily by historians whose main concern was to give an account of the kind of administrative practices or structural institutions obtaining in a particular period of Indian history. These scholars had no basic training in the theory and pratice of public administration and naturally, therefore, their main emphasis has been only on the descriptive account of administrative machinery in a chronological order. The description of the administrative apparatus and procedures in isolation with other organs of government and without proper evaluation of the kind of pressures and circumstances which influenced the growth of such apparatus compels us to infer that most of the authors proceeded in their historical research on the assumption that there was a dichotomy between policy and administration, for in almost all studies we do not come across a proper evaluation of how the administrative machinery was able to influence the processes of decision-making and policy-formulation.

Historical method has recently been increasingly used by political scientists and students of public administration. But their attempts have been merely confined to provide us with a background for any particular administrative phenomenon or institution. The method has not been used by many to interpret the past institutions to see if there was a 'system' in their evolution to provide the basis for any indigenous administrative theory.

The utility of historical method in public administration primarily lies in an analysis of changes through a period of time and in the efforts to evolve a pattern of analytical study whereby the antecedents of a particular administrative procedure or institution can be related to some other factors other than the purely chronological ones. This may not be an easy exercise, but at the same time it has not been tried by students of public administration in India. Nor has there been an attempt to study the transitions from one historical phase to another except in a few studies, that were written just before independence.

In terms of areas of administration, it is evident from the above-mentioned analysis, that only a few institutions in the Indian administrative system, *e.g.*, the civil service, the district administration, and the revenue administration have come for attention, other areas of administration have mostly been neglected in terms of historical research. For example, except for Misra's book, there is no comprehensive study of the British administration in India on the model undertaken by Leonard D. White in his books *The Federalists*, *The Jeffersons* and *The Jacksonians* and *The Republican Era* 1869-1901 (New York, 1948, 1951, 1954 and 1958). Besides giving an account of the history of Federal administration of the United States of America in these volumes, White sought to make a systematic study of American ideas about public administration, and to explore the origin and growth of the opinions that Americans now possess about public management in the light of prevailing values

and events, personalities and institutions, from which they were largely derived. This kind of approach in the use of historical methodology is to a large extent, absent from a majority of volumes on the administrative history of India. Neither these works attempt to depict the characteristics of society, the flow of events and the quality of personalities nor have they placed emphasis on the practical problems of government and the formulation of ideas as these problems were surmounted. Further, no attempt has been made to study the 'administrative reforms' in different aspects of administration. Studies on history of functional administration in various phases are also conspicuous by their absence. For example, Personnel Administration, Financial Administration, Administration of Justic, Law and Order, etc., provide various aspects where historical researches are still lacking.

Administration of Indian states and a comprehensive study of indigenous administrative institutions, and the impact of British administration on the administration of princely states in India, provide another area where historical method could be fruitfully applied in public administration. It is time that researches in these fields are undertaken before the rich material in the possession of 'Princes' in India is either destroyed or meets its natural destruction through negligence. For example, a study on the 'Administrative Institution of Indian States and their Working' would, I am sure, prove to be both interesting and illuminating.

A growing trend that is being witnessed in India today is that many erstwhile public servants, including the military officials, have started writing their memoirs giving the inside story of the decision-making process. While such accounts tend to be subjective, yet they provide basic research material for scholars to interpret the interaction of bureaucratic, political and other factors in the processes of policy formulation and decision-making in historical perspective. One hopes that this trend would also catch the attention of the civil servants and the politicians who could, through their memoirs, provide a good amount of research material for future scholars concerned with the study of administrative phenomenon in historical perspective and for the development of various case studies for professional administrators.

Finally, it can be said that historical method has still its potentialities and is an effective tool to understand the administrative institutions and processes in their full perspective. But this method has been utilised by the students of public administration more as a sort of introductory approach to study such institutions and no attempt has been undertaken by them to establish a more meaningful framework of analysis and interpretation of the past institutions in the perspective of the prevailing theories and terminology of the discipline of public administration.

COMPARATIVE METHOD

The study of public administration through comparative method opens up immense possibilities of fruitful and meaningful research. However, in contrast to the historical method, this has been utilized on a very small scale by the researchers in India. The reason is that the significance of comparative method of research has not been fully understood by many students of public administration. Most of the works that have been published in the name of comparative studies are no more than a juxtaposition of the account of one institution in a particular country over the account of the same institution in another country. Most other works in the field give an account of a foreign institution or practice and in the end make a small comment comparing it with some such similar institution in India without adequately taking into consideration the range of variables and the cross-cultural patterns which make the analysis difficult, if not impossible.

Cross-National Studies

Two major works, which have incorporated the comparative method of research in a cross-national perspective are R.B. Jain's *A Comparative Study of the United States Civil Service Commission and the Union Public Service Commission in India* (Ph.D. Thesis, Indian School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1969); and D.N. Bhalla's *The Damodar Valley Corporation: A Study of the Transplantation of Foreign Administrative Institutions into India* (Den Haag, 1969). The former studies the system of personnel administration in the two countries. It is not merely a study of the structural organizations of the two agencies, but it also attempts to analyse the similarities and differences in the role and functions of the two agencies and their overall impact on the system of personnel administration. In making this comparison, the author's aim has been to explore the possibilities of reforms in the system of personnel administration in India in the background of a more mature system of the USA, recognizing, however, the historical, constitutional, social, cultural and economic factors that have conditioned the working of these institutions in their national settings. The study is based on the first-hand researches conducted by the author at the United States' Civil Service Commission and the British Civil Service Commission. Similarly, Bhalla's work analyses the experiment of the transplantation of the Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA) model in the United States for the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) in India and examines various political, ecological and cultural factors. This is perhaps the first study which has attempted to evaluate the impact of the ecological and social factors on the working of 'imposed structures' borrowed from outside the country. N.P. Nair's

doctoral dissertation on *Administration of Foreign Affairs in India : with Comparative Study of Britain* Ph. D. Thesis, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1966) is an attempt to understand the organization for the administration of foreign affairs in India in the perspective of the British experience.

Other works, such as IIPA's *Staff Councils in UK and India* (IIPA, 1960); *A Study of Personnel Systems in South East and Far East Asia* by J. N. Khosla and Ajit Banerjee (IIPA, 1963); C. N. Bhalerao's *Public Service Commissions of India : A Study* (Delhi, 1966); A.R. Tyagi's *Civil Service in Developing Democracy* (Delhi, 1969); and M.P. Jain's *Lok Pal* (Delhi, 1971), have also incorporated the comparative method of study. But mostly these efforts have been confined to the description or working of the various institutions in different countries without having a common framework of analysis or a theoretical hypothesis to test with respect to several countries. In most cases, the description of the institutions in one country is interposed on the other and the narration has not even taken into consideration the peculiar characteristics of each of such institutions which govern their functioning.

Textbooks on Public Administration

A number of textbooks that have appeared in the market on public administration written by Indian authors purporting to carry a comparative account of the system of public administration in many countries, specially the UK, the USA, and France. Some of these works are: A. Avasthi and S. R. Maheshwari, *Public Administration* (Agra, 1971); C.P. Bhambhri, *Public Administration: Theory and Practice* (Meerut, 1960); S. R. Nigam, *Principles of Public Administration* (Allahabad, 1965); M. Ruthnaswamy, *Principles and Practice of Public Administration* (Allahabad, 1962); D.R. Sachdeva and Vidya Bhushan, *A Textbook of Public Administration* (Delhi, 1961); V.P. Singh, *Lok Prashasan* (Delhi, 1961); Parmatma Sharan, *Public Administration: A Text Book for University Classes* (Agra, 1962); M. P. Sharma, *Public Administration in Theory and Practice* (Allahabad, 1963); and A. R. Tyagi, *Public Administration: Principles and Practice* (Delhi, 1966). All these books have one thing in common, that is, they have relied very heavily on standard textbooks published abroad, and while they try to pack in a good deal of information about different administrative systems, there is no common framework for analysis. It is here that the comparative method of study can be fruitfully employed to develop a textbook on public administration, which will incorporate the development of the concepts and practices of public administration in India in the light of such developments in other countries. The major thrust could be centred on the testing of the so-called universal

generalizations about public administration with reference to the Indian situation, and in the light of a comparative study of varying national and social characteristics of certain nations, to determine what aspects of public administration, if any, have no bearing on the national and social setting.

Certain other books, which deal with one aspect or a functional area of public administration also claim to have adopted a comparative approach to their studies. But, in fact, they more or less follow the same textbook type approach, with certain exceptions and consequently suffer from the same defects. Some of the works falling in this category are : R.C. Agrawala, *Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution and Administration* (New Delhi, 1966); P.K. Wattal *Parliamentary Financial Control in India* (Bombay, 1962); C. P. Bhambhri, *Parliamentary Control Over Finance in India* (Meerut, 1959); R. N. Aggarwala, *Financial Committees in Indian Parliament* (Delhi, 1966.; D. K. Sinha, *Working of Public Corporations in India* (Allahabad, 1966); A. K. Murdheshwar, *Administrative Problems of Nationalization: With Special Reference to Indian State Enterprises* (Bombay, 1957); S. S. Khera, *Government in Business* (Bombay, 1963); Nabagopal Das, *The Public Sector in India* (Bombay, 1966); Om Prakash, *The Theory and Working of State Corporations with Special Reference to India* (London, 1962); R. S. Arora, *Administration of Government Industries* (New Delhi, 1969); D. S. Ganguly, *Public Corporations in a National Economy; With Special Reference to India* (Calcutta, 1963); S. L. Shakdher, *Budgetary System in Various Countries* (New Delhi, 1957); J. S. Bhalla, *Public Enterprises in UK, USA and India* (Bombay, 1969); and S. R. Nigam, *Local Government in India* (Allahabad, 1968).

Comparative Methods in Government Reports

The technique of using comparisons also finds expression in practically all the reports and studies made by the Parliamentary Committees or special commissions and investigatory bodies appointed by the Government from time to time. A survey of the numerous *Estimates Committee Reports* on various aspects of administration would bear testimony to this fact. Similarly, the *First and Second Pay Commissions' Report* (1950 and 1959), the *Reports of the Law Commission* (1959 and 1971) *Report of the Committee on the Indian Foreign Service* (1966 , and the *Report of the Study Teams of Administrative Reforms Commissions* on different aspects of government administration in India invariably carry a good number of pages describing the practices and procedures in different countries corresponding to the aspects dealt with in the Reports. A.V. Seshanna is understood to have undertaken a detailed study of the civil service in seven different countries for the *Third Pay Commission Report* expected to be out in 1972. All these

are merely efforts to acquaint the personnel of those bodies or commissions with the situation in some foreign countries with a view to helping them arrive at certain conclusions with reference to the processes or institutions under review. Very few of such studies have attempted to analyse deeply the situation in other countries with the perspective of cross-cultural and environmental differences. Although the importance of such studies in the reports cannot be minimized, this being a common technique followed in other countries (*e.g.*, the studies of the various civil service systems (USA, France, etc.) undertaken by the Fulton Committee while formulating their *Report on the Civil Service* (London, 1968), yet they can hardly be called true comparative studies in terms of academic research.

Periodical Literature

Comparative method has also been adopted in many articles published in some of the Indian Journals. While there are a large number of articles, which deal with the study or analysis of the functioning of some aspects of public administration in other countries (which have not been taken into consideration for the purposes of this article as these fall outside its scope), studies in comparative administration are still few. Perhaps the first article on the study of "Comparative Public Administration" in India was by Paul H. Appleby [*IJPA*, Vol. I (1955), pp. 3-7], in which the author raised certain theoretical problems, *e.g.*, identifying substantial elements of kinship between the systems, importance of culture and ecology of public administration and the terminological problems in the study of comparative public administration. R. S. Milne's *Concepts and Models in Public Administration* (IIPA, 1966), deals with the whole history and implications of the movement on comparative public administration. While V. Subramaniam's "Middle Range Models in Comparative Administrative Ssudies", [*IJPA*, Vol. X (1964), pp. 625-630] discusses the theoretical basis of Rigg's Agraria and Industrial models and points out that institutional comparisons are *prima facie* pointless and a total understanding of each new society was required before one could begin to make comparisons. V.A. Pai Panandikar's "Public Administration in Asian Countries", [*IJPA*, Vol. 16 (1970), pp. 13-23] is an analytical study of the developments in public administration in Asian countries and highlights some of the important neglected dimensions of public administration in general which are common to most of the countries in the region. Similarly, A.T.A. Rahman's "Theories of Administrative and Political Development and Rural Institutions in India and Pakistan", [*Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 8 (October 1969), pp. 243-256] deals with the rural institutions of the two countries in the framework of developmental administration.

On the institutional aspects, various comparisons have been attempted. Bureaucracy and the civil service have been the favourite themes of most of the writers. Wallace S. Sayre's "Bureaucracies: Some Contrasts in Systems", [*IJPA*, Vol. X (1964), pp. 219-229], and O. Glenn Stahl's "Of Jobs and Men", [*IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 256-265] are the two articles which discuss the basic contrasts in the bureaucratic systems with reference to practices in the USA and Britain (and India). C.P. Bhambhri's "The Indian Foreign Service" [*Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 7 (October 1968), pp. 528-5 7]; Lynton K. Caldwell's "Education and Training for Public Administration—Some Contemporary Trends" [*IJPA*, Vol. V (1959), pp. 261-273]; J. W. L. "Henley and Hyderabad" [*IJPA* Vol. IV (1958), pp. 66-78]; S. Lall, Adams, "Civil Service Neutrality", *IJPA*, Vol. IV (1958), pp. 1-13]; S.R. Maheshwari's "Employment of Retired Government Officials in India" [*IJPA*, Vol. XII (1966), pp. 232-254]; R.A. Deshpande's "Organisation and Functions of Public Service Commissions: A Comparative Study"—I & II [*Civic Affairs*, Vol. 8 (1960), No. 3, pp. 22-28, and No. 4, pp. 13-21]; C. N. Bhalerao, "The UPSC (India) and US Civil Service Commission" [*Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13 (1957), pp. 216-28]; and R.B. Jain's "The United States Civil Service Commission: Its Place in the Machinery of Government" [*IJPA*, Vol. XVII (1971), pp. 86-116], by and large, seem to follow the conventional approach to the study of the administrative institutions on a comparative basis, although some of these have also referred to the factors other than the institutional and structural ones, which affect the working of such institutions in different countries.

Some other articles falling in the same category, but dealing with other institutions of public administration are: Laxmi Narain, "Constitution of the Governing Boards of Public Enterprises", [*IJPA*, Vol. VIII (1962), pp. 18-39]; H.K. Paranjape's "Political Rights of Public Sector Employees" [*IJPA*, Vol. VI (1960), pp. 339-361]; Richard E. Hamilton, "Damodar Valley Corporation: India's Experiment with the TVA Model", [*IJPA*, Vol. XV (1969) pp. 86-109] relating to the public sector; S.L. Shakdher, "The Estimates Committees", [*IJPA*, Vol. V. (1959), pp. 388-401, and Vol. VI 1960), pp. 16-26]; K. L. Handa, "Rationale of the Indian Financial Year", [*IJPA*, Vol. XVI (1970), pp. 220-233]; and S.L. Shakdher, "Comptroller & Auditor General of India and the UK—A Comparison" [*IJPA*, Vol. IV (1958) pp. 393-410], in the field of financial administration: D.G. Karve's "Police Administration in India—A Reappraisal of the Aims and Means" [*IJPA*, Vol. II (1956), pp. 307-315]; Kailash Prakash, "Service at the Post Office Counters in the United Kingdom and India: A Comparative Review", [*IJPA*, Vol. X (1964), pp. 73-87]; Shanker P. Mukherji, "Government Without Tears—A Survey" [*IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 277-307); and S. N. Chaturvedi,

"Machinery for Redress of Grievances" [*IJPA*, Vol. XII (1966), pp. 636-655], are some of the articles dealing with services rendered to the public and the procedure of citizen's grievances in various countries.

B.S. Khanna's "The Training of Administrative Services in India" [*IJPA*, Vol. I (1955), pp. 359-360]; A. Avasthi's Organization and Management—The States", [*IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 469-490]; Jitendra Singh, "The Administrative Reform Report of the States—A Content Analysis" [*IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 491-513]; IIPA, "Collector in the Nineteen Sixties", [*IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1965)] are some of the prominent works which attempt to deal with the comparison of administrative institutions and processes in the regional framework—an approach which could lead to some fruitful research in Indian situation.

In the empirical-comparative analysis, a recent article which deserves special mention is Kuldeep Mathur's "Administrative Mind in a Developing Nation: An Empirical Exploration", [*IJPA*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (1970), pp. 575-96]. This article is an attempt "to investigate the behavioural orientations of the developmental bureaucrats in India", and "to evaluate their perceptions of the outstanding behaviours and practices of the public administration system".

In his comparative analysis, he has, at the outset, identified certain geographical, socio-economical, and political factors which present a different background for the Block Development Officers (BDOs) of two different States. In the background of such differences, he has through the factor-analysis technique, attempted to develop the major dimensions of bureaucratic thinking and perceptions so as to establish an empirical pattern of the reactions of the bureaucrats to the changing environments. He has further attempted to develop a typology and a profile of the local administrators in a near-similar cultural pattern and to find out the differences in the perception and reactions of the bureaucrats of one State from the other and to correlate such differences. For such an analysis, the author has used the computer technique to develop the profiles of the bureaucrats and has employed discriminant analysis method to find out whether the BDOs differ in the two states along the perception-dimensions.

The author's effort in this direction furnishes a refreshing analysis of the different behavioural patterns of two groups of the same class of officials in two geographical settings having different socio-economic and political background. He has attempted to prove that the differences in their behaviour pattern were not only due to their different socio-economic and political settings but also reflected the differences of their educational background, recruitment and training methods.

Dr. Mathur's attempt at a comparative analysis of the perceptions of the same level of local administrative officials in two adjoining states in India is a modelthat could be followed for similar enquiries in other

aspects of administrative phenomena and at other levels of state administration. Much of the comparative analysis today must be based on empirical techniques and tools of research. Dr. Mathur's model could furnish an insight in the various patterns of interactions of politics and bureaucracy and the perceptions and attitudes of the officials at every level of administration in relation to their work, motivational factors and in evaluating the moral of employees at every level of administration. Similarly, one could also conduct enquiries into the attitudes and perceptions of various citizens' bodies and the various social and economic groupings towards bureaucracy, bureaucratic decisions and their expectations of the bureaucrats in terms of goal achievements. Dr. Mathur's study should certainly inspire further research work in the vast panorama of similar cultural patterns of State Governments in India which furnish a good ruberic for comparative analysis. However, one is rather sceptical in the success of this model in culturally different situations, unless one is careful first to analyse how far the cultural differences have a correlation with the differences in the perceptions of the officials belonging to different regions.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW

The rapid survey of the literature on comparative public administration undertaken above indicates a very limited use of the comparative method of research in a scientific and comprehensive manner by Indian scholars. It shall not be an exaggeration to say that there has been a little understanding and significance of the use of comparative method of the study of public administration in India. The three dimensions of comparative research, *viz.*, the vertical comparison—comparison between national administrative phenomena and regional or local administrative phenomena—and the horizontal comparison—analysis of administrative processes over a period of time, and the study of administrative institutions and processes across national boundaries with new orientation and approach—have yet to be fully explored by the scholars of comparative public administration in India.

Comparative public administration delineates an area of concern and a methodological orientation that differ from the traditional approach of merely juxtaposing the description of a number of similar institutions in different countries at one place. It offers to study the administrative processes and organizations for the purpose of answering common problems and questions. It attempts to identify the characteristics of various administrations in terms of certain established analytical categories in the light of which identification of administration phenomena becomes probable for as many administrative systems as possible. It purports to examine not only similarities and differences in the norms,

institutions, and behaviour of administration, but also accounts for them and aims towards the development of a body of knowledge in the light of which predictions of trends and policy recommendations can be made. It is in this sense that it becomes a matrix from which theories emerge and at the same time serves as a laboratory for their testing. As Prof. Dwight Waldo has put it.

> To compare is to examine similarities and differences simultaneously, the effort is bent forward to two main ends: (1) to discover, define and differentiate the stuff (politics or administration) to be compared, wherever in the world it may be; and (2) to develop criteria of differentiation that are useful in ordering and analyzing the 'stuff' once it has been identified. In this task, the contemporary stock of provoked or fashionable concepts in the social sciences (as well as those 'indigenous' to Political Science) has been drawn upon extensively. The works of Weber and Parsons, structure-functionalism as conceived in various sources, the concept of culture, the decision-making scheme, communications theory and cybernetics, systems theory—all these and several more sources have been drawn upon by both movements.[8]

PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

Evidently, this kind of approach to the study of public administration is fraught with many difficulties. The basic problem is of the competence in comparative research methodology. But that is not the only problem. Even if it is assumed that a researcher is in know of the comparative methods of study, there is always the difficulty of 'models building', *i.e.*, to choose between various concepts and models of comparative research or to develop a theory or hypothesis, around which a generalization applicable to many administrative systems could be built and tested.

Besides, an Indian scholar, in particular, faces the difficulties in respect of the availability of data and material particularly across national frontiers. The prohibitive cost and the time involved may itself deter a researcher to venture in this direction. Further, there are difficulties arising from the nature of data, which some governments may regard as confidential and therefore, may not be easily available to a researcher. There are other difficulties which arise from the range and nature of variables which have to be used in the study of compara-

[8]Dwight Waldo, *Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Performance, Problems and Promise* (Symposium on Business Policy, April 8-11, 1963, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University), pp. 10-11, (mimeo).

tive administration. Some variables are just incapable of precise measurement. A researcher may use certain 'general' or 'cross-national' variables (*e.g.*, psychological or socio-economic), but the unique character of each administrative policy and organization has, in some form, to be measured, if comparisons are realistically to account for the presence of a particular type of administrative phenomenon. Difficulties also arise from the interplay and inter-relationships between the norms, structures, and behaviour of the administrative systems. Models and theories must take into account all of these factors. Further, any meaningful comparative research must take into account the study of the societies as a whole which are sought to be subjected to comparative analysis. Obviously, this means that an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of administrative phenomena has to be made. In India, study of public administration through an inter-disciplinary approach has yet to begin on a serious footing. This in itself is a big handicap for a researcher in this country to undertake research through camparative method. It is, therefore, not surprising that the models should be difficult to build and that the researchers have found this method of research even more difficult than the empirical or behavioural approach, techniques of which to some extent have been perfected.

AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH THROUGH COMPARATIVE METHOD

The list of difficulties presented above does not suggest that comparative research in India is not possible, or there are no avenues where research on a comparative plane is feasible, Indeed, the national frontiers of India present a veritable paradise for researchers in comparative administration.

In the first place, there is ample scope of comparative research in various administrations of states and Union territories in India. The socio-economic, ecological and cultural factors, which are to certain extent similar and to certain other extent diverse in various regions of the country, present a challenge to a researcher to make a scientific inquiry into the study of administrative institutions, programme administration and policy implementation on regional basis. An enquiry into the causes of dynamism through which the same institutions work in a particular territory or a state and the slow pace at which they work in other regions would be a worthwhile focus for attention for improvement of administrative organizations in various states and Union territories. The more the states or Union territories are included in the survey, the more is the possibility of "administrative theory-building through empirically-tested generalizations about Indian Administration". Such a research undertaken by Indian scholars would also obviate the subjective element that is likely to crop up in researchers who are

exposed to their own political culture, *e.g.*, of the western type. With some imaginative and concentrated efforts on the part of the professional institutions and universities, a unified programme to study various administrative phenomena on cross-regional basis could perhaps be drawn. This will help build up a substantial amount of literature on the basis of which the future researchers may develop improved research models for comparative study.

Seconly, there is considerable scope for researches with a comparative approach in respect of policy and programme administration in public and private settings. This will especially be fruitful in the comparison of the performances of public enterprises with private enterprises, particularly with reference to the same industry. The development of public sector on an unprecedented scale has confronted the government with the problem of running those enterprises on a basis in which they could generate sufficient dividends necessary for the establishment of a socialist welfare state. The horizontal studies over a period of time of nationalized industries (*e.g.*, it would be interesting to compare the performance of banking industry before nationalization and after nationalization over a period of time along with a comparison, say for example, with regard to consumer satisfaction, of the banks in private and public sectors, would indeed be meaningful and logical.

Thirdly, vertical comparisons of various aspects of functional administration between the national, regional and local governments open an extensive field for researchers. It is generally admitted that the administration at regional and local levels is weaker as compared to the national level. This may perhaps be a universal phenomenon. In Indian context, however, it would be fruitful to undertake such exercises with a view to locating the factors which hamper the growth of sound administrative practices in many areas. The combination of comparative method with empirical analysis will, it may be hoped, solve many bottlenecks of administrative processes.

Finally, comparative studies, on a cross-national basis, provide vast potentialities for scientific and meaningful research towards the indentification of a universal administrative-culture, if such a concept has any value in the process of "generalization on universal plane". Admittedly, such studies would have to be undertaken with considerable planning, insight, and with an adequate knowledge of the unlimited range of variables that interplay in the administrative processes across national frontiers. However, the difficulties are not altogether unsurmountable. To begin with cross-cultural studies can be undertaken on a regional basis (*e.g.*, with respect to administrative phenomena in South Asian countries) with a little systematic effort. For instance, a common theme for a comparative analysis could be the "Impact of public administration on the development process with reference to South Asian countries

or with reference to Latin American countries or East African countries". Another theme for comparative and historical exposition can be the "Impact of the British administration on the development of public administration in various erstwhile colonies". Yet another comparative study can be in respect of an analysis of "Planning and decision-making processes in various countries" in a particular region.

Similarly, comparisons can also be made between various aspects of administrative processes in India and some other developed countries like USA, UK, France, Scandinavian countries and the like, with a view to testing the validity of administrative generalizations evolved through regional comparisons, and for the purposes of determining the overall performance of an administrative system in terms of goal-achievements. For instance, a comman framework in this context can be an analysis of the administration of social services and welfare activities with respect to as many systems as possible.

However, all these suggestions are based on the assumption that the researches will be undertaken with reference either to a common framework to point out the similarities and dissimilarities and to account for them or to test the validity of certain generalizations through empirical studies of as many systems as possible. Only then, comparative studies can be scientific and more meaningful and not simply by following the conventional method of interposing the description of two seemingly similar structures or institutions at one place, which has so far been the practice with most of the Indian scholars. ☐

Toward a Model of Bureaucratic Development Planning*

David K. Brown

IT IS axiomatic that organizations be constructed to suit the purposes they are intended to serve. Since development is concerned with producing change, its machinery, the bureaucratic planning group, must be designed to accommodate this phenomenon. This point goes to the main contention of this article that government bureaucracy, as a public agency, is continually seeking that combination of roles and role assignment that are conducive to directed development. It is this process of differentiation which requires a constant reassessment of its internal ways of doing things. This may involve the intensive establishment and abolition of offices and managerial techniques. A recent essay bears out the complexity of this process.[1]

Furthermore, the bureaucracy serves radically different functions than the mere administration of law and order or of a routinization of current leadership or current power configurations. It does not serve merely to facilitate the maintenance of stability and continuity.

In looking at the role of bureaucracy in planning, it will be well to outline the dimensions of our analysis that form the basis of this examination. Firstly, it is recognized that the administration itself can and may be a great obstacle to development as much as economic or ecological deficiencies. Secondly, public administration in underdeveloped systems may lack the expertise demanded of development planning, and technological help from the outside may not overcome this gap at a cost that indigenous people may be willing to pay. Thirdly, the administrator is an intensely political actor, this is so as he designs the plan and more so as he implements it. Donald Stone offers the following prescriptive advice as how to, in his view, best create the parameters of

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1971, pp. 232-37.

[1]*Vide* Nicholas Georgulas, "Structure and Communication in a Development Agency in Tanzania", *Occasional Papers,* Syracuse, Syracuse University (Program of East African Studies), 1967. *See* also Nicholas Luykx, "Rural Government in the Strategy of Agricultural Development" in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966, pp. 113-131.

effective bureaucratic planning. He recommends: (1) intensification of research and analysis of the development organization itself, (2) ongoing educational and training programme, (3) establishment of a central organ in each ministry with the responsibility of improving the administration of development, and (4) the assignment of sectoral specialists and overall generalists to supervise the planning process and to follow through in its actual implementation.

In this framework, the administrator would opt for the widest participation in the fulfilment of the plan which he can best accomplish by directing the organization to the needs of the village, district, and province as well as metropolitan areas. In Stone's view, the mundane and routine procedure of the plan are most crucial. As he illustrates:

> the way in which a farmer tills and fertilizes his soil, or a supervisor in a textile mill trains his subordinates, is part of the development job. The decision made by villagers in respect to bringing potable water to the village, improvement of sanitation, construction of an access road to a market, highway, or building an addition to a village school are vital elements in the development process.[2]

Along with attention to the mundane, the public agency is faced with the problem of the proliferation of plans and concomitantly the rapid increase of agencies to administer them. This process, largely a problem of differentiation, may lead to an overdispersal of responsibility, lack of sufficient public support for all the new agencies, inadequate assessment of resources and manpower, insufficient participation and coordination among the planning agencies, a strain on the communication process between the agency and central government, an increased resistance of headquarters in delegating field authority, and, finally, a lack of thorough follow-up on the outcomes of the plan.

Specific organizational decisions are also crucial for a reasonable expectation of success. If the planning function is assigned to a regular ministry, for example, it is then faced with the problem of planning for its own peer agencies in the government as well as planning for sectoral areas in the society. The agency in this position is not likely to do either job well.

Another organizational hazard, implying a conflict of integration, occurs when the planning function is given to an autonomous group outside the government which has no real norms of accountability to

[2]Donald C. Stone, "Government Machinery Necessary for Development", in Martin Kriesberg (ed.)., *Public Administration in Developing Countries*, Washington (D.C.), The Brookings Institute, 1965, p. 55.

the regime. It is essential that planning officers have the intimate confidence of the chief executive to avoid the dysfunction of a breakdown in coordination and integration. Planning should, therefore, be related directly to the centre of the power structure of government. Moreover, it should be a balanced effort among and between the agencies.

It is the function of the bureaucracy to provide the tools for the smooth operation of the planning process. It develops as the plan does. The plan is total. The plan is a deliberate, political commitment of government to change.

As it faces further challenges of differentiation, integration and legitimation, it must define the degree of conflict in which it finds itself and reorder its structures to accomplish practical ends. The following criteria are offered by Marceau Long and we offer them as a sample of the readjustment needed in modernizing bureaus, not however as ideal types.[3]

As to recruitment, Long suggests a standard based on merit examination to permit the qualitative selection of candidates, the creation of programmes of pensions and social security benefits, a consistent system of grading and evaluation of performance, a statutory channel for the handling of complaints and grievances, a legal framework for the definition and classification of ranks and grades, clear rules for adjudicating appointments and transfers, and, lastly, a legally defined system governing retirement. Long's system envisages the creation of a career-orientated and professional civil service. Through the routinization of careers, two goals are accomplished: (1) institutionalization and autonomy of the bureau, and (2) reduced likelihood that its prerogatives will be usurped by the government or an overly zealous military group. This scheme assumes that the more complex an organization the more difficult it becomes to disintegrate either from internal or external forces. This is a hypothesis that can well be tested in the field.

The last phase of the discussion deals with a review of some fallacies behind the economic and administrative aspects of planning. The first of these revolves around what Bertram Gross has called the "planners *vs.* doers illusion,"[4] or the notion that specialized technicians have a monopoly on planning and only the administrators are the doers. We have already pointed out the necessity of involving all actors in the planning operation as well as indigenous people who probably know best what their needs are. Purely technical concerns are and impossi-

[3]Marceau Long, "Statutes Applicable to the Public Official", in Martin Kriesberg (ed.), *op. cit*., pp. 118-119.

[4]Bertram M. Gross, "The Administration of Economic Development Planning: Principles and Fallacies", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. III, No. 5 (1967-1968).

bility and are intimately tied to a whole series of subjective, non-economic variables.

A second fallacy that may well attend the planning function is the obsession with the gadgetry of administrative models. An example of this would be the arbitrary imposition of western ways of doing and thinking about things and the arrogant assumption that western norms are successful and 'good' in themselves. This idea can filter into theoretical constructs as well as practical plans.

The national planner would do well to seek to avoid the notion that what worked in other nations will automatically work for him as well. There is no fixed blueprint for planning. Each plan must seek to incorporate those features that it finds unique to the environment for which it is planning. Nor can a plan be devised which can eliminate all uncertainty. Planning for the inevitable is no plan at all, the goal of the plan is to change what is happening in a legitimating manner. Each new round of support that is established is just as important as earlier support and is intimately intertwined with practical goal achievement.

As a part of the integrating function, planners might do well to realize that the basic resources of any plan are the people to which it is directed. Expertise centering around the manipulation of non-human factors to the extent that politics of the situation are ignored may see planners leading a revolution of rising frustration rather than expectation. Any change, no matter how small, is a real threat to the power position of some elite structure. Not everyone is agreed to the aims of the plan or to the values of the system. A general parameter of developing planning may be regarded as the dynamics of support which the planning group strives to arouse.

Another fallacy that Gross points up is the planners claim to rationality. Error, however, is incipient to all human effort. No amount of theorizing or expertize can circumscribe this fact. Planning is a process of trial and error. A case in point was the villagization programme in Tanzania in 1964 which was committed to relocating large numbers of people into agricultural villages. After much debate and friction and reshuffling of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation and the disbanding of the Village Settlement Agency, it was decided that the plan itself, not its administration, was undesirable.

Another kind of overselling of development planning that tends to occur is the idea or conviction of the specialist that quantification, graphs, and statistical projections are in and of themselves a plan. We are admonished hy Gross to keep in mind that a plan is not merely a feasibility study. Data is in itself a power resource that may be jealously guarded by the holding office and not freely and objectively given to the statistician or technician. The claim to pertinent data may be

the only claim to power a department has and it may seek to hoard it.

In short, we maintain that development planning is a national integrating instrumentality seeking to arouse political support. This seems to hold good especially for rural areas which have to undergo the greatest change and, thus, are called upon to make the greatest sacrifices in terms of dislocation that ensues when a rapid departure from traditionalism is effected. Further, what is western is not automatically the best model for change. The plan must be pertinent to current indigenous needs and not merely imported. Economic measures are only one aspect of a solidly conceived plan. What is of most strategic import from the behavioural and explanatory standpoint are the human conflicts that occur within the processes of differentiation, integration and legitimation.

CONCLUSION

Several impressionistic generalizations offer themselves from our initial descriptive effort. They are offered as an attempt to isolate those factors of greatest analytical value from which hopefully interesting (useful for theory building) hypotheses can be drawn as a basis for ongoing research.

The processes of differentiation, integration, and legitimation are societal in scope as well as institutional. Our notion, then, is that bureaucracy is undergoing similar development conflicts as is the general society in which it finds itself.[5]

Differentiation appears as a sub-process of integration working towards a seemingly contradictory end. The former increases specialization, the latter seeks to incorporate and assimilate the specialisation process. The greater and more rapid the rate of differentiation, the greater the difficulty in integration.

The extent of legitimation that occurs within a structure is determined by the degree of a lack of dysfunction that occurs between the ongoing processes of differentiation and integration.

Legitimation is not a linear process but is cross-institutional and cross-structural. Support is generated around social institutions in a horizontal manner. This phenomena suggests that legitimation in a developing bureaucracy is generated around functional offices and roles, it does not proceed automatically downward from the top of the hierarchy. Legitimacy must be aroused, it does not appear to be self-generating.

[5]*See* S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization", in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.) *Readings in Comparative Public Administration*, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1967, pp. 354-372, for a view of bureaucracy as a social system.

Such organisational devices as line-staff and span of control are utilised not as routinising factors but as consent-producing devices which assist in the programme of building legitimacy.

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Bureaucracies : Some Contrasts in Systems*

Wallace S. Sayre

IN WESTERN political systems there appear to be two important types of myths about bureaucracy. The first of these casts bureaucracy in the role of villain. Thus Harold Laski, writing thirty years ago on *bureaucracy* for the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, described bureaucracy as representing a passion for the routine in administration, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in the making of decisions, and a refusal to embark upon experiment. Laski saw bureaucracy as a threat to democratic government. His argument ran briefly as follows: the scale of modern government makes administration by experts inescapable, yet the power of these experts as bureaucrats is not easily controlled by democratic institutions. The bureaucracies continuously push the boundaries of their power, Laski asserts, while control over them becomes increasingly difficult and costly. Describing the problem in terms of the British parliamentary system, he says control takes the following form : (1) the legislature can only reject or accept the proposals of ministers, (2) the ministers are in turn dependent upon their bureaucracies, and (3) the bureaucrats urge the ministers toward caution, toward minimizing innovation. The net influences, then, are in the direction of reliance on precedent, of continuity, and of minimum risk or change. More recently Von Mises, too, in his book called *Bureaucracy*, has argued that bureaucracy cannot be efficient, primarily because the profit-and-loss criterion is absent from the work of governmental bureaucracies.

A second type of myth casts bureaucracy in the role of hero. Max Weber is perhaps the outstanding proponent of this view. Weber argues that bureaucracy is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and the most rational form of administration. This is so, he believes, because it represents the exercise of control through knowledge. He presents an 'ideal type' of bureaucracy in which activities are distributed in a fixed way, authority to command is distributed in a stable manner and is delimited by rules, the hierarchy

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* Vol. X, No. 2, 1964, pp. 219-29.

of authority is monocratic, management is based on written documents. and membership in the bureaucracy is a vocation. In these terms bureaucracy is made virtually synonymous with rationality and objectivity in the administration of large-scale organizations.

We may describe these broad characterizations of bureaucracy as myths because they are persuasive mixtures of both fact and invention. As such they explain both too much and too little. A more modest version might simply assert that bureaucracy is necessarily neither villain nor hero, but rather a phenomenon found in all large-scale, complex organizations. This phenomenon has certain major characteristics : (1) specialization of tasks for the members of the organization, (2) a hierarchy of formal authority, (3) a body of rules, (4) a system of records, and (5) personnel with specialized skills and roles. In this view bureaucracy is a system for the administration of scale and complexity in human efforts to develop and accomplish purposes not otherwise attainable. In serving these purposes bureaucracy has both merits and liabilities. But we may assume that, within broad limits, these merits or liabilities are the result of choices made in constructing the bureaucratic system in a particular time and place. For bureaucracies are not all constructed in the same mould. Instead they vary greatly, one from the other, and they vary also over time. The American bureaucracies differ significantly from the British, and the British from the European, while presumably each of these western bureaucracies differs importantly from the eastern ones, which in turn must differ greatly from each other. And 'new' bureaucracies apparently differ in many ways from 'mature' bureaucracies.

It is with the choices about the forms and methods of bureaucracy that this essay will be concerned, not with the probably unanswerable and somewhat metaphysical question of whether bureaucracy is villain or hero. It will be assumed that it may, in some periods and some places, be either or a mixture of both. And the discussion will focus upon three specific questions about bureaucracies:

1. How are the bureaucrats to be chosen?
2. What is the role of bureaucrats in decision-making?
3. How are the bureaucrats to be governed?

II

How are bureaucrats—especially the higher-ranking bureaucrats—to be chosen? The full answer to this question involves several important choices in public policy, choices which have major consequences for the nature and behaviour of the bureaucracy which will

be developed. That is, the ways in which the bureaucrats are selected from among the population will influence their representativeness, their skills and capacities, their responsiveness to democratic controls, and their attitudes toward change in public policy and in managerial methods. These influences are especially consequent in the case of the choices of those who are to hold the higher posts in the bureaucracy, for these higher bureaucrats usually set the tone and tempo of the whole bureaucracy.

The choices involved in the question of how the bureaucrats are to be selected may be concretely illustrated by describing the choices made in the building of the United States Civil Services, with some contrasts offered by the British system. The first choice may be described as *open* versus *closed* recruitment. The American option is for open recruitment; that is, to recruit from among all the talents available in the national labour market.[1] The British option, by contrast, is to recruit directly from the schools and universities, at the school-leaving or graduating age. The selection of those bureaucrats who are to hold the posts of higher responsibility in the bureaucracy presents an especially sharp contrast: in the American system these persons may be, and often are, recruited from outside the ranks of the bureaucracy at mid-career, or even later, stages. The American system has no counterpart of the British Administrative Class; the posts of the higher bureaucracy in the United States are filled by a wider system of recruitment that draws upon the talents available in the national pool of talent. These briefly described alternatives in deciding how the bureaucrats are to be chosen serve to illustrate that a deliberate and consequential choice can be made in determining the kind of bureaucracy a government wishes to have.

A second kind of choice can be made about the way in which bureaucrats are to be chosen. That choice is between the American preference for 'programme staffing' and the British preference for 'career staffing'. The American practice is to recruit for particular programmes of the government, and secondarily for careers in the government generally. In the United States a new programme of the government usually means also a new agency and a new staff—a response often explained by asserting that 'new ideas' require 'new blood'. The Tennessee Valley Authority may serve as an example. When the TVA was established in the 1930's it was not staffed from the

[1]The term 'labour market' may require some explanation. The American labour market is somewhat distinctive. Career mobility and job mobility are among its strong characteristics. Thus it is possible to recruit for the civil service experienced, highly trained, and successful persons from the general labour market, even though such persons are already well advanced in non-civil service careers. Other national labour markets may be less flexible in their response to such recruiting efforts.

ranks of the national civil service; instead, it was staffed primarily by newly-recruited experts from the professions and other relevant occupations in the national labour market. Two tests were paramount in the selection process: that the person recruited should have the knowledge and skills needed by the TVA, and that he should have a positive commitment to the objectives of the TVA. Thus programme-commitment, not neutrality, was deliberately sought in the recruitment process. More recent examples—the Atomic Energy Commission, the foreign aid and information agencies, the space agency—serve to support the TVA pattern as a major tendency in the American preference for programme-staffing.

These two choices in recruitment patterns are closely related to a third choice: whether one of the criteria of selection should emphasize general capacity or specialized capacity. The British pattern is to select the junior members of the administrative class on the basis of their general knowledge and intelligence, demonstrated in examinations that test their mastery of a liberal-arts university education. These juniors are chosen at a young and plastic age; their training for advancement is provided by a variety of experiences within the bureaucracy, an experience pattern which continues to stress generalist capacities—a kind of amateur versatility within the frame of the bureaucratic tradition. The American pattern is a striking contrast. Although a growing number (but perhaps not an increasing proportion) of the bureaucrats are recruited by general examinations not very different from the British, the stronger preference is for specialized personnel often recruited after substantial experience has been acquired outside the bureaucracy. An example is provided by the recent history of the US Foreign Service. In the 1920's the British model was in a general sense adopted as the recruitment method. World War II brought severe tests to this system, and it was in fact drastically modified by the creation of new agencies staffed by specialists. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was an attempt to restore the generalist pattern of the inter-war years, but the restored system turned out to be not viable. By the mid-1950's it was necessary to reorganize the foreign service personnel system drastically. A massive transfusion of 'new blood' was accomplished by transferring into the foreign service corps practically all the specialized and professional personnel of the State Department, so that the US Foreign Service again reflects the deepseated American preference for the highly-trained and experienced specialist rather than for the generalist.

Yet a fourth choice also confronts the framers of bureaucracies: Shall the interchange of personnel between governmental careers and non-governmental careers be minimized or maximized? The British choice is to minimize the cross-flow of careers between the public and

private sectors of employment. The American choice is to maximize the interchange, especially among members of the professions and among business executives and specialists. There are few high-ranking bureaucrats in the US Civil Service who have not in their lifetime been both a bureaucrat and a non-bureaucrat. Exposure to the tests of success in a professional career or in some other private endeavour is more often than not one of the decisive standards in the recruitment of the higher civil service. These exchanges of personnel between public and private careers are not systematically organized, and are not always consciously sought by the personnel systems, but they are nonetheless one of the durable and prominent characteristics of the American bureaucracy.

These sets of choices, it will be apparent, are closely interrelated, in high degree interdependent. It will be apparent, too, that both Britain and the United States have made choices that give each of them a consistent series of choices; each of the two patterns is internally coherent. In a very real sense, also, the British set of choices arises out of the structure of British society, as does the American pattern out of its society. That is to say, each system of choices is indigenous. It is, therefore, doubtful that either is a neat package ready for export to other societies. The two systems of choices are accordingly less a problem in deciding which represents a preferable ideal than a demonstration that these persistent questions about the bureaucracy (Who are to be the bureaucrats? How are the bureaucrats to be chosen?) must be answered for each country in the context of its own society. The British answers, it may be hazarded, produce a more orderly and symmetrical, a more prudent, a more articulate, a more cohesive and more powerful bureaucracy; the American choices, it may be further hazarded, produce a more internally competitive, a more experimental, a noisier and less coherent, a less powerful bureaucracy within its own governmental system, but a more dynamic one. The most perplexing question remains: for other countries, what is the relevance of these differences for their purposes?

III

What is the role of bureaucrats in governmental decision-making? We are all aware that the actual process of decision-making in governmental systems differs in some marked degree from the formal description of the decision-process. We have often observed, also, that the twentieth century has been especially hard on legislatures everywhere Thus in Great Britain many commentators refer to Cabinet Government, as a way of noting the decline of the House of Commons, while some go a step farther and speak of Prime Ministerial Govern-

ment to emphasize an even greater distance between the House and the centre of decisions. Similarly in the United States observers often write of Presidential Supremacy to emphasize a trend away from Congress as a centre of power. In both countries these phrases are oversimplified descriptions of an important fact: there are trends and changes in the decision-making process in all governmental systems, and the reality of the process is not found merely in constitutional and other formal statements of the way in which power is distributed. The actual process is complex and subtle, and is not easily discovered or described.

In this actual and informal process of governing, it is worthwhile to ask: what is the role of the bureaucracy? The formal and official answer in most countries is that the bureaucracy is an agent of the decision-makers, not itself one of the decision-makers but rather their instrument, not an autonomous brain in its own right but rather the neutral executor of plans made by others. This formal theory of the bureaucracy is of course a myth. It is a myth which serves several purposes, but it does not help in a realistic description of the decision-making process. The fact is that in all countries the bureaucracy is one of the important actors in the making of governmental decisions; in some systems the bureaucrats are the leading actors, and in most systems their power as decision-makers would seem to be increasing. Our concern, then, is not with the formal, and now transparent, myth, but with the question of the roles that bureaucrats do in fact have in the decision-making process.

In a decision system does the bureaucrat take the initiative in making policy proposals, or does he wait upon the proposals of others? The answer appears to be that bureaucrats are increasingly the source of initial policy proposals, but that in most systems care is taken to obscure and to make ambiguous their initiating role That is, the formal theory is deferred to, and a ritual is observed which masks the fact that bureaucrats are actually the source of many initiatives. The British system especially serves to mute the role of the bureaucrat as initiator and framer of policy. The American system, by contrast, pays less deference to formal bureaucratic theory; the higher civil servant is expected to initiate policy proposals, to do so often in full view of the other decision-makers and the public, and to take the career risks associated with such activity. There seems little doubt that the British bureaucrat makes a higher proportion of initial policy proposals than does the American bureaucrat, while the differing style and etiquette of the two systems create the opposite impression. One pattern protects the elected official by inflating his initiating role; the other provides the elected official with competition. One system cloaks the bureaucrat with the safety of anonymity; the other exposes

him to equal risks with other decision-makers. The consequences are thus more substantial than they first appear to be.

Beyond the stage of initiation, is the bureaucrat an adviser on, or a protagonist of policy and programme? The British system emphasizes the advisory and analytical functions of the bureaucrats, but this public posture obscures the more active roles pursued by bureaucrats behind the screen of ministerial responsibility. The American system also demands the advisory and analytical roles for its bureaucrats, but it gives equal or greater emphasis to the bureaucrat as champion of his programme—before Congressional committees, interest groups, and not infrequently with the communication media. This more open and visible policy role for the American bureaucrat is not unchallenged by other actors in the decision-making process (for example, by Congressmen, political executives, interest group leaders, and the communication media), but the role is widely and skilfully managed by the bureaucrats. In a large degree this practice is related to the fact that a substantial proportion of American bureaucrats are more fully committed to policies and programmes than they are to uninterrupted careers in the bureaucracy; many of them move in and out of the public service several times in a life-time. The role of protagonist is a recognized and legitimate role for the American bureaucrat; risks attend it, but these are softened by the alternative careers open to the American civil servant and the genuine prospects of a return to the bureaucracy when the policy wheel has turned.

As one of the actors in the decision-making system is the bureaucrat cast as innovator and source of energy, or as guardian of continuity and stability? The British system emphasizes his role as prudent guardian; his task is to make the minister aware of risks and difficulties, of errors in fact and reason, of unanticipated and undesirable probable consequences. His most proper role is seen as the firm but deferential vetoer of amateur though perhaps popular enthusiasms. The American system is not free of these tendencies (probably common to the permanent staffs of all large and complex organizations, whether in the public or private sector), but the dominant characteristics of the system encourage the American bureaucrat to be an innovator, a source of forward-moving energy. The controlling expectations of the system are that new ideas, energetically expressed, will emerge from the bureaucracy. The system awards the rank of hero to these innovators, not to the guardians of continuity and stability.

These three aspects of the bureaucrat as policy-maker serve to underscore again the complexities and subtleties of the governing process, the gap between formal doctrine and structure and the realities of decision-making, as well as to emphasize the central role of the bureaucracy in governing. And this central role of the bureaucracy

gives significance both to the question of how bureaucrats are to be chosen and to the question of the actual roles of the bureaucrats as initiators of proposals, protagonists of policy, and sources of innovation. These questions in turn lead to an even more crucial one: how are the bureaucrats to be governed?

IV

In any society that has as central institutions large scale, complex organizations for the conduct of governmental business, the bureaucracy has perforce greater power. The bureaucrats thus become not merely a problem in administration but also an important problem in governance. How are the boundaries of bureaucratic power to be set, and by whom? What restraining rules are to confine the power role of the bureaucracy? What arrangements in the decision-making apparatus serve to make the bureaucrats visible and responsible actors in the exercise of their power?

Some commentators on these questions answer that the main ingredient of bureaucratic responsibility to democratic norms is a code of behaviour for bureaucrats which emphasizes deference to elected officials and other aspects of the democratic system. This "inner check", a democratic self-restraint to be exercised by the bureaucrats themselves, is regarded by other observers as an insufficient guarantee against bureaucratic domination. These skeptical commentators offer alternative answers, the more important of which can be examined by continuing to compare the characteristics of the British and the American bureaucratic systems.

There is first the proposal that the bureaucracy be made representative in its composition. The British system has given small emphasis to this criterion, while the American system has made it a major characteristic. Both systems recruit an elite group in terms of intelligence and skill, although these two terms are given different definitions in the two societies, but the American system has also been concerned to recruit a bureaucracy that is essentially a mirror of the nation—in social and economic class characteristics, in geographic, educational, ethnic, religious, and racial characteristics. To a very large degree, the American system does succeed in its aim to build a bureaucracy which is 'representative', not an exotic elite. In fact, some students of the system declare that the American bureaucracy is more representative of American society than is the elected Congress. This is a large claim, and is perhaps not wholly relevant to the problem of a responsible bureaucracy, but it does reflect the degree of the American commitment to an open, mobile and representative bureaucracy, linked closely in its main characteristics to the American society itself.

There is also the proposal that the bureaucracy be made more responsible by making it more internally competitive, to make certain that bureaucrats compete openly with other bureaucrats for the exercise of power. The British system does not have this preference for a bureaucracy that is pluralistic and internally competitive in its structure and operations; instead, it values symmetry and a tightly meshed bureaucracy, especially in the monolithic characteristics of the administrative class at the top of the bureaucratic structure. The American system, by contrast, produces a bureaucracy that is so competitively pluralistic that contesting elements in the bureaucracy are compelled to seek allies outside the bureaucracy—in the Congress, in the interest groups, in the communication media. The American system accordingly does not often pose bureaucratic power against non-bureaucratic power; most often the contest in decision-making power is between opposing alliances each of which contains bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic elements. The American bureaucracy is not, as a consequence, self-contained as a centre of power, nor can it be self-regarding in its goals or strategies; each significant segment of the bureaucracy must be more involved with forces in its non-bureaucratic context than with other bureaucrats. And, to add to the pluralism of the system, most bureaucratic-non-bureaucratic alliances are vulnerable and impermanent, so that there is a constant reshaping and realigning, emphasizing still further the internally competitive nature of the American bureaucracy. Thus, one kind of answer to the problem of bureaucratic power is the American design for producing an internally competitive bureaucracy, a system in which bureaucrats restrain the power of other bureaucrats and each major group of bureaucrats must share power with non-bureaucratic allies.

There is a third approach to the governance of bureaucrats: personal responsibility rather than anonymity for the bureaucrat. In this respect the British and American systems also present contrasts. The British system emphasizes anonymity; the minister not only is required to take full responsibility but the bureaucrat remains a faceless unknown. (The establishment of this convention represents one of the great strategic triumphs of the bureaucracy, since anonymity is a method of exercising power without being required to pay the costs of error.) The American bureaucrat is not an anonymous, invisible actor in the decision-making process. He is, without any important limitation, held responsible for what he does. Presidents may on occasion try to shield him, or department heads may also; but in the end the Congressional committees, the interest groups, the communication media, or other actors, will usually bring home to the bureaucrat his personal responsibility for his own actions. This is not always accomplished with a fine sense of abstract justice—whether the bureaucrat is being

praised or blamed—for this is competitive world of power in which no actor is regarded as either privileged or fragile. The American civil servant who earns high and lasting prestige in his society is usually one who most completely breaks the mask of anonymity and becomes a public figure. There are, of course, situations in which American bureaucrats would prefer the cloak of anonymity, and the convention is sometimes invoked by them or by allies on their behalf; there are also American observers who urge the adoption of the British model. But the system of personal responsibility prevails against these reservations, and appears likely to continue to do so. The visibility and personal responsibility of the bureaucrat is a characteristic built strongly into the American governmental system.

There is, finally, another aspect to the governance of bureaucracies: publicity *versus* secrecy. Here also the British and the American models stand in sharp contrast. In the United States there is a widely accepted code that the public is entitled to know everything about what the government is doing, even what the government is planning to do. The strongest exponents of this doctrine are the communication media, especially the newspapers, which have increasingly used their motto "the Right to Know" as if it were a part of the Bill of Rights. But every cross-section of American society tends to believe that there ought to be no governmental secrets except those which clearly affect national defence or the rights of individual persons to privacy. This general belief is encouraged and made effective by central features of the governmental system: the inquiry powers of the Congressional committees which open up executive branch secrets, the internally competitive bureaucracy which shares its secrets with its outside allies, and the zeal of the communication media in its daily probing to reduce the boundaries of secrecy. The bureaucracy is directly affected by this system of publicity because it is the custodian of most governmental secrets. In the American setting the bureaucrat's inherent preference for secrecy is sharply limited by the assumption of all the other actors that secrecy most often serves the convenience of those who hold the secrets, and that a strong case must be made against publication, the presumptions of the system being that publication is the norm. And, further, the operation of the actual decision-system compels the bureaucrats to share their secrets with non-bureaucratic allies; secrets thus shared are not secrets very long. The functioning of this system, with its strong preference for publicity over secrecy, is not devoid of difficulties. It is accompanied by complaints and counter-complaints, by rough exchanges between the contestants and by rough justice rather than mercy toward some participants, but the system does curtail the bureaucratic uses of secrecy and does make the American governing process one of the most highly visible in the world.

V

These brief and somewhat oversimplified observations on the contrasts between two important bureaucratic systems are intended mainly to suggest a few general hypotheses about bureaucracies. One of them is that in the building of bureaucratic systems there are many options, each choice having different consequences for the whole system; that is, these options are not merely technical issues in personnel management but more importantly choices affecting the nature of the governing process. Another implication is that the contrasting choices made in constructing these two bureaucratic systems were in the main determined by the matrix of the society in which they were each made; in other words, the nature of a particular bureaucracy is linked to the system of government and the society in which it operates. The options are thus limited by the social and political context of the particular bureaucracy, but this is not to suggest a rigid limitation—for example, the context of a parliamentary system does not dictate a particular set of choices. Instead, what is suggested is that the whole indigenous context—social and political and governmental—is the limiting factor. Bureaucratic models are not packages ready for export or import: they provide illustrations of options and styles for consideration in their separate parts, and for adaptation before acceptance in a different context. ◻

Development Bureaucracy: A Tentative Model*

E.H. Valsan

CURRENT LITERATURE is abundant with definitions and classifications of bureaucracies of the 'Non-Western' world.[1] This article is concerned with the bureaucracy involved directly in economic, social, and political development in the emerging nations—a topic which has recently attracted 'model' builders and theoreticians.[2]

It has been emphasised by several writers that today, bureaucracy even in Western countries does not conform to the Weberian description. Scholars who write mostly on developing countries have held that in those countries the bureaucracy performs several political roles as well.[3] Actually, they seem to perform a multiplicity of roles.[4] The following is an attempt to reduce conveniently those roles into certain limited, but prominent categories and to discern major constraints that the bureaucracy faces in performing its roles, particularly in developmental tasks. While the role of bureaucracy in social, political, and administrative development is important, this article confines itself mainly to economic development programmes which may have political, social, administrative, and other implications. An attempt is made, however, at the end to suggest some of the political roles performed and constraints faced by the development bureaucracy.

We shall consider civil servants enagaged in development projects and activities as those who constitute development bureaucracy. Those

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1972, pp 36-50.

[1]Two different classifications are provided by Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective", *Journal of Comparative Administration*, Los Angeles, Vol. 1, 1964, pp. 4-10, and Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case", Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University, 1963, pp. 235-238.

[2]See Berton Kaplan, "Notes on a Non-Weberian Model of Bureaucracy: The Case of Development Bureaucracy", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 13, 1968, pp. 471-483; Richard Harris, "The Effects of Political Change on the Role Set for the Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 13, 1968, pp. 368-401; and Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity*, Honolulu, East-West Center, 1966, pp. 311-366.

[3]Fred W. Riggs refers to this aspect in most of his writings. *See* Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development", in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, and Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Societies*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1964.

[4]*See* Richard Harris, *op. cit.*

who have done field research in economic or 'community' development will probably agree that in many respects, the usual practice of putting all civil servants into one whole lot of bureaucracy is misleading and inadequate. Hence, the attempt in this model to classify development bureaucracy into three categories according to their roles and the special constraints faced by each category in performing its tasks. While the exact designations of higher, middle, and lower levels of development bureaucracies will vary from country to country according to history, geography (size), and other factors, the major roles and constraints related to development activity can be classified according to the ideal types presented in the model. Again, as the salary scales vary from one country to another or even from one state or organization to another, they do not necessarily clarify the distinctions in terms of roles or responsibilities. Bssides, it is possible that some who are paid less are in certain cases asked to shoulder greater responsibilities than others.

HIGHER LEVEL DEVELOPMENT BUREAUCRACY (HLDB)

The civil servants at higher levels in most developing countries include career officers and in some cases those who are appointed on the basis of patronage, political affiliations, and expertise. They play important roles in almost all economic development programmes. For the sake of analysis, these developmental roles of the higher level bureaucracy can be divided into four major categories: (1) Policy formulation: goals and strategies; (2) Appropriation and allocation of funds ; (3) Execution of policy; and (4) Training.

ROLES

Policy Formulation: Goals and Strategy

In most of the countries, the political leadership which took over administration from a colonial power or after a local revolution were preoccupied with several problems other than economic development. Some of them continue to be preoccupied with internal political tensions [5]

In certain cases, political leadership lacks required expertise for economic planning. Under these circumstances, the role of higher level bureaucracy in the formulation of developmental policy becomes

[5]This is true of Nigeria, India, and Pakistan with internal tensions and Egypt with external danger.

all the more important.[6]

The senior civil servants participate both in the process of setting the goals of a development plan and in formulating the strategy for attaining goals. In many instances, their 'advisory' role transforms itself into virtually the most effective factor in the determination of policies.

Appropriations and Allocations of Funds: Fixing of Priorities

Being more aware than the politicians about the financial resources and possible expenditure involved in development projects, the experienced civil servants are also responsible very often in fixing the appropriations policy as well as in allocating funds for the implementation of plans according to priorities. This major task has led at times in India and Pakistan to the selection of former members of Indian Civil Service as political leaders responsible for financial policy.[7] Where such political leadership is vested in laymen, the civil service experts exert great influence in policy-making.

Execution of Policy: Direction

Besides participation in making policies, the HLDB is involved in the traditional role of direction and execution of policy. This needs hardly any elaboration.

Training

It is the responsibility of the HLDB to interpret the policy set by themselves and the political leadership to the lower levels of bureaucracy and to train the latter in the methods to be adopted in order to achieve developmental goals. This major task is performed through conferences, institutionalized training programmes, and a host of communications media. They are also supposed to devote some time in training junior administrators under them.[8]

[6]In India, from the very beginning of the five year plans till the end of the Third Plan, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, V.T. Krishnamachari and a score of retired or functioning members of the Indian Civil Service influenced developmental policies considerably.

[7]C.D. Deshmukh, in India, and Chaudhri Mohamed Ali, in Pakistan, were called upon to occupy political positions with responsibility for financial and developmental policy.

[8]A retired member of the ICS told this writer in an interview that under the ICS, the senior officers took special interest in their junior officers who would spend considerable time during their probationary period listening to the experiences and pieces of advice given willingly by the former. However, according to this officer, under the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), this practice is neglected. An interesting exhortation on this practice is given by R.G. Huxtable, "Training for Public Administration : The Senior Officers' Responsibility", *Public Administration*, London, Vol. 46, 1968, pp. 281-286.

The four major roles mentioned above are not in any way exclusive. Several more can be added to these or included under any of these four roles. In performing these tasks, however, the higher level development bureaucracy often has to confront certain constraints. Four major types of constraints are suggested below.

CONSTRAINTS

Disagreements with Political Bosses on Policy

In spite of their expertise and experience, the HLDBs are often confronted with the problem of lack of agreement with the political leadership. Such disagreements can either force them to become 'yes men' or to exercise bureaucratic power more forcefully at the phase of implementation. Sometimes such disagreements result in ambiguity in policy due to artificial attempts to bring out compromise formulae.

Personal Background of the HLDB

Personal background of the HLDBs in general is conservative and socially exclusive. While there are indeed some exceptions like the socialists who are supposed to be behind what has recently been termed 'the Secretariat Socialism of Indira Gandhi', in many countries, including India, the very nature of the social life and economic status of the HLDB contradicts the tenets of socialism or social equality which are supposed to be the ideological goals of most of the development plans. Almost in all developing countries, the higher civil service is a relatively better salaried class than the lower levels. Mostly hailing from the urban middle class,[9] their social background and vision are centered around the big cities and foreign capitals. Socialist goals and slogans of equality raised by the politicians are only of academic interest to them. In certain cases, the civil service may even sabotage socialist programmes at the stage of implementation if not at the stage of policy formulation itself.

Supremacy of Seniority and Patronage

Despite foregoing discussion, which tends to take the expertise of the HLDBs for granted, closer analysis will generally prove that many of them occupy higher positions not necessarily because of special skill in economic planning or technological expertise, but because of seniority and even patronage. Having entered the permanent civil service at an early age, many have come to the top by promotion but at the same time

[9]V. Subramaniam, "The Social Background of Zambia's Higher Civil Servants and Undergraduates", University of Zambia, 1969, p. 13; the paper was submitted at the University Social Science Conference, Nairobi, in December.

with very little interest in studies being made in various branches of knowledge related to development. Some of them are ineffective in terms of the challenges of the new era and some are there because of political patronage and, thus, lacking independence of outlook.

Unwillingness to Accept New Ideas and Technology

As a natural consequence of the constraints mentioned above, the HLDBs often tend to resist new ideas and innovations suggested by foreign experts or their own junior officers who have been trained in modern ideas and skills. Such resistance arises out of ignorance as well as out of fear that technically qualified junior men may oust them from the pedestals of power and influence with the regime. Administrators who were trained under the 'law and order' approach of the colonial rule with charitable attitude to merchants and landlords find themselves inadequate in dealing with the complicated process of economic planning leading to an egalitarian society.

One way of meeting the constraints half way has been creation and encouragement of a new class which has come to be known as technocracy. Eastern European countries seem to have given great importance to this 'second new class'.[10] In India, the creation of the Indian Economic Service and other new categories of central services along with the Indian Administrative Service seems to have taken this need for expertise into consideration. Our hypothesis, however, is that, in most of the developing countries, the HLDBs suffer from one or more of the above mentioned constraints or related difficulties. Researchers should be able to present a comparative picture of the degree of presence of such constraints.

MIDDLE LEVEL DEVELOPMENT BUREAUCRACY (MLDB)

The middle level bureaucracy performs several important roles in economic development. While all levels of civil servants perform some common functions sharing ultimate common goals, certain developmental roles distinguish the middle level from the other two levels of functionaries for development. The exact title and salary of this category will vary from country to country or organization to organization. The exact category will come to the mind of the reader in the light of the following analysis of roles and constraints. Besides generalists, technical personnel at sub-national or district level also may be included under this category. Major distinguishing roles of the MLDB can also be divided into the following four groups.

[10] *See* for instances, Carl Beck, "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe", Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 291-300.

ROLES

Learning and Interpreting

It is the task of the MLDB to learn the developmental policy and programmes prescribed by the superiors and the political leadership and to interpret it to lower level and grassroot development workers and the public. The learning part here is linked with the training role of the MLDB. MLDBs are involved in training the lower levels.

Energizing and Supervising

Closely linked with the training task of the MLDB is their direct responsibility in energizing the lower level workers. Whereas the HLDBs have the overall responsibility for the implemetation of programmes, real and immediate field responsibilities over administratively coherent area are vested in the MLDBs. Consequently, they have great deal of supervisory tasks too. Inspection is also an important task at this level especially in technical departments engaged in development.

Coordination

Development plans being largely diffused in the countryside, one of the major administrative tasks has been that of coordination at provincial, district, and sub-district levels. The MLDB is generally called upon to assume this responsibility. To a great extent, success of development programmes depends upon the capacity of the MLDB to perform this task.

Collecting Information

Also, the MLDB is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and communicating the data and valuable pieces of information for the formulation of policy at higher level. However, skilled and imaginative the HLDBs may be, still they have to depend upon information available through responsible officers at the middle level.

In general, if the above mentioned four tasks are performed well by the MLDB, chances of success are high in development. Again, we are not excluding other roles which may appear to be equally important. The MLDBs perform certain important political roles which will be discussed in the appropriate section later.

CONSTRAINTS

In playing the four major, roles, the MLDB seems to face four major constraints which, like its special roles, are distinguishable in many ways from the constraints faced by the HLDB.

A Qualifications Crisis

The MLDB constitutes generally a mixed group. Both in terms of age and experience as well as of technical qualifications, there is very little uniformity at this level. Whereas some are young and newly recruited administrators, others have reached this level through long years of service at lower levels and are almost about to retire. In technical services particularly, the young have had modern training whereas those who have come up the hierarchy were trained long ago and hence lack the capacity to absorb the spirit of new economic policies and technology. Hence, in terms of developmental tasks we find a qualifications crisis often reflecting an uneasy co-existence of the good and the deadwood. This situation leads further to conflict and delay in decision-making.

Differences of Opinion with HLDB and Local Politicians

Generally, it is at this level that young and talented officers begin their administrative career. One major problem they face is that of differences of opinion with the higher civil servants. The enthusiasm and originality which they want to demonstrate through administrative innovations are often discouraged by the 'disinspiring'[11] bosses who always have 'experience' to fall back upon.

Still another type of disagreement takes place between the MLDB and the local politicians, particularly if members of the former are posted in field administration. This happens all the more, because at the provincial or district level the calibre of political leadership tends to be low. This is due to the fact that whenever a politician shows some acumen of administrative and political leadership, he is taken away by national or state leadership and given wider responsibilities than in a small area. Consequently, the leadership in the field often tends to be second rate or even worse. In many instances, they may not even identify themselves with the goals of revolution or development upheld by the national leadership or even may not be aware of such goals. Under these circumstances, they are eager to use development projects and funds for their own benefits or narrowly conceived partisan and tribal purposes. Inevitably, if the MLDBs who are trained nationally and who have wider loyalties and deeper understanding of problems then the local politicians find it difficult to perform duty according to their conscience.

[11]The term was introduced by this writer in E.H. Valsan, *Community Development Programs and Rural Local Government : Comparative Case Studies of India and the Philippines*, New York, Fredrick A. Praeger, 1970, p. 399.

Financial Status and Material Aspirations

Whether young or old, MLDBs generally get much lower emoluments than the higher civil servants. At the same time, their associations and aspirations are closely linked with the HLDB. In order to cope with the social status of the higher level, members of the MLDB sometimes indulge in extravagance which they cannot afford.

However, some of the major decisions regarding contracts and regional licences are dealt with at this level. Profit-minded businessmen thoughtfully notice the higher aspirations of those MLDBs—particularly the older ones with greater family responsibilities—and offer them bribes in kind or even in cash. A valid hypothesis in this connection can be that a higher degree of corruption and bribery is found among the MLDB than among the HLDB or lower level development bureaucracy (LLDB). This is because, at the higher level, remunerations and job satisfaction are high as has been quoted in a comparative study of Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt,[12] while at the lower level, corruption can be only small-scale and thus not as disruptive to the projects as at the middle level. Of course, individual cases of variances to this statement can be found in any society.

Ideological Ambivalence: Little Commitment to Development

Again, with aspirations associated with those of the rich and the HLDB, the MLDB often reflects an ideological ambivalence. They are too proud to identify themselves with the LLDB and the masses, and at the same time are not quite accepted in the circles of higher classes. Even those who are young, efficient, and honest at this level are, in many cases, more so in their own interests of promotion and status before the political leadership and not because of ideological commitment to socialism, democracy, or even development. Our analysis of the LLDB deals with this question of ideology in greater detail.

The constraints at the MLDB can be minimized, however, through appropriate training and also by better placement systems which will take into account the personal qualifications, commitment, and ideological orientations of the civil servants.

LOWER LEVEL DEVELOPMENT BUREAUCRACY (LLDB)

ROLES

From the point of view of popular support and involvement in

[12]*See* Leslie Roos and Naralon P. Roos, "Bureaucracy in the Middle East: Some Cross-Cultural Relationships", *Journal of Comparative Administration*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1969, p. 296.

development projects, the role of grassroot workers is perhaps more important than that of the higher levels. Four major categories of roles played by the LLDB are analyzed below. Here again, four is not a magic number. More roles could be included among the four being discussed or the list could further be extended in all cases cited so far.

Mass Contacts

The LLDB operates on the basis of contacts with the masses. These contacts help popular participation in development, but they also help the development workers ascertain popular demands and local needs. Policy formulation at higher levels can be realistic only if policies are based on true reports transmitted by the village and town level development workers. Also, it is at this level that the real task of inspiring the masses through dynamic inter-personal and collective approaches can be performed.

Demonstration of Innovations

LLDBs are often required to learn the techniques of new innovations and methods of new projects and then to explain these to the people. In so doing, they often have to perform successful demonstrations in order to convince the farmers and local leaders about the utility of the new innovations. Thus, LLDBs generally turn out to be multipurpose workers with the semi-expertise in such different subjects like adult education, plant protection, family planning, animal husbandry, first aid, and nutrition.[13]

Introduction of New Institutions

Expansion of development activities involve organizational proliferation and, consequently, new institutions are created especially in the field in order to provide new services and to stimulate new habits among the masses. The LLDB is invariably asked to perform the task of introducing cooperatives, credit unions, local savings banks, and family planning clinics. On the one hand, they have to be maintained according to the rules prescribed by higher levels, and at the same time, they have to be run with the cooperation and for the benefit of the local people.

Collection of Taxes and Levies

An unenviable task of the LLDB is the collection of taxes and newly created levies, including food procurement where food rationing is in vogue. While the policy regarding taxation and developmental levies is decided upon by the legislators and the senior civil servants,

[13] *See* E.H. Valsan, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94, 277, and 341-344.

its implementation is left to the LLDB. This unpleasant task puts them in a very crucial work of public persuasion for developmental obligations and goal achievement.

CONSTRAINTS

Despite the importance of the tasks being performed by the LLDB, they work under certain constraints in most of the countries. All these constraits may not prevail together in one area or project, but in many cases they are very much interlinked as can be observed from the following.

Insufficient Qualifications

Generally, people at the lowest level of development bureaucracy are not sufficiently qualified to deal with the masses and are also inadequately trained. On the one hand, we recognize the importance of their role and, on the other, we also find that the best young men and women in a soceity are not drawn to fill positions among the LLDBs.

Poor Salary

The reasons for the scarcity of well trained and qualified people of LLDB are often their low salary and poor living conditions. In one sense, this situation reflects a vicious circle of poor salary, inadequately qualified personnel, and what Gunnar Myrdal calls 'overstaffing'.[14] The less efficient the personnel, the more of them are required to do the job.

Ideology and Frustration

The most intriguing irony of the developmental scene is the fact that the LLDB which constitutes people who are expected to play most important roles for stimulating popular participation are the least paid of all levels and still they are probably the ones who identify themselves most with the proclaimed ideology of socialism, democracy, or development. It is in their interest that there should be equality and justice in the society, but their own experiences often lead them to pessimism and frustration. Loss of morale on their part nips the bud of inspiration from developmental activity.

Loss of Initiative

Loss of morale among the LLDB leads to loss of initiative and they become subservient to official bosses or local chiefs often sacrificing the goals of development and public interest in general. They also

[14]Gunnar Myrdal's Speech at the Public Services International, *Report of the Second Asian Conference*, Singapore, 1968, p. 5.

indulge in small-scale corruption, but what they can do in this respect is little because they are closely watched by the public.

Problem solving in this area is often dependent upon overall perception and long-term view of development leadership in any nation. If young and highly qualified development workers are appointed at lower levels with comparably good salary and opportunities to rise up in the national hierarchy, much of the frustration can be mitigated.[15] At the same time, it is important to keep their ideological commitment even as they rise up in the hierarchy.

Social and Political Development and Bureaucracy

An elaborate analysis of social and political roles and constraint of development bureaucracy is not being attempted here as the writer is still bewildered by the inter-relationships between economic and social development and also with the difficulties in defining political development. However, certain propositions which flow directly from the above mentioned model and are related to the role of bureaucracy for economic development are being made as hypotheses for further investigation.

Social Responsibility and Constraints

Whether or not social development is to be defined in terms of socialism or social justice, it is linked with all economic development plans. In most of the countries, such plans include statements which purport to say that they are meant to reduce inequalities in the society and to lead to equitable distribution of wealth. As we have seen so far, in implementing such development plans, the bureaucracy is used as the most vital instrument for action. Paradoxically enough, in most developmental organizations, bureaucracy which is supposedly responsible for inducing social change is itself a symbol of inequalities and reflection of social hierarchy. Besides the syndrome of class conflict and ideological dilemma discussed earlier, religion, race and other divisive loyalties and animosities plague the bureaucracy. Class consciousness among the three levels and the sub-levels wihin each of them often leads to lack of cohesion in developmental endeavours and often keep the lowest level, which is the most important, as the least dynamic category of workers Exceptions may be there to this situation and the more these are there, the brighter the prospects for development.

[15]In the Philippines, the practice in the field of community development is to recruit university graduates for barrio level development work. Many who joined service at that level have been able to rise up in the hierarchy.

POLITICAL ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY

Whether we can have an agreement on the definition of politicaı development or not, it appears that bureaucracy at all levels performs certain political roles while working for economic development. While some reference has been made to these, particularly in connection with the higher level, an attempt is made here to list four major political tasks undertaken by all levels of development functionaries. Later, a discussion of the constraints which either follow such political involvement or arise out of some situations discussed earlier, is attempted.

Increasing Role in Policy Formulation

Especially in systems which have introduced decentralization of authority, besides economic policy, many 'political' policies also are decided on the advice of the bureaucracy. They may deal with the tackling of certain pressure groups or violent opposition, controversial policies, like land reforms, location of a university or steel mill or, in smaller areas, of a primary school or hospital. In most of these situations, 'political' advice is very important and the civil servants are called upon to give it informally, but effectively, especially where political leadership is weak.

Political Socialization

Bureaucracy is called upon to participate in the political education of the masses according to solialist ideologies or developmental goals set by the nation.[16] Teachers, information officers, generalist administrators, and even at times technical staff are asked to participate in this process directly or indirectly. Public speaking is a part of their job in development projects and however neutral they may be in partisan politics, they relate their immediate technical responsibility with the overall ideology of the national leadership.

Political Bargaining and Representation

In areas where political leadership is weak, as mentioned earlier, the tasks of the civil service leadership is immense. One political role being performed by able and popular administrators is that of bargaining and lobbying for additional development funds for the departments or areas they belong to at a particular time. This representative role is played because of their influence with the state or national government bureaucracy or even with political administrators whom they know

[16]Typical examples would be those of the communist countries as well as of Egypt where the ruling organization, the Arab Socialist Union, includes civil servants as well.

better than does the local political leadership.[17]

Resistance to Political Pressure

Again, in development, bureaucracy has to play the political game of either resisting or responding favourably to continuous political pressure. The way to react to the politician in many such situations is by being extremely tactful in tackling the situation. This is perhaps the most difficult 'political' role of the bureaucracy engaged in development.

CONSTRAINTS

Usurpation of Power

Writers on bureaucracy in developing countries have warned about the danger of usurpation of political power by bureaucracy.[18] While it may be good for bureaucracy to do its best, especially where political leadership is weak, even in the best instances, it weakens the growth of democratic leadership. The more the people become dependent upon a 'good' administrator, the less inclined will they be to shoulder responsibilities.

Distortion of Political Goals

Increased influence of the bureaucracy often leads to the distortion of goals and strategy to suit class interests of the bureaucracy concerned. Highly influential HLDB often injects conservative ideas into the administrative and even political circles much against the 'revolutionary' or 'socialistic' facade of the political regime. Especially during revolutionary take-over of administration by a 'progressive' group, creation of independent or 'neutral' civil service leads to several conflicts which imply political connotations.

The following two constraints are more relevant to multi-party democracies.

Extremist Influence on LLDB

The LLDBs, whose tribulations have been described earlier, are the victims of extremist political parties or factions who promise the amelioration of their living conditions. They are led to strikes,

[17]E.H. Valsan, "Positive Formalism: A Desideratum for Development?", *Philippines Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 12, 1968, p. 6; B.B. Schaffer also refers to the representative role of the civil servants in development administration. [B.B. Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration", in Colin Lys (ed.), *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, London, Cambridge, 1969, p. 210].

[18]Riggs refers to it several times. *See* Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development", in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*

demonstrations, and even political activities linked with the trade unions under the hegemony of such parties.

Negative Neutrality

Under multi-party democracies, where coalition ministries are formed frequently with all kinds of combinations, the civil service becomes an instrument in the hands of opposing parties and ideologies from time to time. Consequently, they realize that the best thing to do would be to perform their task only to the minimum extent necessary for their continuance in service. This situation can be called negative neutrality. Political neutrality of the British type presupposes neutrality towards the two major political parties, but it implies positive attitude towards administration. While ideally, for development, positive neutrality is what is needed, in reality, due to political rivalries among several parties and the uncertainties of future developments, civil servants are forced to adopt a 'cool' attitude towards the parties as well as their programmes and even towards development projects. Negative neutrality is a phenomenon spreading fastly in the state governments of India and it may have serious repercussions at the national level too.

CONCLUSION

While the roles and constraints suggested above constitute only a part of the whole developmental syndrome, effort to test the major propositions made under the detailed description of economic development and its bureaucratic implications as well as the few implied hypotheses of social and political category are expected to throw more light on our understanding of development in general. The attempt to study bureaucracy according to the three levels and their respective roles and constraints is meant to induce further studies on intra-bureaucratic phenomena affecting or contributing to development. □

A Comparative Paradigm of Western* and Soviet Bureaucracies†

Shivaji Ganguly

NO DISCUSSION on western conceptions of bureaucratic organisation can proceed without reference to Weber's analysis.[1] To Weber, all technologically great modern states are invariably based upon a bureaucratic structure. In his viewpoint, all organisational systems—political or non-political—are functionally related to the development of the money economy. He, however, submits that the fully developed 'bureaucratic mechanism' compares with 'other organisations' exactly as does the 'machine with the non-mechanical' modes of production. He contends that the manifold tasks of development or management of public affairs in complex industrial society are susceptible to rational human control through a huge apparatus—bureaucracy. As a type of bureaucracy, the large corporations are only matched by the public bureaucracy.

There are certain social consequences that follow from modern bureaucratic organisations. Firstly, the rational basis of bureaucracy with its emphasis on anonymity compels modern man to become an increasingly specialised expert qualified for accomplishment along specified channels of hierarchical order. As relationship and position of man in this system is determined by functional interaction, it leads to increasing dehumanization and the consequent reduction of subjective orientations. Secondly, it levels the social and economic differences, since merit and not ascriptive status becomes the principal criterion of its recruitment. Thirdly, the 'concentration of means of production' increasingly expropriates resources from autonomous groups and individuals, for running the organisation. And finally, a developed bureaucracy sustains a system of authority relationships that has an element of permanence.

BUREAUCRACY IN SOVIET VIEW

As for the Soviet conception of bureaucracy, it has been influenced

*The term 'Western' in this study is limited to USA and UK.

†From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1977, pp. 100-113.

[1]For different facets of Weber's analysis, see "Bureaucracy" in H.H. Garth and C. Wright Mills (tr. and eds.), From *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 196-244.

by the Marxist theory of state as defined and adapted by the Soviet ideologies.[2] There are three basic elements in the Marxist perception of the state. First, state is an organ of class domination. Secondly, its aim is to create an order which legalises and perpetuates the oppression of one class by moderating class conflicts. Thirdly, state is a temporary phenomenon; it will wither away with the abolition of classes. In advocating the abolition of the state, however, the Marxist theory does not rule out imperative of having an administrative machinery in a society. It contends that unlike the capitalist society, in a communist society agencies of administration will be organised on the principle of representation and their functioning will be conditioned by social division of labour. In this context, the function of administration primarily relates to the management of the level and the varied modes of production in the light of the social priorities at a given point of time. In other words, it ceases to remain merely as an instrument of coercion and becomes responsible to society.

When the Bolsheviks under Lenin came to power with the promise of replacing the existing centralised state power structure—based on civil bureaucracy and military—with a new one based on 'armed workers'[3] they soon realised that revolutionary rhetoric or spontaneity was no substitute for experience in the art of administration. Thus, with rationality as the basis of administration, the new regime could not afford to dispense with the Czarist specialists and bureaucrats. The new regime enlisted them in its service under the control and guidance of the Communist Party. Its ideological rationale was that socialism could be built only by combining the Soviet Government and Soviet administration with the modern achievements of capitalism. Under Stalin, the Leninist formulations were more vigorously pursued for the purpose of defending socialism in the country and the forced industrial development. The administrative pattern that he had evolved was one of extreme centralisation which had more generalised advantages as long as trained and experienced administrators were scarce and the economy was not complex. Since Stalin's death, the Soviet theory of state underwent certain significant transformation (especially during Khruschev's tenure). It was contended in the CPSU programme at the 22nd Congress that instead of being the last stage in political development, prior to the withering away of the state, the dictatorship of the proletariat gives way

[2]For an overview of the Soviet theory of State, see O.V. Kuusinin (ed.), *Fundamentals of Marxism and Leninism*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, pp. 192-93, 636-39, 728-43, 755-59.

[3]"The State and Revolution", see V.I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947, p. 220.

to the "state of all the people."[4] This stage of political development was viewed as one of transferring separate state functions to different social organisations and, thereby, gradually transforming the various social and political organs of the state into agencies of "public communist self-government".[5]

Evidently, the western and Soviet conceptions of bureaucracy differ in regard to its specific functions and role. Weber views bureaucratic organisation in a value-neutral context; it stands for rationality and machine-like efficiency. In Marxist-Leninist conception it is an organ of political coercion in a class-society. Weber underlines the continuity and permanence of bureaucracy and considers it as an indispensable machinery for managing a complex industrial society. In the Soviet viewpoint, old bureaucracy needs to be replaced by a new one based on elective principle and responsible to the society. These differences apart, the Soviet theory does emphasise the continuance of administration (though on a social basis) even after the so-called withering away of the Soviet state. Theoretically, it denotes the management of manifold public affairs on specific functional basis without the impingement of states' coercive political role.

ATTRIBUTES OF BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucratic organisation in western democratic and socialist nations alike assumes greater responsibility in managing economic, social and political spheres of civic life. In UK railroads, aviation, the banking system, the production of coal, gas and electricity, etc., have come under direct government control.[6] In contrast, regulation and indirect control rather than direct ownership and administration are the rule in the US.[7]

[4]This formulation seems to have been shelved by the post-Khruschev Soviet leadership. According to Soviet dissident view, the process of liberalization initiated in the Soviet system under Khrushchev has been undergoing through certain "regression" since the latter's political exit. (See, Roy, Medvedev, tr. and ed. by Ellende Kadt, *On Socialist Democracy*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975, Ch. 1).

[5]Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22nd Congress, October 1961. (See, Charlotte Saikowski. and Leon Gruliouw (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies IV: The Documentary Record of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 14-31.)

[6]For a perceptive treatment of the characteristics of the bureaucratic organizations in US, see, Hilton M. Power, "The British Civil Service: Its Present Methods of Recruitment and Promotion and Their Implications for New States", in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative*, Boston, Alyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967, pp. 118-134.

[7]The American system of administration is basically federal which delegates considerable freedom of action not only to regions and local communities but also to government agencies of public corporations. For a general treatment of the Public Administration in the USA, see Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, New York, Macmillan, 1955.

In the Soviet Union almost every type of economic activity and enterprise is under direct state control. All these activities—whether public or private (depending on the particular state), are run by the huge bureaucratic apparatus. In order to handle these manifold tasks bureaucracy must be well-organised, competent and efficient and must have specified ground rules for policy formulation as well as execution. Within its internal structure there must be a clear distinction between staff and operational personnel.

Evidently, one attribute of all bureaucratic organisations is the implementation of commands through an administrative staff. Weber deals with some of the basic principles of its structure. These prerequisites[8] may be summed up in brief : *(i)* defined rights and duties prescribed in written regulations; *(ii)* systematically ordered authority relationship; *(iii)* promotions regulated by merit and seniority; *(iv)* technical competence as a formal condition of employment; *(v)* fixed monetary salaries; *(vi)* strict separation of office and the incumbent in the sense that the employee does not own the means of administration and cannot appropriate the position; *(vii)* administrative work as a full time occuption ; *(viii)* operations governed by a consistent system of abstract rules and consistent in application of these rules to particular cases.

In his analysis of administrative structure, Weber concentrates on official regulations and requirements and their relevance for administrative efficiency. In spite of the inadequacies of the Weberian monocratic model, it continues to remain an organisational ideal in the modern nation-states of the western type. It has been perceptively noted by some that 'modern organisations' are structured more on the 'parent-child relationship' than on the "adult relationships of specialist equals and colleagues."[9] In this model superior is the 'only source' of 'legitimate influence' upon the subordinates.

The compact definition of bureaucracy has been the one given by Thompson that states, "superimposed upon the highly elaborated division of work in such organizations is an also highly elaborated hierarchy of authority."[10] It tends to view bureaucracy within a flexible frame of reference. In its operation, bureaucracy in the modern context reflects a complex process consisting of interdependent roles structured in order of priorities. Some of the obvious examples of bureaucratic organisations would be the various governmental departments/agencies,

[8]See, Weber, *op. cit.*

[9]Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961, p. 20.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

and business organisations.[11] Evidently, in terms of its essence and scope, modern bureaucratic organisations should be viewed from the standpoint of how relevant decisions are made within given structural determinants (of various role occupants' behaviour) in the context of the wider social setting In other words, administrative system-maintenance, or goal gratification and environmental transformation capabilities are salient features of modern bureaucratic organisations.

In the Soviet Union, the organisational structure as well as the process of decision-making, either at the level of the state organs or the party apparatus, are guided by the principles of democratic centralism, dual subordination, and production territorial criterion. The term democratic centralism[12] denotes the permissibility of dissent or debate to the extent that it does not jeopardise organisational unity of action already agreed upon. In addition, it also calls for 'absolutely binding character of decisions of higher bodies on lower bodies'. The principle of dual subordination makes each administrative unit responsible to the popular assembly which apparently created its and vertically, to the corresponding organ at the next level in the hierachical chain. The production-territorial principle assumes that within a particular geographical area, all enterprises engaged in a given line of production would be coordinated within one administrative hierarchy.

FORMS OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

Generally speaking, operative methods of the Soviet administrative apparatus are based on the concepts of *edinonchalie* or "one-man-management" and collegiate management. Theoretically, these two concepts stand for two different forms of organisation within the Soviet system—board governed or individually managed agencies. In practice, however, both the principles are involved in the operation of all Soviet agencies—irrespective of their cited form.[13] If the principle of collegiality seeks to ensure collective leadership in making of decisions regarding vital problems, "one-man-management principle", on the other hand, has been so conceived as to inhibit shirking of individual respon-

[11]There are various non-bureaucratic organizations, like families, religious or educational institutions. But as some of these organizations, especially the educational institutions, organize their functions on the basis of specialization and specific expertise, they tend to become more bureaucratic in their operation.

[12]For the different implications of the concept, see "The Statutes of the CPSU", reprinted in Joseph L. Nogee, (ed.), *Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union*, New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 97-100.

[13]For an insight into the relative saliency of these principles, see Iu. M. Kozlov, "The Relationship Between Collegial and One-Man Management in Soviet State Administration at the Present Stage of Development", in *Soviet Law and Government*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Fall 1964, pp. 3-12.

sibility by entrusting precise task to any one in charge of an agency or a bureau.[14]

Unlike the western system, however, there are no specific checks and balances within the Soviet administrative machinery. The functions of the Soviet Government are controlled and guided by the Communist Party. The Soviet constitution accepts the sole directing role of CPSU within certain limits.[15] It has created parallel state and party bureaucratic structures designed to organise, direct, and control the entire economy. This is indicative of the fact that in the Soviet Union, economic decision-making in general is a function of the ideological guidelines as laid down by the Party. But despite its pre-eminent position, it has never been the goal of the CPSU to replace the Soviet state bureaucracy. The role of the Communist Party has been sometimes described as that of the 'stockholders' in modern corporations.[16] Like the major shareholders in business corporations, the Party's central committee and that committee's presidium, along with the secretariat, may be considered as agencies which fulfil the function of the board of directors. As the sovereign body, the Party has the complete authority to formulate goals and shape decisions relating to social, economic, and political spheres of the entire society.

Since this system of organisation is controlled by the CPSU, elite recruitment is principally planned and supervised by the Party's central organs. The method of recruitment in the Soviet Union is exceptionally centralised and is also an extremely 'political civil system'. It operates through what is known as the 'nomenklatura'—a comprehensive set of job categories and descriptions, defined as a list of posts confirmed by superior organisations.[17] It is administered, in accordance with their status by the Party and the government. This system seeks to ensure standardisation of selection norms, tenure of office, and promotion based on competence and ideological commitment. Evidently, inclusion in the 'nomenklatura' list is not determined by any test, but by the recognition of one's efficiency and merit in a particular field or profession. In spite

[14]The concept of "one-man-management" should not be considered in an unlimited sense. First, it stipulates the making of decisions only of a routine nature by an agency incharge without reference to the Party or trade union organizations. Secondly, important decisions are usually made by the Party organs though implemented bv the relevant governmental organ. For details see, Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industriat Decision-Making*, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 80-100.

[15]For role of the CPSU, see, text of the Soviet Constitution, John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1968, reprinted in pp. 219-257.

[16]See, David Granick, *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry*, Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., pp. 159-71.

[17]See, Hough, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30, 114-16, 151-69.

of this criterion of professional competence, Soviet bureaucracy has been essentially staffed by loyal party members. In fact, recognised scientists or technocrats who are in the 'nomenklatura' list are supposed to join the Party.

In the western political systems, there are widely varying patterns of bureaucratic recruitment. The American system is based on open recruitment as opposed to the British system of competitive entry into the civil service.[18] Because of the general availability of highly trained and technically competent persons in the open labour market, the US bureaucracy draws its personnel, especially for the higher posts, from this vast reservoir. The British practice is to recruit personnel from the universities and schools. The second basic difference between the two systems is that while the US civil service recruitment is largely programme-based, the British administrative system recruits for careers in the state services, generally. Evidently, the US system reflects preference for persons with specialised knowledge in contrast to the British stress on generalists. In many ways, the US recruitment pattern is similar to that of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet system, specialists are employed not only in particular occupational posts but also in senior administrative and managerial posts.

The Soviet administrative system conforms to a monocratic model that does not permit internal conflict. It is a one party administration in which no representative body is permitted to intervene, for the former claims a monopoly on the representation of interests of all people. Control of the state apparatus is the primary means through which the Communist Party exercises control over every sphere of the society. As stated above, the Party bureaucracy operates parallel to and almost penetrates into the state bureaucracy. Its members become *apparatchiki*. A Soviet apparatchiki can opt either for a career in the Party apparatus or in the state bureaucracy. But since the Party apparatus is the most important bureaucracy, the power of the apparatchiki is determined by his position in the Party organisation. According to Brzezinski and Huntington 'organization position' to him is what "votes are to the American politicians."[19]

The British and the US political systems are characterised by what Almond and Verba called the 'civic culture'. They describe it as a

[18]For a comparative treatment see Wallace S. Sayre, "Bureaucracies: Some Contrasts in System", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. X, No. 2, April-June 1964, pp. 219-29. Also see Hilton H. Power, "The British Civil Service: Its Present Methods of Recruitment and Promotion and their Implications for New States", in Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-34.

[19]Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Huntington, P. Samuel, *Political Power: USA/USSR: Similarities and Contrasts/Convergence or Evolution*, New York, Viking Press, 1965, p. 149.

political culture that is, 'participant' and 'pluralistic'—based on 'communication and persuasion', a "culture of consensus and diversity" —"a culture that permitted change but moderated it".[20] The congruence of the political culture and political structure gives a relatively stable political system based on well established principles of legitimacy. The 'gradualist pattern' of political development is also reflected in their administrative adaptations. In view of this development, the 'political theme' is always dominant which inhibits the total assumption of the government's responsibility by administrative apparatus.[21]

STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS IN FORMAL BUREAUCRATIC SET-UP

It is important to note here that formal bureaucratic structure (based on specific ground rules) by itself cannot ensure either operational efficiency or an effective system maintenance. Though the Weberian 'ideal' model of bureaucracy with its assumed rational operation and the mechanism of depersonalisation and oppressive routine, provides a working frame of reference, it does not offer a fail-safe mechanism to handle the dynamics of modern technological development. In order to operationalise the formal bureaucratic structure, it is quite imperative not only to relate it to the wider developmental context but also to take note of the psychological tension of the personnel produced by oppressive routine or unfavourable working conditions.

The problems of bureaucratic operations may be adduced to the inherent imbalance between three basic structural characteristics, *viz.*, hierarchical command, specialisation and competence. There are certain basic contradictions involved in the principles relating to these structural features. For instance, the concept of hierarchy based on authority comes into perpetual conflict with the trends towards specialisation or decentralisation determined by functional specificity. In other words, the most ideal-type bureaucracy has a built-in 'irrationality'. The second major weakness of an ideal type bureaucracy is that it assumes its personnel as behaving like machines, subject to precise control. Since human beings do not exhibit similar comprehension and are not completely devoid of subjective orientations, it is inconceivable that, in real life, bureaucracies would be able to operate with personnel completely dehumanised or turned into machines. It should, however, be noted here that some of the irrational behaviour or orientations noticeable in bureaucratic organisations are not merely the function of individual psychology but they are the result of the 'structural deter-

[20]Gabriel A. Almond, and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1965.

[21]See, Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1966, p. 46.

minants'. In order to comprehend the basic characteristics of the modern bureaucratic organisations, it is necessary to focus on the effect of various organisational activities and relationships upon two sets of values, *viz.*, the 'formal', 'external' goal of the organisation and the 'personal goals' of the role occupants.[22] It is, however equally worth noting that the outcome of a relevant decisional process within an organisation is likely to be determined by the 'interplay' of the cited two sets of values.[23]

SINGLE-LINE COMMAND

All bureaucratic organisations are hierarchically structured in a 'single line of command' which receives information and communicates directives. In the Soviet Union it takes the form of one-man-management responsibility in the functioning of the administrative machinery. Like its western counterparts (which are responsible to the legislature), the Soviet administration has a subordinate relationship with the Party—an extra-governmental institution. There is, however, an element of paradox in the Soviet system. Though the Soviet bureaucracy is beyond popular control it is more subservient to the Party and is supposed to fulfil its responsibility according to the priorities laid down by the latter.

In spite of this stress on 'single line of command' there are reasons to believe that this principle in practice is greatly qualified by the concept of collegial decision-making and the growing dependence on the staff experts. With the ever increasing trend toward specialisation and the complexity of the modern technological development, it is inconceivable that the policy directives can be formulated on the basis of single line of information flows. There are two interrelated implications here. To the extent the complexity of the task and the increased size of modern bureaucracy demand greater decentralisation and the delegation of its activities, it creates problems of ensuring control of the top command. On the other hand it creates tension between hierarchy and specialisation on account of the difficulty of 'fitting specialisation' into the older hierarchical framework.[24] It tends

[22]Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[23]For a discussion on the various facets of the interrelationship between "Human behaviour and organization", see, Herbert A. Simon, *et. al.*, *Public Administration*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. pp. 55-90.

[24]What is more, specialisation in technical and administrative functions could also give rise to group interests of a specific type. For an interesting treatment in regard to the Soviet system, see, Gordon H. Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses", in Gordon H. Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds.), *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, N J., Princeton University Press, 1971, Ch. II.

to keep administrative chiefs responsible for the execution of the decision actually made by the experts.

In view of this consideration bureaucracy has constantly to reorganise and adjust its structure to handle the more challenging tasks of coordinating increasingly complex activities. Although this constitutes only one of the prerequisites for ensuring organisational efficiency, bureaucratic hierarchs quite often become so much obsessed with the formal organisational forms that they tend to forget the other important elements. This phenomenon sometimes described as 'bureaupathology' prevails in every bureaucratic organisation whether in the west or in the Soviet Union.[25] This is the symptom of the sense of insecurity produced by the widening gaps between managerial authority and specialised ability in the modern organisation. And the consequent 'bureaupathic behaviour' is the reflection of an attempt to reduce this sense of insecurity through the insistence on formalised rules and regulations.

This behaviour pattern is certainly dysfunctional from the viewpoint of organisational goals and efficiency. It is quite safe to assume, at least theoretically, that since the Soviet bureaucracy, unlike the western governmental agencies, or the big corporations, has the monopoly of administration of every aspect of the society, it is likely to exhibibit relatively greater bureaupathic tendencies.

If the maladjustment between specialisation and hierarchical roles produced exaggerated bureaucratic behaviour among insecure persons, the complexity and impersonality of modern organisation also produce a nonadjustive, reactive behaviour, what Thompson describes as 'bureautic.'[26] This behaviour is the effect of personal 'immaturity' which does not enable a person to adjust to the requirements of the modern organisation and thereby producing in him a sense of alienation or powerlessness. Though this phenomenon is more conspicuously reflected in a 'distinct ideological group' of the conservative type in contrast to that of the radical variety,[27] it is not inconceivable that it could also prevail among the Soviet administrators, especially those who were trained in the old Bolshevik school of simple administration.

[25]Alfred G., Mayer, *The Soviet Political System*, New York, Random House, 1965, pp. 209-210. The term 'bureaupathology' has been coined by Thompson., *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

[26]Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-77.

[27]Alvine W., Gouldner, "Red Tape as a Social Problem", in Robert K. Morton, *et al.*, (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy*, Glencoe, Ill. The Free Press, 1960, pp. 418. Incidentally, it is the 'conservatives' who have developed the culturally familiar epithet "red tape" as a way of giving expression to their resentment against the complexity of the bureaucratic machine and its dull routines, *op. cit*.

INFORMAL STRUCTURE

No set of rules or structures can project in advance every contingency that an organisation encounters. Hence informal structures spring up spontaneously to implement the formal goals of the organisation. They are, however, not controlled by the top hierarchs. Informal elements in the organisation are inevitable because the pattern of interaction between human beings—as different role occupants—cannot be kept rigidly rule-bound even in a highly formal setting. What is more, informal interaction in this context is also motivated by self-interest.

In the Soviet Union informal organisation makes inroads into formal bureaucratic structures in various forms.[28] First, the rigidity of the structured communication produces what has been called the 'out-of-channel communication'. Its basic purpose is to get things done through illicit communications. These communications become so formalised that even the Party, or other control agencies, also become a part of this interaction process. Secondly, it also takes the shape of familial ties. For instance, some kind of mutually 'protective' relationships may develop between the Party and the administrative agencies or between the various state organisations in total disregard of the norms of the command chain. Thirdly, there is a tendency among the Soviet administrators to evade decision-making responsibility. The Party has persistently tried to combat this chronic 'buckpassing'. Fourthly, another informal structure that is produced by the proliferation of new organisations and the expansion of functions and scope, relates to a 'complex evasion system'. Faced with bottlenecks, produced by detailed paperwork and rigidity to rules and regulations, the bureaucrats take resort to various evasive tactics to fulfil their allotted tasks under the plan. They may minimise in their reports the capacity of their organisations so that the work load will be less or maximise their attainments by lowering the standards or inflated records.

Finally, although the Soviet system is based on the monocratic principle, it is equally competitive and this permits bargaining of an informal basis. Since all administrators are subject to rewards or punishments depending on their performance, in fighting for their success they try to build up their own agencies.

Given the limited resources and decision-making bottlenecks in the system, all the agencies tend to behave as competitive groups. The effects of this competition is a process of bargaining between various agencies which has led to the emergence of special expeditors *(tolkachi)*.

[28]The following discussion is based on Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-37. For further insights see, David Granick, *The Red Executive*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1961, pp. 148-150.

His job is to induce suppliers to meet their schedules or, if this fails, to find available supplies that the plan did not allocate to the expeditors' agencies.

In any bureaucratic organisation there is constant need to provide mechanisms of control or check on fulfilment of orders and adherence to regulations from quality specification to safety rules. This supervisoy task is largely built into the hierarchy of authority, *i.e.*, the obligation of the hierarchs to check on the performance of the subordinates. However, to the extent such enforcement through organisational hierarchy is inadequate, there is need for specialised control agencies outside the regular line structure. Such specialised control agencies increase the accountability of the organisation. Besides, such specialised agencies are also needed for coordinating the activities of the different organisational agencies.

In the Soviet Union, despite the explicit directions issued by the Party and superior administrative officials, all exigencies cannot be foreseen, and all administrators are required to make independent decisions. The Soviet system therefore requires numerous controls to ensure that decisions conform with Party policy and overall state plan. Policy making is the prerogative of the Party, and the state machinery exists only to execute its political and economic decisions. The Party is organised as a command structure in which information relating to various requirements are collected and collated for the transmission of policies and directives below. Party's decision-making role, however, is not uniform in regard to certain state agencies like Gosplan of the Ministry of Finance, which are concerned with more specialised and technical functions. The broad responsibility for economic plan or the budget is borne by the experts in these two agencies.

Through a network of interlocking directorates, Party control is ensured at each hierarchical level of the state bureaucratic organisations. The Party supervises every major organisation and undertaking through its units. In recent years attempts have been made to control and coordinate the various executive and administrative functions of the Party state agencies. Following the reorganisational scheme, a USSR peoples' control committee has been instituted with a view to verify Party and state policy directives and to prevent bureaucratic waste.

In the Soviet bureaucratic organisation, any official is subject to accountability to multiplicity of control: by the Party, the legal apparatus, the planning agencies, the political policy and the control organs. But in terms of the authority structure of the society, the Soviet system reflects the Party's attempt to ensure efficiency and implement policy decisions through a mechanism of check and countercheck.

There is, however, a degree of ambivalence in this control mechanism. The system may overlook violations of certain norms of behaviour

provided it is counterbalanced by success. With success as the criterion of the Soviet system, it naturally generates administrative ingenuity at all levels, in perceiving the Party priorities and the requisite steps for their fulfilment. Soviet administrative control mechanism is, therefore, restrictive in nature.

In one important sense, the Soviet administrator is not unlike that of his counterparts elsewhere in the world. He is not overzealous to any commitment which he knows he cannot fulfil. Or, in other words, he does what he can "to secure plan targets" which are attainable and 'within his capacity'.[29] But at the same time, unlike his counterparts in the west, the Soviet administrator must succeed in fulfilling performance indices of the enterprise concerned, or else he is likely to face a quick transfer if not sudden demotion in the social standing.[30]

The role of recruitment or selection is an important factor in the actual functioning of the bureaucracy. Like bureaucratic organisations in other parts of the world, the Soviet system also faces the problem of evolving certain concrete norms of bureaucratic efficiency against which the proficiency of the personnel (before or after the recruitment) and the performance of the organisation may be compared. Besides, there is the added problem of making a balance between the subjective considerations (*i.e.*, loyalty to the Party), and the more concrete technical requirements, in the personnel recruitment policy.

In the Soviet system there is an apparent tendency to combine the programme staffing system with the career staffing system as in the USA. The Soviet career staffing, however, is not based on 'tenure', and the recruitment is usually made without a competitive examination. They rely on the schools and the universities for the supply of the various types of specialists. Since education is state controlled, courses can be so structured that they can produce the trained personnel according to governmental plan requirements.[31] In addition to this general system of schools and universities, certain agencies have their own training schools.

[29]Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case", in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 261.

[30]It should be noted that during the pre-second world war period, promotion and demotion of industrial managers in the Soviet Union had been extremely rapid. In contrast to this earlier trend, by the 1960s promotions or inter-enterprise mobility: have become relatively limited. For a recent comparative perspective of this aspect see, David Granick, *Managerial Comparisons of Four Developed Countries France, Britain, United States and Russia*, Cambridge. Mass. MIT Press, 1972.

[31]For an overview of the Soviet educational system and as it pertains to certain aspects of management training, see, Granick, *op. cit*, f.n. 16, pp. 46-73.

A COMPARATIVE PATTERN

Any meaningful construction of a comparative paradigm of bureaucracies consists in isolating those characteristics, either functional or operational, which are discernible in any social system despite the structural differences. It obviously underlines the efficacy of analysing bureaucratic organisations within a systemic frame of reference (based on interdependent roles) rather than in terms of isolated relationships as prescribed by the formal legal-role structure. It has been demonstrated above that neither the formal institutional structure nor the nature of the wider political system clearly underlines the actual style of functioning of bureaucracy or its informal inputs. Some of the relevant questions that have been handled in this context on the basis of a comparison between the Soviet and the western bureaucratic organisations may be briefly mentioned.

First, what are the basic functions of bureaucracy? Secondly, what are the structural characteristics of bureaucracy? Thirdly, do they necessarily determine the actual functioning or the efficiency of bureaucracy? If not, is there any other latent structural pattern beneath the formal structure? Finally, what are the operational constraints of a bureaucratic organisation? And what are the adjustment mechanisms?

In answering these questions it has been shown above that bureaucratic organisations in a complex industrial society exhibit certain similar traits or orientations. Bureaucratic organisations whether in the west or in the Soviet Union perform some important social functions. Some of the common attributes of these organised are: hierarchically ordered structure, use of rules and regulations, impersonality of operations, division of labour, complexity of administrative tasks, and employment of trained personnel either on a career or programme basis.

In analysing the Soviet and the western bureaucracies it has been further demonstrated that formal attributes by themselves do not ensure the operational efficiency of a bureaucratic organisation. In spite of the over-simplified view of the Soviet system as a huge monolithic structure, it has been noted above how Soviet bureaucratic organisations, like their western counterparts, do develop pluralism and informal interaction patterns on familial basis.

Finally, like the big corporations or the governmental agencies in the USA or UK, the Soviet organisations also suffer from the weaknesses of 'bureaupathic' behaviour that create bottlenecks in their operations. This is due to the perennial problem of insecurity that results from imbalance between the hierarchical authority and specialised ability. These dysfunctional tendencies may be mitigated either by periodic structural adjustment for improved coordination or by the control imposed by certain external agencies to which the bureaucratic organisa-

tions remain accountable. In the west, governmental agencies are not only responsible to the legislative bodies but also are mutually counter-poised. In the Soviet Union, though the bureaucratic organisations are theoretically responsible to the Party, they are also answerable to the various control agencies. ☐

The Origins of the Public Bureaucracies in the ASEAN Countries*

Jon S.T. Quah

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to initiate comparative research on the public bureaucracies in the five member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. More specifically, this paper focuses on the origins of the public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries and is an attempt to: (1) as certain whether the theories of the origins of bureaucracy propounded by two western scholars apply to these countries; and (2) identify and explain similarities and differences in the origins of the ASEAN public bureaucracies.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to justify the research focus. First, a review of the literature on public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries reveals that little or no comparative research has been done in this area.[1] Indeed, the dominant research emphasis has been on the case of country study approach and this is reflected in the various case studies on the public bureaucracies in these countries.[2] As many case studies are now readily available, it is necessary to proceed beyond them by encouraging studies of a comparative nature. This paper is a modest attempt in this direction.

Second, the decision to focus on the ASEAN countries is based on two grounds. In the first place, these countries have been associated with each other in the ASEAN since August 8, 1967; and have since then accelerated their efforts in regional cooperation especially after the fall of the incumbent Cambodian and South Vietnamese governments to the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese respectively in April 1975. These efforts at cooperation have culminated in the first ASEAN summit meeting among the heads of government of the five member states in Bali in late February 1976. The second reason for focusing on the

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1978, pp 400-429.

[1]A good comparative study is Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1966. However only one of the five ASEAN countries—Malaysia—receives attention in this volume.

[2]See the studies quoted in the section below on the origins of the ASEAN public bureaucracies.

ASEAN countries is that they provide a very interesting base for comparative analysis because of their diversity in colonial heritage, population (in terms of the various religions, languages, customs and ethnic composition), structures and styles of government, physical environment and geographical location.[3] For instance, in terms of their former colonial background, it is wellknown that both Singapore and Malaysia have been colonised by the British, the Philippines by the Spanish and Americans. Indonesia by the Dutch; but Thailand has never been made a colony by a western power.

The term 'public bureaucracies' as used here refers to the governmental bureaucracies or civil service system found in most countries today.[4] It excludes the military as well as the various quasi-governmental bodies or public enterprises in a country as these are usually not considered to be part of the civil service. In other words, this paper is only concerned with the origins of the civil service in the ASEAN countries and does not deal with the beginnings of the military, semi-governmental agencies or public enterprises in these countries.

Ideally, comparative research should be initiated on various aspects of the ASEAN public bureaucracies such as their origins, structure, evolution and performance, to name only a few. As it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all these aspects, it has been decided to focus on the origins of these bureaucracies simply because scholars have so far neglected this topic in their comparative research. Moreover, apart from being the logical place to start with, research on the origins of the ASEAN public bureaucracies can help both scholars and bureaucrats to understand better the nature of some of the contemporary problems facing these bureaucracies.

There are three major sections in this paper. The following section is theoretical in nature and provides a brief review of the literature on the origins of bureaucracy by summarising the views of two scholars, namely, Max Weber and Anthony Downs. The second section describes the origins of the public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries by relying on the available published sources. The final section links the first two sections together by identifying the reasons for the rise of the ASEAN public bureaucracies and accounting for any similarities or differences in their origins.

According to Martin Albrow, the term 'bureaucracy' was first used by the Frenchman, M. de Gournay in the eighteenth century to refer to

[3]For more details see Bernhard Dahm and Werner Draguhn (eds.), *Politics, Society and Economy in the ASEAN States*, Hamburg, Institute of Asian Affairs, 1975.

[4]Robert L. Peabody and Francis E. Rourke, "Public Bureaucracies," James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965, p. 803; and Louis Fougere (ed.), *Civil Service Systems*, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1967.

"a fourth or fifth form of government" in which "officers, clerks, secretaries, inspectors and *intendants* are not appointed to benefit the public interest, indeed the public interest appears to have been established so that offices might exist."[5] However, the credit for popularising the use of this concept in the social sciences should go to Max Weber because of his seminal work on bureaucracy.[6] It is, therefore, appropriate to begin this review of the literature with Weber's ideas and then proceed to discuss the views of another distinguished and more recent students of bureaucracy, Anthony Downs. In other words, these two scholars have been selected on the basis of their writings on bureaucracy.

WEBER'S FORMULATION

Max Weber (1864-1920) was the first sociologist to attempt a systematic study of bureaucracy. His major contribution to the study of organisations is his typology of authority which forms the basis of distinguishing between different organisations. He identifies three pure types of authority, namely, traditional, charismatic and legal-rational, each of which is characteristic of a particular administrative apparatus or organisation. This distinction is based on the kind of claim to legitimacy made by each type of authority. For traditional and charismatic authority, the obligation is to a person, the traditional chief or the heroic or messianic leader. Legal-rational authority is more restricted in scope, and obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal network of positions.[7] Organisations can thus be differentiated according to their authority structures, *i.e.*, traditional, charismatic, and legal rational (or bureaucratic).

A bureaucracy or bureaucratic organisation is characterised by the following features: (1) "a continuous organisation of official functions bound by rules"; (2) high degree of specialisation; (3) hierarchical authority structure with specified areas of command and responsibility; (4) impersonal nature of relationships between organisational members; (5) recruitment of officials on the basis of achievement criteria (*i.e.*, ability and technical knowledge); (6) separation of private and official income and fortune; and (7) documentary basis of official business.[8]

[5]Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, London, Macmillan, 1970, p. 16.

[6]See H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Prsss, 1946, and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*. trans. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York. Oxford University Press, 1947.

[7]See Jon S.T. Quah, "Organizational Authority: A Critical Review of the Literature" *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 1973, pp. 149-150.

[8]Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 53-54. See also Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-204.

All these features are related to each other in the sense that all of them illustrate "the existence of a system of control based on rational rules, rules which try to regulate the whole organisational structure and process on the basis of technical knowledge and with the aim of maximum efficiency".[9] Indeed, Weber has contended that a bureaucracy is technically the most efficient form of organisation possible. According to him:

> Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organisation—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organisation and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.[10]

These technical advantages of bureaucracy over other forms of organisation are responsible for its advance. In other words, one of the reasons for the origins of bureaucracy is its purely technical superiority over other types of organisation. Such technical advantages allow the bureaucrats to take care of both the quantitative and qualitative changes of administrative tasks in modern states which are "absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis".[11] A bureaucratic organisation is necessary for handling both kinds of changes but "bureaucratization is occasioned more by intensive and qualitative enlargement and internal deployment of the scope of administrative tasks than by their extensive and quantitative increase".[12] Examples of qualitative changes of administrative tasks in a modern state include the various activities performed by the government in pursuing a social welfare policy and in administering such modern means of communication as roads, waterways, railways, and the telegraph. In short, the second reason for the emergence of bureaucracy is the quantitative and qualitative changes of administrative tasks in modern states which necessitate its formation.

[9]Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories*, Chicago, Aldine, 1967, p. 39.

[10]Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

[11]Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-214.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 212.

The third factor responsible for the origins of bureaucracy is the development of a money economy which provides a constant income for maintaining a bureaucracy through the payment of salaries to its officials. Weber's argument is as follows:

> The development of the *money economy,* insofar as a pecuniary compensation of the officials is concerned, is a presupposition of bureaucracy....According to experience, the relative optimum for the success and maintenance of a strict mechanization of the bureaucratic apparatus is offered by a secured money salary connected with the opportunity of a career that is not dependent upon mere accident and arbitrariness.[13]

The final cause of bureaucracy identified by Weber is related to one of its hallmarks; the existence of rules which regulate the performance of official functions. Apart from being labour-saving devices (in the sense of removing the necessity of formulating a new solution for every problem and case), such rules (or standard operating procedures as they are now called) ensure that the clientele of a bureaucracy receive uniform and impartial treatment from its officials.[14] In short, a bureaucratic organisation contributes towards the levelling of socio-economic differences in a society by providing standardised and fair treatment to its clients regardless of their social status, ethnic group or religion. Not surprisingly, bureaucracy is thus an inevitable concomitant of modern mass democracy as one of the major concerns of the latter is the reduction of socio-economic differences in society.[15]

DOWNS' FORMULATION

Anthony Downs describes the life cycle of bureaus by first specifying the four ways in which bureaus are created.[16] The first type of bureau genesis is by the means of what Weber has described as the "routinization of charisma". According to Weber, one of the consequences of the latter is the "creation and appropriation of individual positions and the corresponding economic advantages" by the administrative staff for its members. Three alternatives are possible: (1) if benefices are developed, a praebendal organisation is the result; (2) if offices are created, the outcome is patrimonialism bureaucracy; and (3) feudalism is the consequence of the development of fiefs. Downs is actually referring to the second alternative of the transformation of the charismatic mission

[13]Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 204 and 208.
[14]Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
[15]Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-228.
[16]Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967, p. 5.

into an office when he identifies the routinisation of charisma as one of the types of bureau genesis. However, he fails to mention Weber's observation that patrimonialism rather than bureaucracy is the more common consequence of such routinisation of charisma.[17]

The remaining three types of bureau genesis are less controversial and also more common. Downs contends that a second way of bureau genesis is the creation of a bureau by social groups in order to fulfil specific functions. Most of the federal agencies which emerged during the New Deal years in the United States were created in this way. The third method of bureau formation involves the splitting off of a new bureau from an existing one. An example of this is the splitting off of the US air force from the army after World War II. Finally, a bureau can be formed by means of the entrepreneurship of a few zealots.

After identifying the various ways in which bureaus can be formed, Downy proceeds to explain why such bureaus are necessary.[18] In a democracy, non-market-oriented organisations are needed to perform those important social functions which involve external costs or benefits. Such organisations can intervene in markets to ensure that all the pertinent costs and benefits are considered in the decision-making process. Examples of social function incurring external costs or benefits include zoning controls, traffic regulations, and smoke suppression laws.

Second, non-market-oriented organisations capable of using coercion can be employed for allocating resources to collective goods which provide indivisible benefits. The performance of such vital functions as national defence, maintenance of law and order, enforcement of contracts, and education results in the provision of many indivisible benefits to every citizen in the country.

Third, non-market-oriented organisations are necessary for implementing policies concerned with redistribution of incomes in the society. Examples of such policies are those dealing with unemployment compensation, medical care for the poor, and aid to dependent children. Implementation of these policies is only possible if contributions are forthcoming from citizens to underwrite the costs involved. However, as most citizens will not contribute unless they are compelled to do so by law, the intervention of non-market-oriented organisation is required to ensure that this occurs.

Fourth, non-market oriented organisations also perform the function of regulating such monopolies as public utilities (gas, water and electricity supplies) and telecommunications in order to protect the consuming public. Related to this function is that of protecting the

[17]Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-373.

[18]The following discussion is a summary of Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

consumers from their own ignorance of incompetence by ensuring that such products as foods, drugs, cigarettes and water supplies are properly prepared and safe for consumption. Moreover, non-market agencies are sometimes formed to measure the performance of the economy or to conduct research in certain fields.

Finally, non-market-oriented organisations are necessary for maintaining the framework of law and order in a society as well as the government itself. In other words, certain agencies are required to perform the necessary 'housekeeping' functions for all the other government agencies. Examples of such bureaus in the United States include the Treasury Department, the General Services Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, and the General Accounting Office.

The preceding paragraphs have dealt with the origins of bureaucracy by reviewing the works of two distinguished scholars on bureaucracy. First, Weber's concept of bureaucracy has been briefly outlined and his analysis of the origins of bureaucracy discussed. He identifies four reasons for the emergence of bureaucracy : (1) its technical superiority over other types of organisation; (2) the quantitative and qualitative changes of administrative tasks in modern states; (3) the development of a money economy; and (4) and advent of modern mass democracy with its emphasis on alleviating socio-economic differences in society.

Second, Downs identifies four types of bureau genesis: (1) Weber's routinisation of charisma; (2) creation of a bureau by social groups in order to perform specific functions; (3) the splitting off of a new bureau from an existing one; and (4) through the entrepreneurship of a few zealots. He goes on to list the various functions performed by non-market-oriented organisations (or bureaucracies) namely, those social functions incurring external costs or benefits, the allocation of resources to collective goods which provide indivisible benefits, the implementation of policies dealing with redistribution of incomes, the regulation of monopolies, and the maintenance of the framework of law and order in the society.

In order to ascertain whether the above analysis of the origins of bureaucracy by Weber and Downs is useful for explaining the origins of the public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries, it is necessary for us to describe how these bureaucracies came into being.

What are the origins of the public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries? Information on this aspect of the ASEAN public bureaucracies is available from various sources which are employed here to provide a systematic picture of the beginnings of the public bureaucracies in the five countries. This section provides the idiographic data necessary for the nomothetic analysis to be undertaken in the next section as it describes in turn the origins of the public bureaucracy in each of the five countries.

ORIGINS OF INDONESIAN PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

The Indonesian public bureaucracy had its origins in the administrative system set up after the Dutch East India Company, formed in 1602, was liquidated in 1798. According to Djunaedi Hadisumarto, the initial stage of colonial administration under the Dutch East India Company (1602-1798) was "a period of private administration in which the company had secured the monopoly in trade operation".[19] The public bureaucracy did not emerge at that time as the Dutch East India Company was essentially a private trading company even though it was supported by the metropolitan government at home. One scholar, A.D.A. De Kat Angelino, described this feature of the Dutch East India Company in the following way:

> In the days of the Company there could scarcely be a question of a real administrative or judical organisation. The Company was a trading organisation and it always most frankly admitted its mercantile character. Its policy aimed at making as big and as quick profits as possible in order that it might pay large dividends to its shareholders. Therefore its organisation . . . was first of all a trading organisation. Apart from sailors, militarymen, a few judges, clergymen and schoolmasters, its personnel consisted of trade agents who were at the same time entrusted with diplomatic, administrative, judicial, and other functions which the Company saw itself compelled to delegate to its representatives as its own sovereignty increased.[20]

The Dutch East India Company implemented its policy of trade by imposing a system of indirect rule over the natives in the Netherlands Indies (as Indonesia was known then). Native chieftains were appointed as Regents to provide the produce and services required by the Company. In other words, the Company received free produce and labour from the Regents as a form of tribute. To ensure that these Regents performed their duties, European officials known as Residents were posted at suitable locations to supervise the work of the former. The Residents were assisted in their task by *Controleurs* (or inspectors), who had no authority but served as a link between the European Residents and the local Regents.[21]

However, "reckless financial administration in the Netherlands,

[19]Djunaedi Hadisumarto, *The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movements*, D.P.A. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1974, p. 105.

[20]A.D.A. De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, trans. by G J. Renièr, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1931, Vol. 2, pp. 2-3.

[21]J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands, India*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 21.

penurious treatment of its servants in the Netherlands Indies, and the breakdown of the commercial monopoly finally led to the fall of the Company".[22] Moreover, bribery and curruption were rife among the Company's personnel as their salaries were quite low. After the liquidation of the Company in 1798, the Netherlands Government appointed Lieutenant-General William Daendels as the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies. Daendels introduced drastic measures to curb corrupt behaviour among the Company's personnel and divided Java into administrative units resembling the French *prefects*. Cooperative native rulers were appointed as Regents and placed in charge of a part of the *prefects*, thus becoming colonial servants officially. Daendels also reorganised the personnel system by abolishing the previous ranks and replacing them with five classes of civil servants. Salary scales were standardized, detailed job-descriptions were provided and civil servants were expected to be competent and honest in the performance of their duties.[23] Thus, Daendels was able to transform "a commercial and loose organisation into a centralised state authority supported by a disciplined Dutch and Javanese administrative body "[24] In doing so, he was responsible for the emergence of thc civil service in the Netherlands Indies, which is the precursor of the contemporary Indonesian public bureaucracy.[25]

The civil service initiated by Daendels underwent further reforms during the remaining stages of colonial administration. During the British interregnum (1811-1816) the administration was similar to the British system of administration in South India as the Lieutenant-Governor, Stamford Raffles, had replaced the regency with the village as the unit of administration, Employed European magistrates and judges instead of Regents, and substituted land revenue collected in money through the village headman in place of compulsory contributions and services.[26]

After the British interlude, the Netherlands Indies became part of the Dutch colonial government asiatic possessions. During that period "there was a dual administration with an European civil service, charged with direction and inspection, and a native civil service, in which hereditary officials, governing on 'oriental lines' enforced the policy of government".[27] There were three classes of civil servants then: entrance to the first class hinged on a candidate's possession of a doctorate in law and his knowledge of the language, geography and

[22]Hadisumarto, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.
[23]*Ibid.*, p. 116.
[24]Angelino, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[25]Hadisumarto, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.
[26]Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
[27]Hadisumarto, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

ethnology of the East Indies; civil servants in the second class were those who had successfully completed those subjects considered to be important for the administrative service; and for those in the third class, the only requirement was a secondary school education. Officials in the first class were eligible for all positions in the Netherlands Indies, those in the second class were restricted from the judicial positions, while members of the third class were only offered the lower positions.[28]

The European civil servants were trained at the Royal Academy at Delft and the Institute at Leyden. In contrast, the training of the local civil servants was not given much emphasis and took the form of an initial stint at a training school or *Osvia* and a further period of three years' training at the Administrative School at Batavia after such officials had performed six or ten years of active service.[29]

Finally, although there was a unified salary scale, European civil servants received higher salaries and more fringe benefits than their local counterparts. Officially, both local and European civil servants were supposed to be treated equally in terms of emoluments, but in practice there were three salary groups (A, B and C) for the Native, Eurasian and European personnel respectively. Needless to say, the local officials received the lowest salaries and the European civil servants enjoyed much higher salaries.[30]

Dutch rule ended with the Japanese occupation of Indonesia from 1942-1945. As in the other ASEAN countries, the Japanese occupation accelerated, *inter alia*, the deepening of Indonesian national consciousness. Apart from arousing Indonesian nationalism, the Japanese occupation also gave the Indonesians opportunities to occupy important civil service positions vacated by the Dutch. Indeed, in the view of George M. Kahin:

> The Japanese had extremely few military government personnel and had to rely on Indonesians to fill most of the middle and upperbracket administrative and technical positions vacated by the Dutch and Eurasians. Thus almost all such Indonesian personnel found themselves advanced at least one and frequently two or three ranks in the hierarchy in which they had been employed.[31]

Such opportunities in important civil service positions provided excellent training for the Indonesians to prepare themselves to assume even

[28]Hadisumarto, *op. cit* , p. 131.

[29]*Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

[30]*Ibid.*, pp. 137-141. See also Sondang Paian Siagian, *The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in Indonesia*. Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1965, pp. 55-56.

[31]Quoted in Siagian, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

greater responsibilities in an independent Indonesia.

After the attainment of independence on August 17, 1945, Indonesia faced the problem of scarcity of trained personnel in the civil service mainly because of the exodus of large number of Dutch and Eurasian civil servants. This problem of lack of trained personnel was not tackled immediately by the Indonesian Government as the dutch attempt to re-colonise Indonesia after World War II resulted in a four-year revolutionary war. This problem was further aggravated after the war by the abundance of untrained civil servants who had been recruited into the civil service as a reward for their services in the revolutionary war of 1945-1949.[32]

ORIGINS OF WEST MALAYSIAN PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

The development of public administration in West Malaysia (or the Federation of Malaya as it was then called) can be divided into three stages: the feudal period, the colonial period, and the post-independence period (since 1957).[33] The public bureaucracy emerged during the colonial period and its origins can be traced to the civil service created by the English East India Company during the late eighteenth century.[34] The Company employed the term 'civil service' to differentiate its civilian employees from those working in the military, maritime, and ecclesiastical establishments.[35] Furthermore, there were two types of civil servants: those who were covenanted, *i.e.*, occupying positions requiring a bond of £ 500 as security to ensure the performance of their duties, and those who were uncovenanted.

The Company began its operations in Malaya with the acquisition of Penang as a settlement from the Sultan of Kedah in 1786.[36] With the landing of Francis Light in Penang on July 17, 1786, the Company's long search for a secure base from which it could acquire commodities that

[32]Quoted in Siagian, *op. cit.*, p. 71. For a discussion of the contemporary Indonesian public bureaucracy, see Theodore M. Smith, "Stimulating Performance in the Indonesian Bureaucracy: Gaps in the Administrator's Tool Kit", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 23, No. 4, July 1975, pp. 719-738.

[33]For more details see Harry E. Groves, "Public Administration in the Federation of Malaya"; S.S. Hsueh (ed.), *Public Administration in South and Southeast Asia*, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences. 1962, pp. 77-92. The origins of public bureaucracy in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) are not dealt with here because of limitations of space and unavailability of relevant data.

[34]Robert O. Tilman *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1964, p. 40.

[35]Sir Edward Blunt, *The I.C.S.*, London, Faber and Faber, 1937, pp. 1-2.

[36]S.W. Jones, *Public Administration in Malaya*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, p. 7.

would help the China trade was over.[37] Light, who was appointed Superintendent of Trade by the Company, set up a trading factory and was assisted in his duties by a small group of officers which included a storekeeper, a beach manager and a beach master. These four individuals have been described by one writer as "the fore-fathers of the present civil service."[38]

From 1786 to 1805 the Company's staff in Penang was drawn from the Bengal Civil Service. When the status of Penang was raised to that of an Indian Presidency in 1805, the Company created the Straits Settlements Civil Service (SSCS), with the junior officers being recruited from the Bengal Civil Service.[39] The SSCS was over-staffed and its officers had to supplement their meagre salaries with private trading.[40] However, Penang did not fulfil the Company's expectations of it, and in 1832 the capital of the Straits Settlements was transferred from Penang to Singapore with Stamford Raffles as the Governor-General. Following the dissolution of the Company in 1858, the Straits Settlements was transferred from the India Office to the Colonial Office in 1867. The immediate consequence was that civil servants posted to each of the Straits Settlements (Malacca, Penang or Singapore) were considered to be colonial servants and not seconded ICS (Indian Civil Service) officers.[41]

Another more important consequence was the emergence of a Malayan Civil Service (MCS) which encompassed not only those administrative officers in the Straits Settlements, but also those serving in the Federated Malay States (FMS) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). Before their federation, each of the four states of Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak and Selangor had its own civil service which was controlled by the Resident. The federation of these four states in 1895 led to the formation of a central secretariat and the creation of a federal civil service, which was thus superimposed on the system of state Residents. The UMS (Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu) had their own civil services and their state governments were under the control of Advisers.[42]

A third consequence of the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office was that the Secretary of State for the colonies became responsible for selecting candidates to the SSCS. In 1869 a

[37]K.G. Tregonning, *A History of Modern Malaysia and Singapore*, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1972, pp. 48-51.

[38]Abdul Aziz Zakaria, *An Introduction to the Machinery of Government in Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1974, p. 32.

[39]Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[40]*Ibid.*, p. 10; Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 79; and Tilman, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.

[41]Tilman, *op. cit.*, p. 46, fn. 23.

[42]Groves, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

formal qualifying examination was introduced for the selection of such candidates and was discontinued in 1882 when the recruitment procedures of the ICS were adopted. In 1896 there was further standardisation of examinations syllabi for the ICS, the Home Civil Service, and the Eastern Cadetships (which included Ceylon, Hong Kong and Malaya). This meant that officers recruited to the Eastern Cadetships could be interchanged among the three territories concerned; but in practice, "the diversity of languages, the inconsistent classification of posts, and the highly dissimilar salary scales made such transfers unusual."[43] The colonial Administrative Service was established in 1932 as the first step in the unification and reorganisation of the colonial services. During the same year, the competitive entrance examination for the Eastern Cadetships was discontinued, thus severing the MCS's remaining historic tie with the ICS.[44]

The public bureaucraey that emerged in Malaya during the British colonial period was the agency responsible for introducing political and economic modernisation into the country. It not only encouraged private investment for the extraction of tin and rubber, but was also responsible for the building of railways, roads, telegraphs and schools in Malaya.[45] In short, one of the most lasting legacies of British colonial rule in Malaya in the well-developed transportation and communications infrastructure left by them.

Finally, as in the case of Indonesia, it should be noted that local civil servants were discriminated against during the colonial period. They received lower salaries and occupied less senior positions than their European counterparts.[46] Such discrepancies provided the impetus for Malayanisation of the civil service which was initiated in 1956 with the aim of reducing if not removing these anomalies.[47] In 1954, the colonial service was renamed Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service which encompassed a total of twenty unified services in the various territories. Three years later, the Federation of Malaya obtained its independence from Britain and its public services were defined by the constitution to include the armed forces, the judicial and legal service, the general public service of the Federation, the police service, the joint public services and the public service of each state.[48] In sum, the contempo-

[43]Tilman, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[44]*Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

[45]For more details, see *ibid.*. pp. 49-60.

[46]See D.S. Dass, *Malayanization: Malayan Civil Service* (1945-1957) (B.A. academic exercise, University of Malaya in Singapore, 1961).

[47]See Tilman, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-81 for a detailed discussion of Malayanization.

[48]Article 132(1), quoted in Robert O. Tilman, *The Public Services of the Federation of Malaya*, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1961, p. 108.

rary public bureaucracy[49] in West Malaysia is a product of British colonial rule and its origins can be traced to the civil service established by the English East India Company in the late eighteenth century.

ORIGINS OF THE FILIPINO PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

In his seminal work, *The Bureaucracy in the Philippines*, Onofre D. Corpuz has identified four phases in the evolution of the Filipino public bureaucracy from 1565 to 1955, *viz.*, (1) the Spanish Colonial Bureaucracy (1565-1898); (2) the American Colonial Bureaucracy (1898-1913); (3) the Filipinization of the American Colonial Service (1913-1935); and (4) the Philippine Civil Service (1935-1955).[50] The public bureaucracy in the Philippines today is undoubtedly a product of the colonial rule under the Spanish and the Americans as well as of the local environment.

The Spanish landed on Filipino soil on February 13, 1565 and established a settlement in Cebu. The leader of the expedition, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, later chose Manila as the capital because of its good harbour and central location. He proceeded to establish the first public bureaucracy in the Philippines by appointing twelve aldermen to form the municipal government or *cabildo* and named two judges to the municipal court. In addition, four other officials were appointed : the *alguazil's* task was the execution of the orders of the *cabildo* and the court; the remaining officials were notaries appointed for the two bodies, one for the *cabildo* and two for the court.[51]

The Spanish colonial administration was not only concerned with commercial profit but also with spreading their religion. One immediate consequence of this dual policy was the conversion of the local people to Roman catholicism. The predominance of this religion among the contemporary population in the Philippines can be traced to the proselytising zeal of the Spanish conquerors. The religious conversion of the indigenous people contributed to the emergence of the church and its own bureaucracy. In other words, this gave rise to the existence of two bureaucracies—the public bureaucracy as well as the bureaucracy of the church.

Another important feature of the Spanish colonial administration

[49]For a discussion of various aspects of the contemporary Malaysian public bureaucracy, see Milton J. Esman, *Administration and Development: Institution-building and Reform in Malaysia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972; and L.N. Ahmed, *New Thinking for Malaysian Public Administration,* Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1975.

[50]This discussion on the origins of the public bureaucracy relies heavily on Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Bureaucracy in the Philippines,* Manila, Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957.

[51]*Ibid.*, pp. 15-19.

was its discrimination against the native Filipinos who, as a result, had lower salaries and occupied more junior positions than their Spanish counterparts. There were three categories of bureaucrats: (1) the principal bureaucrats of the central government in Manila, *viz.*, the governor-general, the members and officials (*oidores* and *fiscales*) of the Audiencia, the officials of the royal exchequer, and the governors of the provinces; (2) those petty functionaries who provided assistance to the higher bureaucrats, *viz.*, various ranks of notaries, secretary-clerks, court officials, accountants, custodians and treasurers of funds, tax assessors, and the troops and aldermen of the council of the city of Manila and other Spanish communities; and (3) the native bureaucrats such as the *gobernadorcillos* who were elected to office by their respective communities and assisted by four or five lieutenants each.[52]

Needless to say, the Spanish colonial bureaucracy in the Philippines was subordinate to and dependent on the metropolitan government in Spain. Two institutional agencies were established to maintain the subordinate status of the colonies and to keep the colonial officials effectively under control. These agencies were the *Visitador General* (Visitor General) and the *Residencia*. A Visitor General was usually a high official appointed by the Council of the Indies in Spain to investigate the behaviour of the highest officials in the colonies. He had the power to punish erring officials by removing or suspending them from office, expelling them from the colony, or imposing monetary fines on them. The Residencia sought to ensure a high level of efficiency and morality in the Spanish colonial administration by requiring every official to account for his activities at the end of his term of office. An official could be appointed or promoted to another post in the public bureaucracy only if he had been cleared in the Residencia.[53]

The Spanish colonial period ended in 1898 with the defeat of Spain by the United States in the Spanish-American War. In contrast to their predecessors, the Americans adopted a secular colonial policy which provided the Filipinos with more opportunities for participating in the affairs of their country. This can be seen most clearly in the creation of a modern civil service by the Americans and their efforts to localize this institution.

In 1899, President McKinley appointed the First Philippine Commission, consisting of five Americans, to investigate conditions in the

[52]Onofre D. Corpuz, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41. For more details of Spanish Colonial Administration in general, see John Leddy Phelan, "Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (June 1960), pp. 47-65.

[53]The most comprehensive analysis of the Residencia in Nicolas Zafra, "The Residencia in the Colonial Administrative System in the Philippines", *Philippine Historical Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1963, pp. 14-33.

Philippines.[54] Among other things, members of that Commission recommended the establishment of an efficient and non-partisan civil service. They emphasized that:

> The greatest care should be taken in the selection of officials for administration. They should be men of the highest character and fitness, and partisan politics should be entirely separated from the Government of the Philippines.[55]

Accordingly, President McKinley directed the Second Philippine Commission, which was appointed by him a year later, to establish an educational system and an efficient civil service and to initiate the organisation of the judiciary as well as of the municipal and provincial governments.

The Second Philippine Commission assumed legislative power on September 1, 1900 and began appropriating funds for the construction and repair of highways and bridges. On September 19, the Commission passed an act for the establishment and maintenance of an efficient and honest civil service in the Philippine Islands.[56] In short, the new civil service was formed under auspicious circumstances as it was sponsored by both the Commission and the Governor-General, who was the chief executive of the American colonial administration, as well as chairman of the Commission.

The civil service had twenty-one classes in all and these classes were distinguished on the basis of the annual salaries of their members. Those in the highest class (Class 1) received more than six thousand pesos a year while members of Class K—the lowest class—obtained annual salaries of less than 480 pesos. Entrance to the civil service was based on competitive examinations. When candidates had similar qualifications, appointing officers were instructed to give preference to Filipinos over American candidates. This policy of giving preference to Filipinos and the high turnover of Americans in the civil service contributed to the Filipinization of the latter. In 1903 Americans constituted 51 per cent and Filipinos 49 per cent of the civil service. Ten years later, the percentage of Filipinos in the civil service increased to 71 per cent.[57]

[54]Details of the First Philippine Commission can be found in Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines: Past and Present*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921, pp. 301-324.

[55]Quoted in Corpuz, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

[56]*Ibid.*, p. 191, fn. 45, and Worceter, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

[57]Worcester, *op. cit.*, p. 367. For an account of the American Colonial Civil Service see Frank L. Jenista, "Problems of the Colonial Civil Service. An Illustration from the Career of Manual L. Quezon", *Southeast Asia*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring 1974), pp. 809-829.

The process of localisation in the civil service was accelerated and completed during the 1913-1935 period. Eighty per cent of the civil service was Filipinized by 1915. In 1930 there were 21,248 Filipinos (98 per cent) and 456 Americans (2 per cent) in the civil service.[58] However, the civil service became a truly Filipino institution only after attainment of the country's independence from the United States on July 4, 1946.

ORIGINS OF THE SINGAPORE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

The origins of the public bureaucracy in Singapore are quite similar to those of the West Malaysian public bureaucracy and can be traced to the civil service of the English East India Company in the late eighteenth century. This is not surprising as both countries were former British colonies. In order to avoid repetition, only those developments relevant to the origins of the Singaporean public bureaucracy will be discussed.

The evolution of the public bureaucracy in Singapore can be described in terms of five periods, *viz.*, (1) the pre-colony phase (1819-1867); (2) the period of crown colony rule (1867-1942); (3) the postwar period (1945-1955); (4) the Labour Front Coalition Government period (1955-1959); and (5) the People's Action Party (PAP) Government period (1959-present).[59]

When Singapore was founded in 1819 by Stamford Raffles there was no tradition of a separate civil service.[60] Accordingly, he initiated such a tradition by establishing the nucleus of the civil service through the appointment of his deputy, Major Farquhar, as the Resident, his brother-in-law as the Master-Attendant, and four other officials.[61]

[58]Corpuz, *op. cit.*, p. 183. For more recent discussions of the public bureaucracy in the Philippines, see Jose V. Abueva, (ed.), *Perspective in Governmental Reorganization*, Manila, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969; Wilfredo A. Clemante, *Philippine Bureaucracy and Local Development: The Case of Two Municipalities*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1974; and Raul P. De Guzman (ed.), *Patterns in Decision-Making: Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration*, Manila, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1963.

[59]For more details see Chee-Meow Seah, *Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emerging Nation: A Case Study of Singapore*, Ph. D. dissertation, Victoria University of Manchester, 1971, pp. 2-110; and Boon-Hiok Lee, *The Singapore Civil Service and its Perceptions of Time*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1976, pp. 85-134.

[60]J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "Early Singapore and the Inception of a British Administrative Tradition in the Straits Settlement (1819-1832)", *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 42, Part 2 (December 1969), p. 48.

[61]The four officials were: "Lt. Francis, Crossley, officer-in-charge of pay and stores; Lt. Henry Ralph, Asst. Engineer-in-charge of ordinance; Lt. Low, temporary Cantonment Adjutant; Surgeon W. Smith, Medical Officer for civil and military staff." *Ibid.*, p. 49.

During the initial four years of the precolony phase (1819-1823), Raffles supervised the administration of Singapore from Bencoolen where he was the Lieutenant-Governor. He did this by entrusting the actual supervision of political and administrative affairs to Major Farquhar and his assistants. In July 1826 Singapore became part of the Straits Settlements together with Malacca and Penang, which served as the capital. However, the failure of Penang to fulfil the English East India Company's political and economic expectations led to the shifting of the capital of the Straits Settlements to Singapore in 1832.

The civil service in Singapore during the pre-colony phase was mixed in composition as it had covenanted, uncovenanted and extra-covenanted officers, the latter consisting of those who had been granted covenants locally.[62] The incurring of substantial annual deficits by the Straits Settlements resulted in the lowering of its constitutional status to a Residency in 1830 and in a reduction of staff in the civil service. For example, Singapore had three senior civil servants "who shared among themselves the posts of Superintendent of Convicts, Chief of Police, Superintendent of Lands, Magistrate, Commissioner of the Court of Requests and Superintendent of Public Works."[63] In addition, the salaries of senior civil servants in the Straits Settlements were lower than those of their counterparts in India and opportunities for advancement were limited for the former. In short, the conditions in the civil service in Singapore during this period were far from satisfactory.[64]

The pre-colony phase ended in 1867 when the control of the Straits Settlements passed from the India Office to the Colonial Office. This period of crown-colony rule is important for two reasons. First, this period saw the beginning of a distinct civil service and the establishment of many of the structural arrangements and bureaucratic practices which can be found in the contemporary public bureaucracy. The Singapore branch of the civil service in the Straits Settlements in 1867 was organised on a functional basis and was made up of eleven departments, *viz.*, the Colonial Engineer's Office, Surveyor-General's Department, Medical Department, Police Department, Audit Office, Secretariat, Treasury, Printing Office, Master-Attendant's Office, Prisons Department and the Ecclesiastical Office.[65] Second, entrance to the civil service was restricted to Europeans; and local candidates with the requisite qualifications

[62]Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90.

[63]Seah, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[64]For a listing of the various weaknesses of the civil services in the Straits Settlements, see Param Ajeet Singh Bal, *The Civil Service in the Straits Settlements, 1819-1867* (B.A. academic exercise, University of Malaya in Singapure, 1960), pp. 47-58.

[65]Seah, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

were offered junior positions and discriminated against in terms of salaries and working conditions. This state of affairs caused discontentment among the local civil servants and was responsible for their struggle against such discrimination during the post-war period.

Shortly after the Japanese occupation of 1942-1945, Singapore was separated from Malaya when it was made a crown colony in 1946. In 1947, following the recommendations of the Trusted Commission, the civil service was reorganised and divided into four divisions according to the duties and salaries of its members. Division I consisted of those in the administrative and professional grades, Division II the executive grades, Division III the clerical and technical grades, and Division IV which includes those performing manual tasks. Needless to say, Division I officers received the highest salaries while those in Division IV were recipients of much lower wages.[66] Although the implementation of the recommendations of the Trusted Commission resulted in the rationalisation of the salary structure of the civil service, a fully autonomous and separate Singapore Civil Service (SCS) did not emerge during the postwar period as Singapore retained certain administrative ties with Malaya. For one thing, eleven departments[67] continued to be organised on a pan-Malayan basis; and for another, the 1934 Malayan Establishment Agreement, which "provided for the setting up of a common pool of senior officers to staff the more important posts in the Civil Service structures of the Straits Settlements and the Malaya States," was renewed in 1948 thus allowing the colonial authorities in Singapore to fill the more important positions in the civil service with Malayan Establishment officers.[68]

In other words, there were two obstacles to the emergence of a locally oriented civil service in Singapore during the postwar period. The first obstacle of the pan-Malayan departments remained as the Colonial Government believed that such departments would improve the link between the two territories. The second obstacle of the Malayan Establishment Agreement disappeared in June 1954 with the dissolution of Agreement and the officers affected were reassigned either to Malaya or Singapore. Thus, the removal of the second obstacle contributed towards the formation of a separate civil service as it led to the centralization of personnel policy in the hands of the Colonial Secretary.[69]

In 1955 Singapore's constitutional status was transformed from that

[66]See *Report of the Public Services Salaries Commission*, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printing Office, 1947, para 44.

[67]These eleven pan-Malayan developments were in the following areas: audit, broadcasting, chemistry, civil aviation, fisheries, income tax, marine surveys, meteorology, postal services, survey and telecommunications. Seah, *op. cit.*, p. 31, fn. 6.

[68]Seah, *op. cit.*, pp. 11a and 31.

[69]See *Ibid.* pp. 46-48 for more details.

of a Crown Colony to a ministerial form of government under the Rendel Constitution. The colonial secretariat was abolished and the civil service reorganised into nine ministries, *viz.*, the Attorney-General's Chambers, Chief Secretary's Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Communications and Works, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Housing, Lands and Local Government, and Ministry of Labour and Welfare.[70] This reorganisation of the civil service is important as it provided the basic framework for the civil service in the subsequent periods.

The outcome of the April 1955 elections was the formation of the Labour Front Coalition Government under the leadership of David Marshall. In order to fulfil its election pledge of localizing the civil service within four years, the Labour Front Government appointed a Malayanisation Commission to recommend a comprehensive scheme for the localisation of the civil service. In its interim report, which was published in 1956, the Commission recommended, *inter alia*, the immediate localisation of four departments (the Social Welfare Department, the Imports and Exports Division, the Registry of Trade Marks and Business Names, and the Agriculture Division) and the localisation of the remaining twenty-eight departments within periods ranging from two to five years.[71] Thus by the end of the Labour Front Coalition Government period, the civil service assumed a character of its own as it was no longer dominated by the expatriate officers as a result of localisation; nor was it tied administratively to Malaya after the latter's attainment of independence in August 1957 and the dissolution of the eleven pan-Malayan departments.

One of the first measures initiated by the PAP Government after assuming the reins of political power in May 1959 was the administrative reform of the civil service, which included the twin aspects of reorganisation and attitudinal reform. Reorganisation took the form of a reshuffling of functions between certain ministries as well as the formation of such new ministries as the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of National Development, which were created for attaining the goals of nation-building and socio-economic development. Attitudinal reform of the civil servants was necessary because the "PAP Government found that the public bureaucracy it inherited was deficient on two counts: the civil servants had a colonial mentality and were insensitive to the needs of the population at large; and they were also hostile towards and

[70]For a description of the new Civil Service Structure in Singapore in 1955 with the relevant details of the new ministries, their subjects and departments under each ministry see Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-361.

[71]A detailed discussion of the localisation issue can be found in Seah, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-139.

afraid of the PAP."[72] To rectify these deficiencies, the PAP Government relied on two agencies—the Political Study Centre and the Central Complaints Bureau—and a host of other measures—*viz.*, participation in mass civil projects, recruitment of non-English educated graduates into the civil service, tougher disciplinary measures, and a policy of selective retention and retirement of senior civil servants.[73] The PAP Government succeeded in transforming the attitudes of the civil servants and this is one of the major reasons for the high level of effectiveness of of the Singapore Civil Service today.

ORIGINS OF THAI PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

Unlike the four countries discussed above, Thailand has never been colonised by a western power and accordingly the origins of its public bureaucracy cannot be directly linked with any foreign country. Nevertheless, Thailand has not been immune to western institutions and ideas. Rather, the Thai leaders have modified such institutions and ideas to suit the nature of the local environment.[74] The Thai public bureaucracy has been examined by both foreign (mainly American) and local Thai scholars.[75] However, space limits us to a general discussion of the rise and development of the Thai public bureaucracy which is drawn from such sources.

[72]Jon, S.T. Quah, *Administrative Reform and Development Administration in Singapore: A Comparative Study of the Singapore Improvement Trust and the Housing and Development Board* (Ph. D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1975), p. 325.

[73]See *ibid.*, pp. 324-333 and Seah, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-90.

[74]Kasem Suwanagul, *The Civil Service of Thailand* (Ph. D. dissertation, New York University, 1962), pp. 17-18.

[75]See for example, *ibid.*; Kasem Udyanin and Rufus D. Smith, *The Public Service in Thailand: Organization, Recruitment and Training*, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1954; W.R. Reeve, *Public Administration in Siam*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951; James N. Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behaviour", William J., Siffin (ed.) *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, Bloomington, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1957, pp. 278-331; M. Ladd Thomas, "Thai Public Administration", *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 25, No. 1, September 1962, pp. 3-33; Edgar L. Shor, "The Public Service", Joseph L. Sutton (ed.) *Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand*, Bloomington, Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University 1962, pp. 23-40; Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernizatian of a Bureaucratic Polity*, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1966; William J. Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development*, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1966; Amara Raksastaya, "Preparing Administrators for National Development: Thailand Experience", Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (eds.), *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, Manila, EROPA, 1970; James A. Ramsay, *The Development of a Bureaucratic Polity: The Case of Northern Siam*, Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1971; and Likhit Dhiravegin, *Political Attitudes of the Bureaucratic Elite and Modernization in Thailand*, Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1973.

Malai Huvanandana and William J. Siffin have simply divided the evolution of Thai public administration into two major parts: ancient and modern.[76] The ancient period begins with the Sukothai Kingdom (1238-1350 A.D.) which emerged as a result of a successful revolt by the Thais against the Khmers. The administration of the Kingdom was organised on a military basis to prepare for any external attack from the Khmers. Accordingly, the King was supreme commander of the armed forces and all the princes and senior officials were military officers. Moreover, the King was also regarded as the father of his people (or *Po Khun*, the great father) as he "combined all the functions of government in his own person."[77] He was assisted in his various duties by his chief administrators (or *Look Khun*, the great sons) who were usually drawn from the royal family or selected by the King himself.[78]

During the Sukothai period the basic administrative unit was the *Muang* or province. The provinces were quite autonomous especially those that were beyond two days walking distance from the capital, Sukothai.[79] The vast size of the country necessitated administrative decentralization with the King being responsible for the administration of Sukothai and the governors being in charge of the various provinces. The latter showed their allegiance to the King through the payment of tributes.

In short, there was no public bureaucracy during the Sukothai era as administration centred around the King and his officials. There was also no distinction between civilian and military officials as the administration was military in nature with the King as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Finally, the position of the King's assistants were not institutionalised and these officials were appointed by the sovereign himself.

The origins of Thai public bureaucracy can be traced to the Ayuthaya period (1350-1767 A.D.) and to King Boromotrailokanat (or Trailok for short) who laid the foundations of the bureaucracy in 1448 with the reorganisation of the administrative system.[80] King Trailok sought to strengthen his control over the provinces by abolishing the former system of hereditary governorships and by creating a centralised and functionally specialised bureaucracy. Furthermore a distinction was made

[76]Malai Huvanandana and William J. Siffin, "Public Administration in Thailand", Hsueh (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[77]H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Ancient Siamese Government and Administration*, London, Bernard Quaritch Ltd., 1934, p. 15; and Suwanagul, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[78]Suwanagul, *op. cit.*, p. 19; and Dhiravegin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[79]Udyanin and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

[80]Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy*, p. 17. Note that King Trailok's full name can also spelt as "Paramatrailokanatha" or "Praboromtrailoknat". See Wales, *op. cit.*, and Udyanin and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 20, respectively.

between civil and military administration for the first time in Thailand's administrative history. In practice, this resulted in the existence of two bureaucracies, *viz.*, the civil (or public) bureaucracy which was in charge of public affairs, and the military bureaucracy which was responsible for military matters.

In addition, both civil and military bureaucracies were each divided into two levels of administration, *viz.*, the administration of the central government in the capital and that in the provinces. The central government in the civilian sector was made up of four ministries: (1) the *Krom Wang* or Palace Ministry, which was concerned with Palace affairs and the administration of justice; (2) the *Krom Phra Klang* or Treasury, which was responsible for collecting the country's revenue and supervising royal property; (3) the *Krom Muang* or Ministry of the Capital, which was in charge of the affairs of the capital including the maintenance of law and order and the performance of judical functions; and (4) the *Krom Na* or Ministry of Lands, which was entrusted with the supervision of farming operations, food supplies, and matters dealing with land tenure.[81]

The area outside the *wang rajadhani* or central territory was divided into provinces, which in turn were classified into four categories according to their size and importance.[82] The administrative set-up in the capital was duplicated albeit on a smaller scale in each of the provinces.[83] (A parallel structure existed in the case of the military bureaucracy both at the central and provincial levels, but the details of this structure need not be dealt with here.)

Another achievement of King Trailok was "the complete hierarchisation of everyone in the kingdom, from the Buddhist priests to the palace concubines, from the highest government official to the lowliest freeman.[84] The civil service was not excluded and the rank and status of its bureaucrats were institutionalised in 1454 with the enactment of the laws of the civil, military and provincial hierarchies.[85] On the basis of these laws, the status of each official was determined by means of *sakti na* or dignity marks which indicated the amount of land under his control. For example, the head of an important ministry would have a *sakti na* of 10,000, which gave him jurisdiction over 10,000 *rai* (or 4,000 acres) of land. On the other hand, a commoner with a *sakti na* of 25 had to be satisfied with 25 *rai* (or 10 acres) of land.[86] The status of officials was higher than that of commoners as the former had a

[81]Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy*, pp. 19-21; and Suwanagul, *op. cit.* pp. 21-22.
[82]Udyanin and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.
[83]Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy*, pp. 21-23.
[84]Mosel, *op. cit.*, p. 288.
[85]Dhiravegin, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23.
[86]These examples are taken from Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy*, p. 18.

sakti na exceeding the 25 marks of the latter. For the officials, the *sakti na* also represented their salaries as they were expected to live on the produce of their land. This system was later abrogated by King Chulalongkorn whose officials were not given any land as they received cash salaries.[87]

The development of modern Thai public administration dates from the reign of King Mongkut or Rama IV (1851-1868) of the Chakri dynasty. However, the impact of western ideas on the traditional Thai bureaucracy began earlier during the reign of Rama II (1809-1824) when he adopted the practice of farming out of tax collection to private entrepreneur, which had been suggested by an English ambassador.[88] King Mongkut initiated friendly relations with several western powers including Britain and the United States in order to forestall foreign intervention in Thailand's domestic affairs. He began the modernisation of the bureaucracy, which was continued and completed by his son, King Chulalongkorn or Rama V when he assumed the throne in 1868.

King Chulalongkorn's first task was to reorganise the administrative system. The initial phase of the Chakri reformation was designed to rectify the problems of the traditional bureaucracy. Accordingly, it involved the reform of the personnel system, fiscal reform, the improvement of communications through the introduction of postal services, the telephone and the telegraph, the construction of railways, the modernisation of the naval and military forces, the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the establishment of a modern system of education. Needless to say, this first phase of the reform was time-consuming as it lasted for two decades.[89]

The second phase of reorganisation began in 1892 with the creation of three new ministries, *viz.*, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.[90] The reorganisation of the old Ministry of Interior, which epitomized the Hyuthayan tradition, resulted in the integration of the provinces with the capital and in the emergence of a national bureaucracy in Thailand.[91] In short, the number of ministries had increased from four during King Trailok's time to twelve during King Chulalongkorn's reign.

The Thai public bureaucracy underwent further 'consolidation, readjustment and expansion' during the 1900-1932 period which saw the gradual decline of the absolute monarchy.[92] The June 24,1932 revolution transformed the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.

[87]Suwanagul, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[88]Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy*, p. 39.
[89]Siffin, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-58.
[90]*Ibid.*, p. 59.
[91]*Ibid.*, p. 64-90.
[92]Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 111 and 126-128.

It also marks the beginning of the service State in Thailand which has endured until the present.[93]

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORIGINS OF ASEAN PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES

The preceding section has dealt at some length with how the public bureaucracies in each of the five ASEAN countries have emerged and developed over the years. One final task remains: to compare the origins of the ASEAN public bureaucracies in order to: (1) ascertain whether the theoretical formulations of Weber and Downs are useful for explaining the emergence of such institutions; and (2) identify and explain any similarities or differences in the genesis of such institutions.

How useful are the explanations given by Weber and Downs for the origins of bureaucracies in general? Do the reasons provided by both of them apply to the case of the ASEAN public bureaucracies? The ideas of Weber and Downs are of limited usefulness in explaining the origins of the public bureaucracies simply because all of these countries, with the exception of Thailand, were colonies of either the British, Dutch, Spanish or Americans. In other words, one of the most important factors accounting for the emergence of the public bureaucracies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore is colonial rule which created the necessity of such institutions in the first place. Both Weber and Downs do not take the colonial context into account in their analyses of the origins of bureaucracy. Consequently, it is not surprising to discover that not all the reasons offered by them for the formation of bureaucracy apply in the case of the ASEAN countries.

In the first place, except for Thailand, the public bureaucracies were foreign institutions introduced by the colonial powers for the attainment of a specific goal, *viz.*, economic exploitation of the natural resources of the colonies for the benefit of the home governments.[94] The public bureaucracies were established for the performance of such basic functions as "maintaining order, administering the law, and collecting taxes".[95] In short, the public bureaucracies existed for the sole purpose of consolidating colonial rule and the attainment of its economic objectives.

However, as a result of economic growth, further expansion of the

[93]For more details see Huvanandana and Siffin, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

[94]More specifically, the colonial powers in Southeast Asia concentrated on the following four areas of economic activity: (1) trade; (2) banking and finance; (3) extraction of the region's mineral, fuel and agricultural resources; and (4) development of commercialised agriculture, See Jan Pluvier, *South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 22-29.

[95]David J. Steinberg, *et al.*, *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 203.

public bureaucracies was possible and desirable as this would not only reinforce but also accelerate the economic development of the colonial powers even further. The public bureaucracies in all the five countries grew quite rapidly especially after 1900 and were gradually entrusted with functions which had no local precedents. A variety of 'specialist services' was provided by the public bureaucracies to the population at large in these countries. Some of these services such as geological services, postal, telegraph, and telephone services, railways and censures, had at best an indirect impact on the masses. Of more direct relevance to the villagers were the services provided to improve village life, *viz.*, "a wide variety of public health programmes, forest reserves to check erosion, village schools, rural credit services, cooperatives, agricultural extension services, the reorganization of village structure."[96]

Thus, the public bureaucracies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore were the instruments of their respective colonial powers. However with economic growth. more specialised services were provided by the public bureaucracies for the population. Weber's second and third reasons for the rise of bureaucracy seem to apply here. The provision of the various specialist services by the public bureaucracies represents an attempt on their part to deal with both the quantitative and qualitative changes of administrative tasks in their countries during the colonial period. Moreover, the development of a money economy by the colonial powers provided the necessary income for supporting the public bureaucracies through the payment of wages to its members. It should be noted here that in the case of the Thai public bureaucracy the officials serving under King Trailok during the Ayuthaya period did not receive cash salaries but were expected to live on the produce grown on the land allocated to them according to their status. This system remained until the modernisation of the public bureaucracy by King Chulalongkorn which resulted, *inter alia*, in the payment of cash salaries to civil servants as they were no longer entitled to any land.

Down's description of the first method of bureau genesis—Weber's routinisation of charisma—appears to be more relevant in describing the origins of the Thai public bureaucracy. We have seen that the Thai public bureaucracy was founded by King Trailok in the mid-fifteenth century to enhance his control over the rest of his kingdom. He was responsible for institutionalising the positions of his officials through the routinisation of charisma.[97] In other words, the Thai public bureaucracy arose as a result of the transformation of King Trailok's charismatic mission into offices or institutionalised positions for his

[96]David J. Steinberg, et. al., *op. cit*.

[97]According to Siffin, "Charisma was an important source of royal authority (in the traditional bureaucracy and) . . . was used to exact obedience and proper behaviour from officials." See Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy*, p. 27.

officials. In short, the monarchy was responsible for establishing the pubic bureaucracy in Thailand. This constitutes an important difference in the origins of the Thai public bureaucracy and the origins of the public bureaucracies in the other ASEAN countries as the latter were products of western colonial rule and were not created by indigenous elements. Thus, the Thai public bureaucracy was created by the monarchy for the perpetuation of the latter's interests. It was not an instrument of a western colonial power, but was an instrument of the monarchy. The creation of the public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries was the most important administrative reform in these countries. The source of administrative reform in the case of Thailand was internal as the public bureaucracy was initiated by the monarchy. For the other four countries, the source of administrative reform was external as the colonial powers were responsible for establishing the public bureaucracies in these countries.

However, Thailand has not been immune to western influence and this can be illustrated by referring to the modernisation of the Thai public bureaucracy by King Mongkut and his son, King Chulalongkorn. Among other things, King Mongkut adopted western techniques of administration and introduced the policy of employing Europeans as government advisers.[98] King Chulalongkorn completed the process of modernisation begun by his father by the end of the nineteenth century by means of several administrative reforms. A national bureaucracy emerged in Thailand as a result of King Chulalongkorn's efforts.

The second type of bureau genesis identified by Downs—the creation of a bureau by social groups in order to fulfil specific functions—has some relevance in specifying the origins of the public bureaucracies in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. These institutions were preceded by private trading companies which were established by business groups in Britain and Holland with the approval of their respective governments for the purpose of trading in the Far East. In the case of Indonesia, the Dutch East India Company, which was formed in 1602 with the support of the Dutch Government, was "actually a company of merchants pursuing commercial gain, aiming especially at the 'spice trade'."[99] The Indonesian public bureaucracy emerged after the dissolution of the Company in 1798 as a result of the measures instituted by the Governor-General, William Daendels. Similarly, for Malaysia and Singapore, the creation of the public bureaucracies was preceded by the administration of the English East India Company (or the United Company of Merchants Trading to the East Indies) which was established in 1708 by British businessmen with the approval of the Crown for

[98]Suwanagul, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[99]Hadisumarto, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

the purpose of capturing the spice trade in the Far East.[100] The West Malaysian public bureaucracy was formed after the founding of Penang in 1786 by Francis Light; and the development of the public bureaucracy in Singapore began after the founding of the island by Stamford Raffles in 1819. In short, the creation of the public bureaucracies in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore was preceded by a period of administration by private trading companies involved in the spice trade.

In contrast, the emergence of the public bureaucracies in the Philippines and Thailand was not preceded by such periods of private administration. In the Philippines, the public bureaucracy was formed by the Spanish conquerors shortly after the founding of Manila as the capital in 1571.[101] In the case of Thailand, the creation of the public bureaucracy in 1448 by King Trailok was preceded by a period of military administration under the Sukothai Kingdom which was constantly being threatened by the Khmers. Indeed, the separation of civil from military administration was initiated by King Trailok and this resulted in the creation of two bureaucracies: the civil and military bureaucracies. The Philippines is the only other ASEAN country which has experienced the same phenomenon of having two bureaucracies. However, the two bureaucracies which existed in the Philippines during the Spanish colonial period were the public bureaucracy and the bureaucracy of the church.

If we examine the actual dates of the founding of the public bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries, it becomes obvious that these institutions were formed at different times. The Thai public bureaucracy is the oldest public bureaucracy in the ASEAN countries as it was founded in 1448. The public bureaucracy in the Philippines was established in 1571 by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi and ranks second in age. The Indonesian public bureaucracy is the third oldest as it was created by William Daendels following the dissolution of the Dutch East India Company in 1798. The public bureaucracies in Malaysia and Singapore are the youngest as both emerged after the period of private administration of the English East India Company in 1858 when the Company was dissolved.

The fact that the ASEAN public bureaucracies differ in terms of their actual dates of founding is not surprising as conditions vary considerably in each of these countries. Thailand was the first in establishing the public bureaucracy probably because of her non-colonial status. The other four countries were colonies of the western powers and were thus dependent on these powers in terms of the creation of their public

[100]See Tilman, *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya,* p. 38.
[101]Corpuz, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

bureaucracies. The Filipino public bureaucracy was initiated soon after the Spanish conquest. On the other hand, the public bureaucracies in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the initial period of administration by private trading companies in these countries. The period of private administration varied considerably from 196 years (1602-1798) in the case of Indonesia, to 72 years (1786-1858) for Malaysia, and 39 years (1819-1858) for Singapore. In short, the public bureaucracies were set up at different times in the ASEAN countries because of the peculiar historical circumstances and environmental influences prevailing in each of these countries.

The public bureaucracies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore also differed in the degree of supervision exercised over them by the colonial administration in the metropolitan capitals. A Dutch scholar, Jan Pluvier, has described the administrative systems in Southeast Asia during the colonial period as constitutionally incomplete entities as "each of them was a headless torso, an appendage of an empire with its locus of power thousands of miles away."[102] The control exercised by the metropolitan government in Spain over the Filipino public bureaucracy was perhaps the most strict as two institutions—the *Visitador General* and the *Residencia*—were devised to ensure effective control over the colonial officials working in the Philippines. However, the situation improved considerably under the American colonial rule for two reasons. First, the United States was herself a former British colony and when she became a colonial power herself after the Spanish-American War of 1898, she "did her utmost not to look like one".[103] Second, the American resolution to be a benevolent colonial power was perhaps also influenced by the exploitation and excesses of her Spanish predecessor. The Americans allowed Filipinos some share of participation in governmental affairs and this was clearly seen in their attempts to localise the public bureaucracy.

In between the two extremes of the harsh Spanish rule and the benign American occupation can be found the Dutch and British methods of colonial administration. The Dutch system of indirect rule in Indonesia was a farce as all the native "rulers were reduced to mere servants of the colonial administration, inferior in everything except matters of ceremony".[104] In contrast, the British system of colonial administration in Malaysia and Singapore was more complex and also more successful as it involved a combination of direct and indirect rule.[105] In sum, if we are interested in ranking the western colonial powers in Southeast

[102]Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[103]Pluvier, *op. cit.* p. 6.
[104]*Ibid.*, p 14.
[105]*Loc. cit.*

Asia in terms of their control over the ASEAN public bureaucracies, the rank order would be Spain, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States in order of decreasing supervision and control over the public bureaucracies.

Related to the above feature of the extent of control exercised by the colonial powers over the public bureaucracies in the four countries is the pace of localisation of these institutions. The Filipino public bureaucracy exhibited the fastest rate of localisation as 98 per cent of its members were Filipinos by 1930. Malaysia and Singapore occupy an intermediate position as far as the localisation of their public bureaucracies is concerned. Indonesia ranks last as the Dutch colonial authorities did not encourage localisation of the public bureaucracy which was consequently deferred until the Japanese occupation. Needless to say, the Spanish colonial bureaucracy in the Philippines did not encourage localisation at all as the Filipinos were only recruited to the most junior positions and belonged to the lowest class of bureaucrats.

It should be noted here that not all the seven features of the Weberian model of bureaucracy were apparent in the ASEAN public bureaucracies. Indeed, all the five public bureaucracies were similar in that the recruitment of public officials was not always on the basis of achievement criteria. In the case of the Thai public bureaucracy, officials were appointed by the King on the basis of ascriptive ties. In the other ASEAN public bureaucracies especially those in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, Dutch or British personnel were given preference over local candidates. In other words, the ascriptive criterion of race was employed in recruiting candidates to senior positions in the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean public bureaucracies. Such racial discrimination resulted, *inter alia*, in a disparity in salary scales between the expatriate and local civil servants, with the latter having the worst end of the stick. It was only in the Filipino public bureaucracy that Filipinos were given preference over Americans in entering the civil service, but even then the American civil servants received much higher salaries.[106]

Moreover, it is unlikely that the public bureaucrats in the five countries accorded impartial and uniform treatment to their clientele, *i.e.*, members of population at large. In Thailand this might not have been so obvious because both the bureaucrats and their clientele were Thai; but nevertheless the status incongruency between the civil servants and different groups in the population could have resulted in differential treatment for each group. The problem was more serious in the other four countries because the top bureaucrats were usually foreigners and the clientele was made up of the local population. The local civil

[106]See Corpuz, *op. cit.*, Table V, p. 183.

servants were very junior in status and did not have much say in the running of the countries. The apparent inequality between the expatriate officers and their clients did not encourage impartial and uniform treatment of the latter by the former.

Finally, although Weber has argued that bureaucracy is technically the most superior type of organisation, the ASEAN public bureaucracies were initially not very efficient organisations in terms of preparing their countries for self-government and independence. These institutions were established by the colonial powers for the economic exploitation of the natural resources of the colonial territories. As instruments of the colonial powers, the public bureaucracies were subject to their control and policies. The public bureaucracies became useful instruments in the nationalist struggle much later on and after their transformation from an imperial to a national elite as a result of the localisation process.

In conclusion it can be seen that the origins of the ASEAN public bureaucracies can be explained in terms of two factors: the nature of the colonial power and its policies *vis-a-vis* the public bureaucracy, and the nature of the local environment in each country. ☐

Problems involved in Developing Indicators of Administrative Performance*

G. Sivalingam

THE NEED for increased *qualification* of administrative variables has been pleaded for by various scholars and even by the United Nations. As part of its programme in the Second Development Decade, the United Nations had developed 40 indicators to measure quantitatively growth and development at the international level However, while quantitative indicators could be easily developed for various sectors of the national economy it was not an easy task to develop indicators of administrative performance. To date, there has been no comprehensive indicator developed. Despite the difficulties, there are partial and proxy indicators which lend themselves to easy measurement and use in certain services. However, in the areas of values and policy-making it is extremely difficult to formulate indicators unless, of course, one intends to be naive and push the idea of a value free and pure social science.

The problems involved in developing indicators are not new problems. They involve problems related to the clear and accurate identification and definition of problems; the conflict between fact and value; the problems of gathering data and analysing non-parametric data; the problem of measuring administrative activities such as coordination, control and feedback; the problem of developing cross-culturally valid data gathering instruments and lastly the problems involved or related to political or social change and the ever-changing needs of people.

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

It is a well-known fact that in the social science there is very little conceptual clarity, social scientists lack a common set of concepts and even a common language.[1] There has been little attempt to identify the operationable variables which could be clustered around a concept. Unless things are broken up to the simplest possible unit, measurement and clarity are difficult to attain. Words are value laden and so are concepts but to seek agreement on concepts is to take the value of the

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 1976, pp. 101-105.

[1]Milton J. Esman, "Indicators for Development Administration: A Summary Review", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, July 1973, p. 369.

component in concepts and this is perhaps equivalent to having concepts that do not describe situations adequately in administration. If conceptual clarity is difficult to obtain, then it may be suggested that unambiguous definitions of problems and situations are also difficult to obtain. This is stated because concepts are the building blocks in any definition.

FACT AND VALUE

Fact and value are useful analytic distinctions. They lend themselves to useful abstract philosophical thought. However, to operationalise this dichotomy would be extremely difficult in the real world situation. In the real world of the administrators the constant need to list down priorities and make choices is a fact of life. Choices imply value judgements but these value judgements are based on facts which have evolved out of some ethical propositions. Every decision-making process has to begin with some assumptions and, therefore, the factual statements arising therefrom have a value component because of the initial ethical statements made. It becomes a very complicated process to trace and differentiate factual from value statements. This complication becomes more serious in periods of rapid social change. Therefore, doubts may be raised as to whether facts themselves can be measured since it is extremely difficult to separate fact from value in any decision. Facts can be tested and verified but values are not amenable to scientific verification. To verify facts, values have to be eliminated and this cannot be done. On the other hand, it is not realistic to ignore values on the ground that they are not amenable to measurement.

THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT

The problem of measurement revolves itself around the issues of conceptual clarity, and the refinement of data gathering instruments. There is a dearth of cross-culturally valid data gathering instruments which could be used as a standard to measure administrative performance cross-nationally. Instruments developed in the West unless validated in various cultures are often culture bound. Culture boundness introduces biases and results in errors in measurement. The objectives and functions of government administrations vary to a great extent and if we utilise any one we could be accused of measuring performance according to one's standards and values and not according to other's standards and values. It would also be difficult to decide the best or most correct or most beneficial of the various objectives and functions of government administrations.

PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

As stated earlier, one is not able to decide often what one's needs are. Man's behaviour is a product of the interaction between his personality and environment. When the political and social environments change his behaviour also changes. His needs differ, his aspirations rise or fall and so do his reactions and attitudes towards the administration change. Government administrations are supposed to be development orientated and supposed to interact with the environment goals, objectives and functions as administrations change too. In countries where there is a rapid change, or even a change, it is more difficult to identify and measure the needs of people than in a static environment, where there is a problem of people not understanding their needs. Definition of needs, responses and participation of people has to be more tangible and objective, before they can be amenable to measurement.

ATTEMPTS MADE TO DEVELOP INDICATORS

However, there have been attempts made to develop indicators even though the problems involved appear to be insurmountable. The rough indicators developed so far may be classified as macro and micro-indicators.

Macro-Indicators

The macro-indicators developed cannot be termed direct measurements of administrative performance, efficiency, effectiveness or efficacy. They are merely indirect or proxy variables. The reasons advanced for the use of proxy variables centre around the old argument that a second best solution is better than no solution. This is, however, a sufficient reason to consider them seriously.

Oscar Oszlak[2] has developed six macro-level indicators: (*a*) indices of supervision, (*b*) the number of newly created para-state organisations, (*c*) incidence of double or multiple employment, attendance and strikes, (*d*) employee's personal traits, (*e*) salary levels and policies, and (*f*) allocation of resources by item of expense. To him these proxy variables seem to provide some useful basis for evaluating inputs and processes in administration. For example, the indices of supervision express a quantitative relationship between the number of officials at two different levels in an organisation and are useful to deduce the extent of control in the organisation. The number of newly created public enterprises may denote the flexibility of governments in implementing developmental programme. Incidence of strikes, absenteeism and active employment

[2]Oscar Oszlak, *Diagnostico de la Administration Publica Uruguaya Technical Report*, New York, United Nations, 1972.

both inside and outside public administration would indicate to some extent moral and motivation of workers. Some indicators would help in the planning process in specific areas such as promotion, retirement and training needs. Such type of indicators would be the age, sex, education, years of service. By themselves these may not be useful but if they are not related to what Oszlak calls the structural variables (*i.e.*, rank, functional class, sector and unit), they may generate useful information for developing a career development system. Salary levels and policies if correlated with structural variables may help in identifying and reducing discrimination, law motivation and general frustration or dissatisfaction. As stated earlier, objectives are rarely defined clearly but, however, if we examine the allocation of resources by item of expense we may have an approximate measure of the objectives of an organisation.

Another set of macro-indicators, which are not necessarily opposed to or complimentary to the first set, are more remote proxy variables than the first set. The rationale in the use of the second set of macro-indicators is derived from the study by Beckerman and Bacon.[3] The argument is that if there is greater socio-economic change, in quantitative terms, in one country than in another, then one cause of this may be greater administrative capabilities in the country, which records greater socio-economic growth.[4] While administrative capabilities are not quantitatively measureable, some indicators of socio-economic growth are measureable and these are: (*a*) average annual rate of growth of gross product, (*b*) unemployment, underemployment and employment, (*c*) improvement in quality of education, (*d*) improvement in levels of health facilities, (*e*) expansion and diversification of exports of manufactures, (*f*) strengthening and streamlining tax administration, (*g*) containment of current expenditures, (*h*) improvement of efficiency of public enterprises, (*i*) inventory of natural resources, and (*j*) reform of land tenure.

Hudson[5] has suggested some indicators, whose weaknesses are self-evident but nevertheless could be of help as candidate or proxy variables. These indicators are: (*a*) the number of government employees per sq. km./mile, (*b*) the ratio of government budget to government employees, (*c*) the ratio of government budget to gross national product, (*d*) tax efficiency defined as the ratio of revenue collected to taxable income, (*e*) government allocations to various functions, (*f*) length

[3]W. Beckerman and R. Bacon, "International Comparisons of Income Levels: A Suggested New Measure", *Economic Journal*, Vol. 76, 1972.

[4]Gerald Schwab, "Indicating Improvements in Development Administration", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, July 1973, p. 312.

[5]Michael C. Hudson, "Developing Indicators of Administrative Productivity: The Cross-National Perspective", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 1973, p. 333.

of the budget process, and (*g*) number of computers and similar technology available to a government administration.

Micro-Indicators

Micro-indicators are relatively easier to define and measure. This is because at the micro-level concepts can be broken up into minute definable units. For example as an index of efficiency we may be able to count the number of papers shuffled, the time taken to reply to letters of inquiry and delay in terms of manhours in making per diem payments to employees. However, the use of such indicators is also wrought with problems especially when we go into the realm of appropriateness of the various actions taken. We have to make value judgements and value judgements are not objectively measurable even at the micro-level.

It becomes apparent that indicators, whether representative, candidate, direct, indirect or proxy, are still at an infant stage of development. The trouble with proxy variables is that they are not able to fully explain all statistical variations and at the most they can state relationships but they cannot establish cause and effect to any reasonable degree of certainty. More time and effort is needed if measurable indicators such as we have for economics are to develop. □

Measuring the Effectiveness of Public Service Commissions in the New States: Some Relevant Indicators*

Jon S. T. Quah

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to describe a proposed research design for measuring the effectiveness of Public Service Commissions (PSCs) in the new states of Asia and Africa. The PSC is the adapted version of the United Kingdom Civil Service Commission (CSC) in the former British colonies and was established to keep politics out of the civil service and to accelerate the pace of localization of the public bureaucracy. In short, the PSCs are the central personnel agencies of those Afro-Asian countries which have been under British rule, *e.g.*, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Malaysia, and Singapore.

There are several reasons for this research choice. First, the focus is on organizational effectiveness because it is "one of the most complex and least tackled problems in the study of social organizations"[1] Moreover, very few attempts have been made to measure the effectiveness of public or governmental agencies. Indeed, the bulk of research in this area has been on private or industrial agencies.[2] Hence, this attempt to measure the effectiveness of a particular type of public agency—the PSC—in the former British colonies in Asia and Africa. If effectiveness is defined as "the degree of goal-achievement",[3] it is only possible to measure the effectiveness of an organization so long as the type of organization or its goals are explicit. In other words, the effectiveness of organizations cannot be measured in general terms, but in terms of the specific organization concerned. Therefore, any measurement of organizational effectiveness must focus on a particular type of organization—the PSC in this case.

The PSC is selected as the type of organization to be measured

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1974 pp. 356-363.

[1]Basil S. Georgopoulos and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Subjective and Objective Output Indicators", *Policies, Decisions and Organization*, ed. by Fremont J. Lyden, George A. Shipman, and Morton Kroll, New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, p. 245.

[2]*See* for example, *ibid.*, and some of the studies in James L. Price, *Organizational Effectiveness*, Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968.

[3]Price, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

according to the criterion of effectiveness for three reasons. In the first place, the research on organizational effectiveness is culture-bound in the sense that it is restricted to the United States only. James L. Price, in his inventory of studies on organizational effectiveness, observes:

> The most serious present need is for studies of non-American and non-Western organizations. It is impossible to develop a "theory of the effectiveness of organizations" with studies performed almost exclusively in the United States.[4]

The focus on the PSC, then, reflects an attempt to partially rectify the research gap on studies of organizational effectiveness in the developing countries by initiating research in this area.

Secondly, the existing research studies on the PSC are either single case studies in a particular country[5] or comparative studies[6]. Such studies are mainly descriptive and deal with the role, structure, and functions of the PSCs in the various former British colonies of Asia and Africa. None of them attempt to consider the question of effectiveness or even to mearure it. Apart from the functions of keeping politics out of the civil service and of accelerating the pace of localization, the PSC is also responsible for the appointment, promotion, transfer, and disciplinary control of public servants. It is also in charge of the "fixing of salaries and wages, complements and grading (or classification of posts), conditions of service, negotiations with Staff Associations, organizations and methods, training"[7] and in some countries such as Singapore, the function of awarding of scholarships, training awards and bursaries.[8] Given the multiplicity of important functions undertaken by the PSC, it is necessary to ascertain whether his agency is doing a 'good' job or doing what it is supposed to do. If it is found that the PSCs in the new states are not effective, steps could be taken to decentralize such institutions by relieving them of some of their functions. In short, the effectiveness of the PSCs in the developing countries must

[4]Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-206.

[5]*See* for example, C.N. Bhalerao, *Public Service Commissions of India*, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1966; L.G. Coke Wallis, "The Public Service Commission in Nigeria", *Civilisations*, X : 2 (1960), pp. 233-238; and R.O. Tilman, "Public Service Commissions in the Federation of Malaya", *Journal of Asian Studies*, XX : 2, February 1961, pp. 169-213.

[6]*See* for example Jon Siew Tien Quah, *The Public Service Commission in Singapore: A Comparative Study of: (a) its Evolution, and (b) its Recruitment and Selection Procedures vis-a-vis the Public Service Commissions in Ceylon, India, and Malaysia.* Unpublished Master of Social Science Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, 1970.

[7]A.P. Sinker, "What are Public Service Commissions for?" *Public Administration*, London, XXXI (Autumn 1953), pp. 208-209.

[8]*See* Quah, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

be measured in order to determine whether they are capable of performing the various functions accorded to them.

Finally, the PSC is chosen because the writer is familiar with the available literature and has completed a comparative study of the PSCs in Ceylon, India, Malaysia, and Singapore.[9]

INDICATORS OF 'EFFECTIVENESS'

Before identifying the specific hypotheses to be tested, the concept of 'effectiveness' must be defined and the various indicators of 'effectiveness' identified.

As mentioned earlier, Price defines 'effectiveness' as 'the degree of goal-achievement'. This definition is not very useful because of its vagueness. A more elaborate and useful definition of 'effectiveness' has been provided by Basil S. Georgopoulos and Arnold S. Tannenbaum:

> We define organizational effectiveness as the extent to which an organization as a social system, given certain resources and means, fulfils its objectives without incapacitating its means and resources and without placing undue strain upon its members. This conception of effectiveness subsumes the following general criteria : (1) organizational productivity; (2) organizational flexibility in the form of successful adjustment to internal organizational changes and successful adaptation to externally induced change; and (3) absence of intra-oganizational strain.[10]

Their definition of 'effectiveness' is adopted in this paper but not their indicators as these are only relevant for their study of an industrial service specializing in the delivery of retail merchandise, and not for a public agency such as the PSC. Nevertheless, the indicators to be used do reflect to a certain extent the three criteria specified by them.

Before specifying the various indicators of 'effectiveness' of a PSC, it should be noted that the following list of indicators is arbitrary and not exhaustive but it represents an attempt on the part of the writer to describe the major factors influencing the effectiveness of the PSCs in the new states.

The first two indicators of effectiveness are related to the general criteria of organizational productivity, *i.e.*, the extent to which the PSC has been able to achieve its goals. To reiterate, the principal goals of the PSC are: (1) to increase the pace of localization in the civil service, and (2) to keep politics out of the civil service. The first indicator measures the *speed of localization* in the civil service by ascertaining the

[9] *See* Quah, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[10] Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

rate of localization of the civil service in the country before *and* after independence. As localization refers to the process by which expatriates in the government services are replaced by local citizens, the rate of localization is measured by determining the ratio of expatriates to local citizens in the civil service prior to and after the attainment of independence. The speed of localization is high if there has been a drastic decrease in the number of expatriates and a considerable increase in the number of local citizens in the civil service after independence has been achieved. In other words, the ratio of expatriates to local citizens in the public service has decreased from over one in the pre-independence days to less than one in the post-independence period. On the other hand, the speed of localization is low if there have been no significant changes in the pre-independence ratio of expatriates to local citizens in the civil service. Data on this indicator can be collected by checking the records on localization provided in government documents and by examining the various studies on localization of the civil service in Asia and Africa.[11]

In order to ascertain whether politics has been kept out of the civil service by the PSC a second indicator, the *reliance on achievement citeria* in recruitment and selection by the PSC is required. In the recruitment and selection of personnel, the PSC has to keep the civil service free from political and personal, influences by first eliminating all forms of patronage by 'keeping the rascals out' and second by attempting to find the best men available and putting them in.[12] In order to keep the rascals out and recruit men of high calibre into the public service, the PSC has to rely on achievement citeria in its selection of personnel rather than ascriptive criteria. Its reliance on achievement citeria is absolute if ascriptive considerations do not play any part in the selection of public officials. Conversely, its reliance on achievement criteria is nil if ascriptive rather than achievement considerations govern the selection of public servants. Data on this indicator can be gathered by asking a stratified random sample of bureaucrats outside the PSC, the members and staff of the PSC itself, university students, and the general public, their reaction to the following statement:

> The PSC relies on achievement criteria (such as the requisite educational qualifications, and experience) rather than on ascriptive

[11]*See* for example, D.S. Dass, *Malayanisation: Malayan Civil Service (1945-1957)* Unpublished Academic Exercise in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History, Department of History, University of Singapore, 1961; Richard Symonds, *The British and their Successors: A Study in the Development of the Government in New States* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1966); and R.O. Tilman, *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya*, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1964.

[12]Sinker, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

criteria (such as race or family connections) in the recruitment and selection of candidates into the civil service.

The respondents will be asked to state whether they strongly agree (5 points), agree (4 points), are undecided (3 points), disagree (2 points), and strongly disagree (1 point) with the above statement. A high score shows that the respondents believe that the PSC relies more on achievement rather than ascriptive considerations in selection, while a low score indicates the opposite.

The remaining set of indicators deals with some of the internal characteristics of the PSC such as : the *level of training* of its members, the *level of morale* of its members and staff, the *stability of the staff work force*, and its *volume of work*; as well as such external factors as the *prestige* or image of the PSC and the *size of the country*. Each of these indicators will now be briefly considered.

The size of the membership of the PSC varies from three to twelve depending on the country. For example, there are three PSC members in Ceylon, six to nine in India, and six to twelve in Malaysia.[13] The members of the PSC are appointed on the basis of the following five criteria : (1) high public standing, (2) detachment from politics, (3) possession of high judicial or legal qualifications, (4) previous working experience in the civil service, and (5) representation of minority groups.[14] As one of the major functions of the members of the PSC is to select the most suitable candidates for the civil service by means of a personal interview after such applicants have satisfied certain requirements (such as educational qualifications for example), the amount of *training* of the members in interviewing techniques is another important indicator of the effectiveness of the PSC.[15] It seems to me that PSC members who have not undergone training courses in interviewing will make poorer interviewers than those who are trained interviewers. Data on this indicator can be easily obtained from the write-ups on the members in the newspapers when they are first appointed to the PSC; or alternatively by interviewing the members themselves.

The next two indicators—the *level of morale* of the PSC members and staff, and the *stability of the staff work force*—have been suggested as two indicators for measuring the effectiveness of a personnel programme by Boris Blai, Jr.[16] As the PSC is the central personnel agency in the former British colonies in Asia and Africa, these two indicators

[13] Quah. *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

[15] "Interviewers should be trained. . . The most conspicuous and damaging failure at this time is the lack of training." V. R. Taylor, "A Hard Look at the Selection Interview", *Public Personnel Review*, XXX : 3 (July 1969), pp. 152-153.

[16] Boris Blai, Jr., "How Effective is Your Personnel Program?", *Personnel Journal*, XXX : 3, July-August 1951, pp. 98-101.

can be used to measure the effectiveness of the PSC also. As PSC members serve for a fixed number of years—usually five years—specified by the Constitution, the morale of the members can be ascertained by the number of resignations before the terms of office expire. The morale of the PSC staff can be gauged from the number of grievances or complaints voiced by staff members. The latter can be determined from interviews with staff members, or by administering a questionnaire on job satisfaction to them. The stability of the staff work force can be measured by the 'turnover' rate of the staff or the number of staff members resigning from the PSC. Details of this are available in the annual reports of the PSC.

The *volume of work*, the sixth indicator, refers to the number of applicants interviewed by the PSC annually. My own research has shown that the PSC in Singapore is much more effective than that in Ceylon and one manifestation of this is the heavier workload of Singapore compared to Ceylon which is larger in size and has a larger population. This is obvious from Table 1. Data on this indicator can be obtained from the PSC annual reports.

TABLE 1 NUMBER OF APPLICANTS INTERVIEWED BY THE PSCs IN CEYLON AND SINGAPORE FROM 1964 TO 1967[17]

Year	*Number of Applicants Interviewed*	
	PSC, Ceylon	*PSC, Singapore*
1964	1,122	10,595
1965	2,869	18,187
1966	1,147	14,625
1967	1,347	15,305

Robert Presthus, in his research on the effectiveness of private hospitals argues that:

> Their prestige in the larger community has an immediate impact on their operational effectiveness. Community support, in effect, has legitimated the hospital's role, and given it the patina of superiority that privately-fostered institutions often enjoy in our society.[18]

It follows then that the *prestige* of the PSC among the general public and the bureaucrats is an important factor, affecting the effectiveness of the PSC. In other words, the prestige of the PSC is a measure of its

[17]This table is reproduced from Quah, *op. cit.*, Table 3.9, p. 140.

[18]Robert Presthus, *Behavioral Approaches to Public Administration*, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1965, pp. 75-76.

effectiveness. The prestige of the PSC can be measured by asking the stratified random sample of bureaucrats outside the PSC, the members and staff of the PSC, university students, and the general public, the following question:

> What do you think of the PSC? Do you think the PSC is doing a poor, fair, good, or very good job?[19]

Other measures of the PSC's prestige are: (1) the number of complaints against the PSC in the local press, (2) the attitude of opposition party members toward the PSC (obtained by asking them the same questions, or by making a content analysis of their speeches in parliament or elsewhere), and (3) the number of persons applying for jobs with the PSC. The PSC's prestige is not high if there are many complaints against it in the newspapers or if there are fewer applicants for PSC jobs.

Finally, the *size of the country* is an important indicator of the effectiveness of the PSC. Generally, small countries have greater control and coordination over administration, and are able to create centralised organizations that can easily penetrate the society to mobilize resources from it, to regulate behaviour and to distribute political goods more expediently.

HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

The hypotheses to be tested in this proposed research design are:

1. The faster the *speed of localization* of the civil service, the greater will be the level of effectiveness of the PSC.
2. The greater the *reliance on achievement criteria* in recruitment and selection of personnel by the PSC, the greater will be the level of effectiveness of the PSC.
3. A PSC with *members* who have been *trained in interviewing techniques* is more effective than a PSC whose members have not been trained in such techniques.
4. The higher the *morale* of the members and staff of the PSC, the greater will be its effectiveness.
5. The greater the *stability of the staff work force* of the PSC, the greater will be its effectiveness.
6. The greater the volume of work of the PSC, the greater will be its effectiveness.

[19]This question is adapted from one of the questions in S.J. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham, and A. P. Barnabas, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy*, Glenview., Ill., Scott, Foresman & Co., 1968, p. 160.

7. The higher the *prestige* of the PSC, the higher is its level of effectiveness.
8. The smaller the *size of the country*, the more effective will be the PSC.

What has been suggested above are merely tentative indicators for measuring the effectiveness of the PSCs in those Afro-Asian states that are former British colonies. These indicators are tentative because only actual testing of the eight hypotheses listed above will show whether they are useful indicators or not. Moreover, the above catalogue of indicators is not exhaustive and needs to be expanded by the inclusion of other measures of effectiveness which have not been considered here.

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A.P. Sinker, "What are Public Service Commissions for?", *Public Administration*, London, XXXI (Autumn 1953), pp. 206-212. □

Administrative Mind in a Developing Nation : An Empirical Exploration*

Kuldeep Mathur

IT IS now generally accepted that machinery for implementing development programmes is tremendously inadequate in the developing nations.[1] This inadequacy is not only concerned with administrative structures and organizations but also with bureaucratic dispositions.[2] As a matter of fact, bureaucrats have come under heavy criticism and a detailed catalogue of complaints is built up against them.[3] For it is essentially argued that, in these nations, much of the bureaucratic pursuit is directed towards goals other than achievement of programme objectives.[4] This feeling of bureaucratic failure is enhanced in former colonial countries where bureaucrats symbolized all that imperialism stood for. Thus, today, there is increasing attention being paid to the bureaucrat—the man himself—for understanding the problems of poor performance of development programmes in these nations.

In India, national leaders realized very soon that plans beautifully prepared become meaningless visions unless effectively carried out and implemented. This led to increasing attention to bureaucratic problems, and government had maintained an impressive output of studies and reports on these.[5] Varied conclusons were reached but the main thrust

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1970, pp. 575-96.

[1]In an early article, Riggs maintains that public administration and economic change have an interdependent relationship, *see* Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries*, Boston, Houghton and Mifflin, 1964, pp. 243-59.

[2]*See*, for example, the writings of Braibanti and associates, particularly Ralph J. Braibanti, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1966.

[3]Leonard Binder, *Political Development in a Changing Society*, Berkeley University of California Press, 1962, pp. 337-42; David Hapgood and John D. Montgomery, *Policies for Promoting Agricultural Development*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT, 1965.

[4]Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, Englewood Cliffs (N.I.), Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 71.

[5]The Five Year Plans in India have placed great stress on administration whether in the Community Development programme or in running a huge public enterprise unit, like Hindustan Steel. For a detailed bibliography, *see* Special Number on Administrative Reforms, *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1963. A recent Administrative Reforms Commission has also brought out a series of reports on problems of Indian administration.

of arguments of most observers was that there existed a dichotomy between bureaucratic dispositions and needs of development today. Paul Appleby,[6] Bert Hoselitz,[7] Taylor, Ensminger and associates,[8] Snowiss,[9] and Tinker,[10] among others, have developed a simplistic cause-and-effect approach. LaPalombara has summed this up by saying that an administrator, steeped in the tradition of the Indian Civil Service of the British days, is not useful as developmental administrator.[11]

It is intriguing, however, that even though such comprehensive indictments have taken place and a judgement passed on the behavioural orientations of the present bureaucracy, little serious effort has been directed toward establishing an empirical base for such propositions. Enough systematic data to describe and analyse the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of Indian bureaucrats is lacking. Braibanti, with his associates, has provided initial scholarly work in presenting invaluable insight into the ethos and dispositions of the past Indian Civil Service.[12] These studies are primarily of historical nature though attempts have been made to explain the current traditions in terms of the old. In the same context, Eldersveld and others have made an attempt to find out whether bureaucratic contacts with the common masses in India are functional and relevant to socio-economic change.[13]

Only recently has an attempt been made to study bureaucrats in their own work setting. Taub, in an excellent study, has investigated bureaucratic attitudes towards work, community and their own group in Bhubaneshwar, a small state capital in India.[14] He has identified sources of stress and strain on Indian administrators and attempted to investigate how they acquaint themselves in terms of the demands placed on them.

[6]Paul H. Appleby, *Public Administration in India : A Report of a Survey*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1953, pp. 8 and 14.

[7]Bert F. Hoselitz, "Tradition and Economic Growth", Ralph Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (eds.), *Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1961.

[8]Carl Taylor, Douglas Ensminger and associates, *India's Roots of Democracy*, New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 579.

[9]Leo M. Snowiss, "The Education and Role of Superior Civil Service in India", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Jan.-March), 1961, p. 64.

[10]Hugh Tinker, "The Village in the Framework of Development", R. Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (eds.), *Administration and Economic Development*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1963.

[11]Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview", Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 12.

[12]*See* the various writings and volumes edited by Ralph Braibanti.

[13]S. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A.P. Barnabas, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Society* Glenview (Illinois), Scott Foresman, 1968.

[14]Richard P. Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.

The purpose of the present study is to investigate the behavioural orientations of the developmental bureaucrats in India in this context and to evaluate their perceptions of the outstanding behaviours and practices of their public administration system. Our interest is in identifying their own images. This effort in sorting out the various dimensions of self-image will help us in understanding their implications and in identifying the individual in his work setting. This is important before any effort is made to analyse and relate bureaucratic dispositions to the needs of development. Thus, in the context of our earlier formulations, this study is an effort to fill in the gap of empirical studies on Indian bureaucratic behaviour and to develop a more concrete base for hypothesizing about the bureaucratic failures or successes.

But this study makes an important deviation from the type of studies mentioned above. It is focused on the local administrators, who are actually implementing plans and coming in direct contact with the people. Various scholars and commentators of Indian bureaucracy have studied mainly the ICS and its successor—the IAS. Subordinate units of bureaucracy have received scant attention. The IAS is important in the total political system but, it seems, it is more important to turn attention to those bureaucrats who are easily identified as developmental and are actively involved in eliciting public cooperation for developmental tasks. The local administrator not only has greater influence in moulding the public attitudes towards development and government but he also faces the greatest test, namely, successful implementation. For it is at the local level that the hardest core of traditions and beliefs are found and economic development programmes seem to falter the most.[15]

SAMPLE AND THE SETTING

Thus, the data for this study were based on a survey questionnaire administered through personal interviews to a random sample of Block Development Officers (BDOs) in two states: Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The BDOs satisfied the criterion for local administrators because they are at the base of the hierarchy in community development administration. Community development is the single most important vehicle of government-initiated change and has great contemporary relevance in terms of major responsibility in overall development of India. The sample consisted of 89 BDOs: 40 from Rajasthan and 49 from Uttar Pradesh.

Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are two neighbouring Hindi speaking

[15]*See*, for example, the arguments in LaPalombara, *op. cit*., p. 7; and also Myron Weiner, "Political Development in the Indian States", Myron Weiner (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 4-6.

states in North India. Rajasthan is larger than UP in area but its population is much smaller than that of UP. Literacy in Rajasthan is low while education is far more widespread in UP. The level of urbanization also shows a wide disparity between the two states with Rajasthan having only one-third the number of cities in UP with more than 100,000 population. Economically, Rajasthan has much lower income at state level and per capita income than UP. But in the last decade the rate of economic growth in Rajasthan has been much higher. It is on the basis of the figures of rate of growth that both Rosen and Brass have suggested that the political implications of these economic conditions in Uttar Pradesh are that it is not a society which is experiencing the disruptive impact of rapid economic change.[16]

Politically, UP has been the most important centre of Indian independence movement and many contemporary developments in Indian politics can be traced to it. It was deeply involved in the politics of partition and the resulting social turmoil. Rajasthan, on the other hand, was well-insulated from the mainstream of Indian independence movement. It was not involved in the politics of partition and was largely free of communal politics or social turmoil. The princes were successful in maintaining and enforcing law and order and keeping their states isolated from national aspirations to a great extent. Administratively, UP was under the direct rule of the British while the erstwhile states in Rajasthan were governed by the doctrine of paramountcy. This left the princes largely to their own manipulations without any overt interference from the representative of the British Crown.

In the post-independence era, personal and fuctional politics dominated the State of UP.[17] This has had a serious impact on the stability of the government and, after the departure of G. B. Pant in 1955 from the state scene, a series of chief ministers have been there with some spells of President's rule. In contrast, Rajasthan, newly arrived on the democratic scene, has been comparatively stable all these years. Since 1954, the same chief minister has been in power and, even though, factional movements did spring up, no serious threat to his dominance developed.[18] Thus, despite its poverty and backwardness, Rajasthan has done better on the economic front and registered greater political stability than UP. Independence and democracy were crowning achievements of the intense nationalist struggles centered in UP among other states. Independence, on the other hand, was a gift to Rajasthan, a challenge and an adventure into the unknown.

[16]George Rosen, *Democracy and Economic Change in India*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 317-323, Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965, p. 2.

[17]*See* Brass, *op. cit.*, for an excellent analysis of such trends.

[18]Richard Sisson, "Institutionalization and Style in Rajasthan Politics", *Asian Survey*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1966, pp. 605-13.

With this introduction and description of the setting, this study makes an attempt in two directions. First attempt is to develop the major dimensions of bureaucratic thinking and perceptions so as to establish an empirical pattern of how the bureaucrats are reacting to the changing environment. This analysis is being attempted through the factor analysis technique. Second attempt is to develop a typology and a profile of the local administrators and find out whether they differ from one another. A computer technique has been used to develop the profiles of the bureaucrats and discriminant analysis has been employed to find out whether the BDOs differ in the two states along the perception-dimensions. The following section presents the factor results and the next section, the results of profile and discriminant analysis.

FACTOR ANALYTIC STUDY

Factor-analysis technique has the ability to reduce the original number of variables to a smaller number of independent factors in terms of which the whole set of variables can be understood, to provide a simpler and more compact explanation of the regularities apparent in the data, and to delineate structure in the attitudinal space of interest. What factor analysis does is this: it takes thousands and potentially millions of measurements and qualitative observations and resolves them into distinct patterns of occurrence. It makes explicit and more precise the building of fact linkages going on continuously in the human mind.[19]

In this analysis, common factor model was used.[20] Originally, 65 items of the questionnaire were inter-correlated and factor-analysed.[21] The principal-axis-solution technique was used with squared multiple

[19]R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XI, No. 4, 1967, pp. 444-80.

[20]The common factor model assumes that data on a variable common and unique parts. The common parts of the variable define the common factor space. A basic assumption is that the number of dimensions needed to span the common vector space is much less than the basis for the vector space of the data. In contrast, the component factor model analyses the total variance, including common and unique variance. For a choice between the two, based on conceptual and mathematical grounds, *see* Raymond Cattel, "Factor Analysis: An Introduction to Essentials", *Biometrics*, March, 1965. For detailed exposition, *see* R.J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis*, Evanston (Illinois), Northwestern University Press, 1970, on which much of the reasoning here is based.

[21]Product moment correlation has been used. It is applicable to both dichotomous and continuous data, *See* J.B. Carroll, 'The Nature of the Data or How to Choose a Correlation Coefficient", *Psychometrika*, Vol. XXVI, 1961.

correlations in the principal diagonal as estimates of communality.[22] The structure was rotated to an orthogonal solution, using varimax technique.[23] Many analyses were carried out to eliminate those variables that had low communality in the rotated factor matrix. Low communality means that a variable has very little affinity with any of the factors.[24] Forty-four items were finally selected. The choice of the number of factors was decided on the basis of the scree test.[25] The proportion of total variance explained by the factors included in the factor matrix was around 60 per cent.

To develop a total picture of bureaucrat in his administrative setting, the questions that were asked of him, and were factor-analysed, concerned bureaucrats, society at large, democracy and government in general and administration in particular. Some, were statements wherein they were asked to show whether they strongly agreed, agreed, strongly disagreed, disagreed or were uncertain about them. The mean scores of the various items presented interesting—often conflicting—facets of the perceptions of the BDOs. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works did not lead to a loss of faith in the supreme court or to a strong demand for a dictator. Stronger discipline for the young people did not precluded the acceptance of an active role for the women in politics. Even though newspapermen were perceived as paid propagandists of influential men, newspapers as such were not conceived of doing harm. Superiors within the department projected a poor image; excessive consciousness of high status and lack of receptiveness to new ideas and suggestions coming from below were generally agreed upon. There was hesitation in inter-acting with colleagues and superiors and uncertainty about departmental recognition of good work. In matters of trust, too, there was general hesitation and caution. Even though it was accepted that human beings were selfish by nature, strong agreement was expressed with the statements that the world would not work without trust and, if one was suspicious

[22]A basic indeterminacy of the common factor model is the determination of the communality. However, squared multiple correlation has been accepted as the best estimate of communality on theoretical and empirical grounds.

[23]Orthogonal rotation defines uncorrelated cluster of variables. Varimax technique is generally used as a method of rotation for its ability to define the cluster more sharply.

[24]Adelman and Morris have used a similar technique to reduce their number for variables also to pull out variables with possible random correlation, *See* Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1967.

[25]The scree test requires an examination of the number of factors plotted against the total variance accounted for; where this percentage drops to more or less like a straight line, a demarcation line can be drawn. Only these factors above this 'rubble factor variance' is to be included in rotation. *See* R.B. Cattel, "The Scree Test for Number of Factors", *Multi Behavioural Research*, Vol. I, 1966, pp. 245-276.

of everyone, life was not worth living.

Two open-ended questions were also asked. One wanted them to describe their perception of the best possible administration. The response was categorized and an index was formulated to describe adequately each bureaucrat. This index was named 'Power Monopolizer' and each bureaucrat was scaled from high to low. The second question concerned itself with their perception of a good administrator. Again, an index named 'decision maker' was formulated and each bureaucrat was scored in a similar way.

The factor results are presented below. Each factor has been named and then described briefly. The factor table presents the items that have correlated together to form a single dimension or a factor. The loading can be interpreted as a correlation coefficient and it shows the strength and direction of relationship of that item with the factor. Communality or H-square is the proportion of variation of each variable involved in the total number of factors while the per cent total variance presents the total variation of all the variables involved in the total number of factors. Per cent common variance is a proportion of variation of all the variables involved in that particular number of factors as compared with the total number of factors.

The first factor, presented in Table 1 has been identified as 'Cynicism'. It broadly indicates the cautious atmosphere in which a

TABLE 1 FACTOR I—CYNICISM

Sl. No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loadings**	*Communality† H-Square*
1.	If you are the kind of person who trust people, you will be disappointed	0.73	0.58
2.	The only sensible thing is to act as if the other person is capable of cheating you	0.71	0.57
3.	A good rule to follow is never to trust anyone completely	0.59	0.46
4.	Unfortunately, human beings are just selfish by nature	0.51	0.52
5.	On the whole, newspapers do more harm than good	0.49	0.35
6.	A few strong leaders could make our country better than all the laws and talk	0.44	0.33
7.	When you try to have your ideas and solutions accepted by the department, you usually make enemies and get hurt:	0.43	0.37
	Per cent common variance: 23.7		
	Per cent total variance : 11.0		

*Factor loadings : 0.30 given in all factor tables.

†Communality is across seven factors. This is true for all the factor tables presented here.

bureaucrat lives. There are four items that show distrust in human nature and personal relationships. Selfishness its accepted as part of human nature and trust leads to disappointment. Newspapers are looked at with suspicion and are considered more harmful than good. Greater faith is put in strong leaders to make the country better. This item also suggests a distrust of democratic discussions and formulations of laws to improve things. Democracy within a department is also seen with cynical eyes. Thus, this factor includes strong attributes of personal cynicism and distrust toward newspapers, present democratic leaders and departmental organization.

The second factor, named 'democratism', is presented in Table 2. Four items relating to autocratic behaviour are negatively correlated with it. Bureaucrats loading highly on this factor would not like the politicians to leave the administration alone and do not believe that it ought to have greater strength in decision-making. They do not think that newspapermen are paid propagandists of influential men or that young people need strict disciplining by their parents. There is also belief in the current democratic institutions and processes, like

TABLE 2 FACTOR II—DEMOCRATISM

Sl. No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loadings*	*Communality H-Square*
1.	In the long run, public administration will be more effective if politicians leave administrators alone to decide what programmes to carry out and how to carry them out	—0,58	0.49
2.	There ought to be greater firmness and strength in decision-making	—0.57	0.40
3.	Most of our newspapermen are paid propagandists of influential men	—0.51	0.38
4.	What young people need most of all is strict disciplining by their parents	—0.42	0.45
5.	A good administrator should have a sense of dedication toward developmental programmes	—0.41	0.50
6.	You can depend upon the Supreme Court to uphold the law or the supremacy of the constitution at all times	—0.35	0.21
7.	By and large, our elections have been free and honest in spite of the reported cases of violence and fraud:	—0.39	0.37
	Per cent common variance : 18.6		
	Per cent total variance : 9.5		

the supreme court and the elections. A quality of a good administrator is highly associated with this factor. It deals with the desire that the administrators should have greater dedication towards the developmental programmes they are implementing. There seems to be an expression of general satisfaction with what is happening today. The political institutions are accepted and so also is the political environment.

The third factor is named 'trust'. It is is presented in Table 3. All the items correlated with it show a high faith in human nature. With trust is also correlated the desire to see best possible administration as a demorcratized one. In this perception of the best administration, the bureaucrats are talking of better inter-personal behaviour and greater say in the decisions that concern them. Indian administration has suffered from certain procedures that emanated from distrust the British had of the Indians. These procedures have in many instances not changed at all.[26] It is no surprise then to find trust and desire to democratise loading together.

TABLE 3 FACTOR III—TRUST

Sl. No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loadings*	*Communality H-Square*
1.	If you trust people and let them know it, they will very seldom disappoint you	0.80	0.67
2.	Most people can be trusted	0.61	0.49
3.	People are likely to be honest if you trust them	0.58	0.44
4.	If you are suspicious of everyone, life is not worth living	0.42	0.24
5.	The word would not work without trust	0.36	0.37
6.	Democratization of administration	0.32	0.23
	Per cent common variance : 15.4		
	Per cent total variance : 8.5		

Items relating to a desire of increasing bureaucratic power are loaded on the fourth factor, presented in Table 4. It is named 'power monopolizer'. The power-monopolizing index that has been constructed from an opea-ended question inquiring about the perceptions of best possible administration has the highest loading on this factor. This index is primarily concerned with such attributes like efficiency and effectiveness of bureaucracy, separation of politics and administration and unsuitabi-

[26]Cohn has argued that many of the Indian administrative procedures emanate from the image the British held of the Indians. *See* Bernard Cohn. "The British in Benaras : A Nineteenth Century Colonial Society", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1962, pp. 613-28.

lity of democracy. Thus, this index expresses the perception of bureaucracy as a pure instrument for the implementation of policies. It is correlated with a desire for a dictator for at least a few years. This, again, expresses basic dissatisfaction with democracy. Bureaucrats loading highly on this factor also would not like women to play active part in politics. Significantly, therefore, a desire to increase bureaucratic power goes together with authoritative rule. It then seems that the bureaucrats seeing bureaucracy as a strong instrument of implementation also see democracy as hampering this role.

TABLE 4 FACTOR IV—POWER MONOPOLIZER

Sl. No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loading*	*Communality H-Square*
1.	Power moropolizer	0.72	0.59
2.	Good administration should be dedicated to development	—0.66	0.47
3.	In fact what we probably need is a dictator	0.56	0.48
4.	Women should stay out of politics	0.49	0.48
	Per cent common variance : 12.4		
	Per cent total variance : 8.4		

The fifth factor, presented in Table 5, has been named 'decision maker'. At first glance, it may appear similar to the factor 'power monopolizer'. This is not so, for this factor empirically taps different perceptions. In this case, there are mainly the perceptions of good administrators. Two attributes of good administrators, like team spirit and leadership qualities and those of personality and sociability, are negatively correlated with this factor. The decision-maker index, constructed from the description of a good administrator by the respondents, reflects strong administration and strength in decision-making.

TABLE 5 FACTOR V—DECISION MAKER

Sl. No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loadings*	*Communality H-Square*
1.	A good administrator should possess the qualities of leadership and team spirit	—0.55	0.38
2.	A good administrator should possess high social qualities	—0.55	0.44
3.	Decision maker	0.53	0.76
4.	Removal of corruption	0.33	0.33
5.	Fear of chaos and anarchy	0.37	0.16
	Per cent common variance : 11.5		
	Per cent total variance : 7.2		

This loads highly with this factor. An attribute of best posssible administration has been mentioned with these items too. It is that of removal of corruption. Fear of chaos and anarchy is also associated with this factor. The strong-willed administrators have been talked of only in the context of removing corruption and saving the administration from chaos and anarchy. Therefore, in this factor we find the decision-maker index positively loaded with what the performance expectation is of a good administrator.

The sixth factor, presented in Table 6, has been named 'departmental scepticism'. It reflects a poor estimate of superiors. The bureaucrats do not think that good work is rewarded in their department. They also feel that their superiors do not welcome disagreement and are not ready to listen to criticism, no matter how it is offered. With these perceptions is associated the fear of selfishness and increasing corruption. There is a sense of alienation from the organization in which they work and also lack of participation. It is significant that an item of personal cynicism is loaded with this factor. General distrust is correlated with the distrust of one's superiors in the department.

TABLE 6 FACTOR VI—DEPARTMENTAL SCEPTICISM

Sl. No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loadings*	*Communality H-Square*
1.	Most employees in my department get recognition for their good work regardless of their rank and position	−0.57	0.44
2.	No matter what the books say, our superiors do not welcome disagreement, however honest and well-meaning it may be	0.42	0.38
3.	I fear selfishness and corruption are increasing	0.41	0.32
4.	Most superiors I know, welcome suggestions and criticisms if they are offered constructively and diplomatically	−0.39	0.31
5.	Very few people are truly dishonest	−0.32	0.22
	Per cent common variance : 9.8		
	Per cent total variance : 6.8		

The seventh factor, presented in Table 7, conceptually belongs to the dimension of department scepticism. It is concerned with the peculiar aspects of superior-subordinate relationships. Staff meetings are perceived as talking sessions serving no particular value and this is extended to the whole process of democracy where it is thought that too much talking is done. Superiors assert their status and this may be an important

inhibition in communication. This factor is named as 'hierarchical barriers'. It appears that this factor expresses acute dissatisfaction with the way discussions take place in staff meetings. There is a feeling that giving suggestions and criticisms leads to personal animosities. They are taken as personal affronts.

TABLE 7 FACTOR VII—HIERARCHICAL BARRIERS

Item No.	*Items*	*Rotated Loadings*	*Communality H-Square*
11.	Most of my superiors are excessively conscious of their high status in the department.	0.58	0.41
2.	The trouble with democracy is that we spend too much time arguing and too little for the work that must be done	0.51	0.64
15.	However careful you are in giving your criticism, you are often misunderstood because most people feel that you are really criticizing them and not their ideas.	0.45	0.36
12.	If you participate actively in staff meetings by suggesting your ideas and commenting on the ideas of others they will think you are showing off.	0.38	0.45
21.	No one really cares what happens to you when you really think about it	0.33	0.39
	Per cent common variance : 8.5		
	Per cent total variance : 6.7		

Thus, seven major dimensions of bureaucratic thinking have been delineated. These dimensions have empirically sought to make the concepts clearer and shown more explicitly "what goes with what?". The seven dimensions, thus, are : Cynicism, Democratism, Trust, Power Monopolizer, Decision Maker, Departmental Scepticism, and Hierarchical Barriers.

The major variation in the data is generated by several dimensions or forms of cynicism. From the factors of democratism and trust, which from one group, to the other five factors, which form a group by themselves, the wide trust/cynicism syndrome is tapped. At least one item of personal cynicism is associated with each of the five factors of the second group. This holds true also of the factor structure of democratism. It appears that personal trust/distrust is related to political trust/distrust. There is association between personal cynicism and some form of political cynicism. It seems that those who are contemptuous of people in general—the personally cynical—tend to be

politically cynical as well and those who are personally trusting tend to be politically trusting too.[27] Thus, whether the perceptions are regarding the general political system or the administrative system, they are related to the perceptions toward people in general.

Political cynicism has taken various categories and has emerged in factors relating to form of government, attributes of good administrators, departmental organization and hierarchy. It seems that first two factors reflect a position on many social and political problems. The first factor, as such, is concerned with changes in the whole system of government while the second only with the qualities of administrators. Both are concerned with effective implementation of laws and policies but the line of thought is quite different. It appears that for the BDOs, attributes of good administrators are not a function of the administrative system; strong-willed and powerful decision makers can persist in a democratic system.

It could also be expected that general departmental perceptions would form one single dimension. But a more specific factor reflecting attitudes towards hierarchy and interaction within it has also merged. This has taken the form of perceptions of how superiors behave and staff meetings are conducted. Thus, the total picture of the department is separate from the partial picture of hierarchical relationships.

In concluding this section, it must be emphasized that the grouping of the items have brought out the underlying features of bureaucratic perceptions. A pattern of bureaucratic thinking has been tapped and certain concepts have been made clear. Thus, concept of democracy meant faith in human nature, in persuasion, and in current political institutions. It ruled out strong discipline, in bringing up children or accepting newspapers as instruments of propaganda of influential men. The concept of power monopolizer meant not only a desire to increase bureaucratic power but also anti-democratic orientation. It professed belief in efficacy of a dictator in the present time and also in strengthening bureaucracy. The concept of a decision-maker was isolated from any anti-democratic orientation. It did not appear to be associated with dissatisfaction with the present system and saw improvement in the situation through personal qualities of individual bureaucrats. The larger concept of administrative trust/distrust broke into two factors relating to organization and hierarchy. These two factors conceptually form one dimension but have been separate empirically.

DISCRIMINANT AND PROFILE ANALYSIS

In analysing the data in the previous section, no attempt to differen-

[27] *See* the various writings and volumes edited by Ralph Braibanti.

tiate the respondents coming from the two states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh was made. The BDOs were treated as belonging to a single group. But this may be an imposed artifact and empirically the two groups may not only be geographically distinct but also attitudinally. This reasoning is all the more pertinent when the assumption of choosing the two states was primarily based on their difference in political and administrative experience. Thus, the question now is; Are the two groups, based on geographical areas, also *two* groups based on their behavioural orientations? If yes, then the next question is: What is the profile of each group of bureaucrats?

To answer the first question, we have used the multiple discriminant analysis technique. This helps to determine the group to which each individual belongs. Mahalanobis' 'D-square statistic' helps us to establish whether there is a difference between the two groups, and through an 'F-test' we can establish its statistical significance. We can also find which of the behavioural orientations discriminate significantly. Finally, we can also, through this technique, classify the bureaucrats in their most likely group.[28]

In this section, our first attempt is to use the factor dimensions that we have delineated earlier to classify and differentiate the BDOs from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Table 8 presents a summary of the results of discriminant function analysis. First, the variables and the discriminant function/F-ratio are laid out. The last column tells us whether an F-ratio is statistically significant or not. The last row presents the D-square statistic/F-ratio and its significance.

TABLE 8 DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ANALYSIS—SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Variables	*Discriminant Function/F-ratio*	*Significant p=0.05*
Power monopolizing	8.95	Yes
Hierarchical barriers	4.36	Yes
Democratism	3.51	Yes
Trust	1.52	—
Cynicism	1.41	—
Decision maker	1.26	No
Departmental scepticism	0.10	No
D-square/F-ratio=2.93		
Significant *p* =0 05		

[28]D.V. Tiedman, "The Utility of the Discriminant Function in Psychological and Guidance Investigation", *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, 1951, p. 73. *See also* Robert E. Pendley, *Multiple Discriminant Analysis in Political Research*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii (Political Science Department), 1969, unpublished paper.

The first important conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the BDOs from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are significantly different from each other along the dimensions of bureaucratic perceptions. The second important conclusion is that only three variables, *i.e.*, Power Monopolizing, Hierarchical Barriers and Democratism make a significant contribution to the discriminant function.

On the basis of the discriminant function, bureaucrats have been classified as shown in Table 9:

TABLE 9 NUMBER OF BDOs ASSIGNED TO RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH

	Rajasthan	*Uttar Pradesh*
Rajasthan	72.5%	34.2%
Uttar Pradesh	27.5%	65.3%
	N=40	N=49

As can be seen, 72.5 per cent of BDOs in Rajasthan and 65.3 per cent of BDOs in UP have been classified in their own group. This means that bureaucratic perceptions have disseminated remarkably well between the two groups.

We are now in a position to develop a profile of the two groups of bureaucrats along the dimensions of their behavioural orientations. A computer technique has been developed to plot the underlying similarity of groups. What this programme basically does is to present the group averages on the population mean of the perceptions dimensions. If the mean profile score of each group is far removed from the mean profile score of the population, a distinguishing characteristic has been found. It can be said that the members of that group are similar on that characteristic. Since we normally find a variation about the group mean score, group standard deviation can measure group cohesion on that characteristic.[29] Figs. 1 and 2 present a profile of the bureaucrats from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.

Rajasthan is well-above the mean on the dimension of power monopolizing while UP is well below it. This seems to be the dominant characteristic; it has also been brought out by the discriminant analysis. The two other minor distinguishing features are the negative scores of Rajasthan on democratism and hierarchical barriers. Little recapitulation about the content of factors that describe Rajasthan in contrast to UP is necessary. Power monopolizing was concerned with the desire to increase bureaucratic power even at the cost of democracy. The need

[29]For the description of the computer technique employed *see* D.H. Hall, *Computer Program Profile*, Honolulu (DON Project, Department of Political Science), University of Hawaii, 1968.

of a dictator, at least for a few years, was associated with it. It expressed the conviction of the bureaucrats that the country would do much better if bureaucracy was allowed considerable power in implementing laws and governmental policies. Democratism was concerned with the acceptance of the current political institutions and processes. It also expressed a wider trust in human relationships. The profile of Rajasthan bureaucrats shows they score positively on the former and negatively on the latter. The total picture that emerges is that greater autocratic and anti-democratic orientations are exhibited by Rajasthan than by UP.



FIG. 1 PROFILE OF BDOs OF RAJASTHAN



FIG. 2 PROFILE OF BDOs FROM UTTAR PRADESH

At this point, we can raise interesting question, though a little difficult one: Why are the two states different? Why is one more autocratic than the other? A host of factors can be responsible for this difference. General cultural formulations are wide in scope and no specific studies have been made to show cultural differences in this framework. For most practical purposes, the two states are considered more like than unlike each other.

Attention can be turned, however, to three factors where greater specificity can follow in the discussion. If we look at the background characteristics of the two groups of the BDOs, the major difference—and a remarkable one at that—is that the BDOs in Rajasthan are graduates in agriculture or veterinary science while in UP they come from general humanities and social sciences background. Therefore, technical education may be one factor leading to power monopolizing orientation.

Table 10 presents the central tendencies of background characteristics, for purposes of comparison. The BDOs in UP are about three years older but have put in only 0.4 years more in service than the BDOs from Rajasthan. On the rest of the characteristics, the BDOs from the two states are identical. Thus, one important reason we can posit for the difference between the two states is that of educational background. Technical people have been alleged to carry a narrow outlook in administration because of their specialization. They tend to see the general problems from a more technical standpoint. If this is so, then it is easy to see why they get frustrated quickly and why they desire that more power should be put in their hands to achieve and implement given policies. Rajasthan's decision to appoint such people was taken specifically to help solve the technical problems of Block development. It was not foreseen, however, that these people would carry such orientations to their responsibilities which are opposite to what is desired of them in democratic administration.

TABLE 10 COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF BDOs IN RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH*

Background Characteristic	*Rajasthan*	*Uttar Pradesh*
Age	35.50	38.9
Place of birth	rural	rural
Education	technical	general
Father's occupation	agriculture	agriculture
Religion	Hindu	Hindu
Caste	high	high
Length of service	10.9	11.3
Kind of school	Government	Government
Medium of education (school)	Hindi	Hindi
Medium of education (college)	English	English

*For age and length of service, arithmetic mean is computed for the rest mode.

Focusing our attention on the career patterns of the BDOs in the two states, we find that in Rajasthan, BDOs come to serve in the community development and panchayati raj administration on deputation from their departments, namely, Department of Agriculture in the case of agriculture graduates and Department of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry in case of graduates of veterinary science. A number of them have been extension officers in the blocks or have served them in another capacity. Thus, when they are appointed as the BDOs, they are already acquainted with the problems of block administration. But block administration is not their career for their ladder steps in the hierarchy lie elsewhere in their respective departments. Merit or seniority are departmentally determined and service in the blocks may not be necessarily useful as a criterion of promotion.

In contrast, the BDOs in UP have been recruited primarily for that office through a regular civil service examination. The career pursued is that of a BDO and a graduated scale of pay with promotions in specified salary scales are provided. Two kinds of persons are eligible for the service: graduates between 21 and 30 years of age and persons who are already in government service and are below 35 years of age. The State Civil Service Commission advertises the positions and holds examinations for selection. Till their retirement, candidates continue to serve as BDOs and only in rare cases are they promoted as district planning officers. However, about 10 per cent of the total number of BDOs are usually in senior scale of pay. One interesting aspect of this career is that candidates have to go through a three-month training at their own expenses before being given charge of the blocks. It is hard to say whether the large number of applicants in spite of this initial expense is due to attractive job prospects or scarcity of employment. But the fact remains that they bear it.

Then it seems that the BDOs with at least a theoretical choice of forsaking the job and following the usual steps in departmental career are different from those who are pursuing block administration as a career and their promotion lies on what they do or don't do in the block. The tendency to treat his assignment as important appears to be of considerable influence in moulding the outlook of this type of BDOs. The compulsion to develop more understanding of the political environment should exist in greater intensity where the whole career is at stake. After all, each individual, when he is under pressure, usually opts for some safety to protect himself. For a bureaucrat, this option of safety may just lie in going along with the turbulent politics and in accepting the political leaders as the legitimate sources of command and power. The acute bitterness and distrust that characterises bureaucrats in a developing political system, emanates primarily from the non-acceptance of the new elements and sources of power. Possibly,

the protection that technical independence provides to each BDO in Rajasthan seeks to encourage precisely the image that comes in constant confrontation with the new forces of politics.

Finally, another factor that may have considerable import in explaining the differences between Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh is the political and administrative heritage of the two states. One important feature of distinction is the exposure of the state to politics and democracy. Uttar Pradesh has been a centre of the nationalist movement; many contemporary trends in Indian politics can be traced to what happened there. On the other hand, Rajasthan has been essentially isolated from the mainstream of politics and has really arrived on the political scene only after independence. The longer tradition of actual involvement in politics in UP, must have helped in building a rapport between the administrators and the politicians. It, at least, provided a useful process of learning about each other.

In Rajasthan, administrators were trained in a feudal system where loyalty to an individual prince was placed above all priorities in governance. There was a clear-cut line of control and supervision, and source of command could be easily identified. This state was also deprived of modern, political and administrative experience gained in other parts of British India. There were few advisory assemblies or municipalities. Political leaders who emerged in post-independence era had little or no previous experience in administration. We are suggesting that this background of state politics and administration may still be a powerful influence in moulding the outlook of the bureaucrats.

In conclusion, it appears that the three important factors that have led Rajasthan BDOs to be more inclined towards 'autocratism' are technical education, lack of a career in the general framework of community development and panchayati raj administration, a general lack of exposure to politics and a comparatively short time for working democracy. Whenever a new administration has been created in India, a debate to introduce another cadre of civil service to man it has always followed. With community development administration, the question that was faced earlier by the planners was: whether to create a new cadre of BDOs or borrow men from the existing cadre of civil services for work? Rajasthan has switched on to technical personnel to man their blocks only recently. UP has always had a separate cadre for the BDOs.

The earlier discussion mostly has centered round administrative and technical competence but much less attention has been paid to the ability to work with the new political elite and within an atmosphere of constant political tension. This ability seems to be sometimes even more important. Much of administration of development seems to be

administration of confrontation. Conflicts seem to increase when bureaucrats are permitted to use career independence as a weapon of aggression or protection.

Also, the capacity of the bureaucrats to develop a working relationship with the new forces of politics seems to grow as exposure to democratic forces increases. This is merely saying that considerable time is required for an adjustment to take place. UP has long been in the independence struggle and the present generation of bureaucrats has at least grown up in an atmosphere of political upheaval and the rise of social aspirations. There is no doubt that people in UP have much greater acquaintance with the individual politician than those in Rajasthan. It is then reasonable to contend that time is an important factor in developing more congenial perceptions towards democracy and greater exposure to politicians will lead to greater adjustment over a period of time. □

Public Administration in Asian Countries*

V. A. Pai Panandikar

THE TWO pronounced features of the public administration systems of the Asian countries are their administrative continuity and rapid growth, especially since the 1950s. In large part, the stimulus for change came from an innate desire on the part of the countries of the region to adapt their administrative systems to meet the needs of the dynamics of their economics. To an extent, the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and other international agencies and foundations contributed in no small way to increasing attention being paid to the administrative systems.

Undoubtedly the post-World War II emphasis on development activity in the countries of Asia was responsible for the most important stimulus to the attention bestowed on administrative issues. The basic issue at the heart of all their enquiries and efforts was how to gear these administrative systems to meet the challenges facing the countries and the tasks undertaken by them. Coinciding with these developments were the programmes of technical assistance in the field of public administration. In some respects, such assistance anticipated several difficult problems of public administration and triggered both new thought and action in various areas.

LANDMARKS

The major developments in public administration began in most countries of the region in the early fifties which were in several ways the catalytic years. These were followed by activities of consolidation until the end of the decade which again displayed a new spurt of activity. By the sixties, the administrative systems of the Asian countries appeared ready for a major programme aimed at their improvements and adaptation to new developments. Commissions and committees on administrative reform became an increasingly accepted institutionalized means of tackling problems posed by the ageing administrative systems. No doubt the debilities of the systems were more markedly brought out by new responsibilities for development which almost all countries of the region undertook though with varying intensity.

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1970, pp. 13-23.

CHANGING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

In the earlier years, administrative stability was an objective of major concern for most of the Asian countries. The devastation of the World War II in South-East Asia, the partition of the Indian sub-continent, etc., were phenomena of such magnitude that the concern in most of the countries had already achieved a degree of administrative viability; these post-War developments implied strengthening of the traditional bureaucracies. Where there was no such resource, the creation of a minimum administrative structure became the major obsession of the body politics in Asia.

Neither of these objectives and the strategies of administrative organization consequent to them were supportive of the new direction of development planning and socio-economic goals. The rigid traditional structure of administrative organization, whether at the apex or at the level of executive departments of local level, were often found to be ill-suited to the needs of the new activities. This was especially apparent in key programmes of agriculture and community development. Whereas the success of these programmes depended upon the degree and even the quality of citizen participation, the administrative systems were generally apathetic to such shifts in their approach and adaptation. Indeed, such a transformation was against the very grain of the traditional administrative systems built on authoritarian foundations, which were sometimes even hostile to popular participation, not to mention of popular direction.

As the objectives of state policy veered from political and administrative stability towards socio-economic development, the limitations of the administrative systems came increasingly to the fore. Even in those countries of the region which had a strong law and order administrative tradition, such as India and Pakistan, the complexities of the new developments were too much for their administrative systems. Unsuspected weaknesses of the systems were increasingly evident and most importantly the lags between developmental objectives and performance became the much lamented tale in one country after another.

The shift in strategy in matters administrative was, therefore, inevitable from one of achieving stability to that of change and adaptation. While the maintenance of law and order continued to be a basic objective of administration, developmental activities became the prime focus of the administrative systems of the region in the fields of agriculture, industry, transport, education and even exports.

Basic issues in this process of administrative change related to organizational structures, procedures—both financial and administrative—the entire range of administrative technology—including information systems, operations research, etc.—personnel for development

activity, and—most important of all—organizational behaviour. Even in area: where the best of the administrative systems of the continent claimed special competence, *e.g.*, in decision-making, the weaknesses became glaring as 'hunches and judgment' and the 'conventional wisdoms' were proven to lack depth of substance and even based on undependable information. In the absence of properly established systems, decisions were, therefore, many a time based on erroneous considerations, choice of alternatives rarely developed, and the decisions made not on facts since they were not known, but on individual's biases and opinions depending upon his or her status.

In other words the countries of the region lacked administrative policies to support the developmental and nation-building tasks and objectives placed before their administrative systems. Most complex functions and tasks were ascribed to administrative systems with ageing and worn-out structures, concepts and practices which were basically unsuited to these functions and tasks.

The dissatisfactions arising out of the poor performance led to a major change in administrative thinking For the first time perhaps in the histories of these countries were the administrative systems opened to research. It was done clearly in response to the felt needs, especially to understand the reasons for administrative lags, poor implementation of development programmes, etc., as well as to change administrative policies. The instruments of change, especially training, were regarded as activities of major import for bringing about the necessary adaptation of the civil servants and the administrative systems themselves to their new roles and functions.

EMERGING TRENDS

By far the most notable feature of the administrative systems of the Asian countries is the growing recognition accorded to the urgent need for training civil servants, especially those involved in development programmes. The recognition has been to a much lesser extent for research into problems of implementation, particularly into the causes of administrative failures and the possibilities for administrative improvements and the methods thereof. The scale of the issues and problems involved emerges in bold relief when we consider the massive dimensions of the civil services in the countries of the continent. India with nearly 8.6 million government employees at the national, state and local levels in 1968 and during the same period the Philippines with nearly 500,000 employees, Korea with over 370,000 employees, Iran with over 300,000 employees represent some of the major governmental systems in the world to mention but a few countries of Asia.

FOCUS ON TRAINING

With the kinds of pressures emanating from the growing and expanding developmental programmes, attention was inevitably focused first and foremost on training of the personnel for the new tasks and responsibilities through formal arrangements. Bulk of the initial training activity was, therefore, directed to develop those skills which were considered relevant for handling the specific jobs. Naturally, the emphasis in such training was on the technical aspects of administration with some smattering of the broader goals and objectives incorporated in the training curricula.

In addition to such type of job-oriented training, formal training for the probationers was also regarded as essential so as to orient their outlook and attitudes to suit the new needs. Orientation training thus became a widespread phenomenon in most of the countries, with some significant benefits, all the more at the higher officer levels in the hierarchy.

One major factor responsible for confining training activity to junior and middle levels was the resistance to training at the top. The generally held opinion in the region was that 'trainability' was linked to age and status and those who had crossed a certain level did not require to be trained. This approach to training led to several undesirable consequences. Most important of all, the higher levels of management tended to become increasingly obsolescent in their knowledge, understanding and perspectives, even more in their attitudes to change and to adaptation. As a result, the senior personnel became not just hindrances but posed active roadblocks to the subordinates who were better trained and equipped for the new tasks. This unhappy situation was reflected in organizational imbalance and increased frustration among the juniors and it generated a sense of stagnation and administrative decay.

Nonetheless, a rapid growth of training activity and consequently a proliferation of training institutions have been noticeable prominently in almost all the countries of Asia. Barring a few exceptions like the College of Public Administration at the University of Philippines and perhaps the Graduate School of Public Administration in Korea, the academic bodies, including the universities, were sparingly used as training institutions by the countries of the region. Instead, the primary emphasis appeared to have been placed on government sponsored or directly operated training institutions or agencies. Many of these have been built at considerable cost and are well endowed with financial and physical resources.

This phenomenon of creation of separate governmental institutions or agencies for training the civil servants has been widely ascribed to

the 'ivory-tower' outlook of the universities. Allegedly, the universities and such other academic bodies have kept themselves aloof from the mainstream of national life even in activities related to an applied discipline like public administration. Often the universities and similar bodies have been criticized for their undue dependence upon foreign texts and a body of knowledge which has no practical bearing on the administrative issues and problems facing the various countries of Asia. Whatever the merits of such criticism, the lack of direct, effective and continuous interaction between the academic and the applied sides of public administration has had adverse implications both for the development of administrative practice as well as for academic objective of developing a new body of knowledge in development administration.

So much about formal training activity in the countries of the region. Here, it would be pertinent to enquire about the extent to which this activity is related to broader training objectives and policies. Experience in many countries, especially the developed ones, has clearly demonstrated that formal training by itself is not effective unless there are appropriate supporting training policies or a deliberate effort to develop individuals towards certain known goals. In this regard, in most of the countries of the Asian continent, there has rarely been a deliberate policy. Pakistan and Iran are perhaps the known exceptions in that training activity. Iran is deliberately linked to administrative reform, and in the case of the higher civil service of Pakistan, formal training is an integral part of career development and promotion of this small but crucial group of officers.

Generally, speaking of the continent as a whole, formal training is an isolated activity and not organically linked to on-the-job training, placement, rotation, effective supervision, etc., which go to develop the government personnel. Indeed, some of the non-formal training aspects which were emphasized before the era of institutional training, such as on-the-job training and proper supervision have been relegated to the background and almost forgotten today.

Training policy, in other words, is noticeable more by its absence in the countries of Asia than by its presence, even though formal training activity has increased many fold and on a fairly systematic basis since the 1950s. In particular, the institutional training appears to have been better organized and training has become an accepted term in the administrative vocabulary in the region. However, training thus far has been more confined to the technical and to the junior and middle levels in administration. Top management is still outside the pale of organized training activities in most of these countries.

RESEARCH: THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION

Research in public administration has not, however, been as fortunate as training in receiving adequate attention or focus. In large part, this is due to the fact that the tradition of using research for policy formulation in most of these countries has been relatively lacking. In general, research has been regarded as an academic activity more for the universities and other academic agencies. These agencies being outside the mainstream of development activity, have regarded day-to-day administration and its problems as the preserve of the practitioners and, therefore, outside the frontiers of academic activity.

It was only in the recent years when the performance of development programmes run into heavy weather that some of the countries of the region have begun to feel the need for research to understand the causes of the administrative shortcomings, and to take prescriptive action. But nowhere has this feeling been yet translated into any kind of a comprehensive research policy or a programme for it. However, the work of agencies like the Programme Evaluation Organization, the Committee on Plan Projects, and the Research Programmes Committee in the Planning Commission of India is indicative of the research efforts in administrative issues. Most of such effort has been directed at specific problems and not sufficiently aimed at policy issues. More recently, several countries of the region have created reform agencies to study administrative problems, giving the earlier O & M agencies a wider framework. In the very nature of their work, these intramural agencies have focused their attention on technical areas of procedures, and improved systems: few have questioned the basic assumptions of the administrative systems.

In the main, research into administrative matters could be for two broad purposes. The first one may be termed policy research, and the second academic and pedagogic. From the point of plan implementation, the policy research naturally assumes important dimensions. Administrative policy research could be further sub-divided into substantive policy research and research into management technology, though the two go hand in hand.

Policy research of the first type has to examine whether the approach or an alternative accepted as policy is suitable or not. And, if suitable, how to make it more effective. Thus, for instance, the agricultural development strategy in the Asian countries is today based largely on the high-yielding hybrid varieties of seed. Some of the countries of the region have adopted a decentralized programme of seed production and distribution going down to what is called a seed village. Research into the administrative policy of production and distribution of at least one country in the region showed that it was inadequate and ineffective. As

a result of such studies, the policy was subsequently changed.

Policy research is equally important in organization behaviour. A few studies which have been made into the behaviour of the civil servants, especially in development programmes and the compatibility of such behaviour with the objectives of the development programmes, have revealed many important policy issues. Lack of proper behavioural adaptation to the new roles has been brought out as a crucial factor affecting their actual performance. At the same time, training has been found to have an important bearing on bringing about such an adaptation in their behaviour. However tentative such findings may be, the gap between the supportive behaviour and the available patterns clearly has policy consequences which need to be carefully examined if development programmes are to succeed.

The other aspect of policy research concerns purely organizational and administrative matters. Questions like the following have been found to have important consequences on the effective implementation of programmes: Do the staffing and recruitment policies help to make available the right type of skills? Is the internal organizational structure conducive to the effective operation of the programmes? Is the information system adequate for decision-making? Similarly: Are the various rules and regulations, including financial and administrative delegation supportive of the objectives? These questions pertaining to the entire field of administrative policy and technology have been repeatedly found to be the bugbears of many a development programmes. Of course, in many such areas, the therapeutic action may not be within the ambit of the authority of individual programme agencies. But they are within the legitimate field of administrative policy research, especially if the development objectives have to be successfully carried out.

Administrative policy research as an integral part of developmental planning has rarely been a feature of the administrative systems in the region. Perhaps such a neglect stems from the feeling that the administrative systems are basically sound and that all they need is minor adjustment. Such an approach, however, does not appreciate the true character of the administrative process and its implications. Nowhere has this been demonstrated as effectively as in the business and industrial world.

Business and industrial bureaucracies are, as compared to governmental bureaucracies, far more recent in origin. However, the rapidity of acceptance and implementation of a large number of modern management concepts, including the development of administrative policy, has brought rich dividends to this sector of the economy. The information systems to develop new products, to control production and distribution, operations research to refine processes or to develop new

approaches, and a continuous research into how best to achieve the desired objectives have given a remarkable resilience to the modern business and industrial world. Admittedly, the world of public administration is a somewhat different world. Yet the role of public administration is so vast and so fundamental to the national economies of the Asian countries that the present approach to policy research is having deleterious effects on the development of the very instruments of public administration.

The role of academic research, including research for pedagogical reasons, may appear less important than applied research. However, without such work the very boby of knowledge in the field cannot grow and while improvements in technology may bring short-run benefits, long-term issues like improved administrative structures and systems depend a great deal on such research. Such research is almost absent in the region and the limited efforts that have been made are not suitably supported or encouraged.

Insofar as research for pedagogical purposes is concerned, there has fortunately been a somewhat better record. As training programmes are coming up in these countries, especially for the middle and higher levels, the need for case studies, simulation techniques, ete., has been felt and recognized. In many countries of the region, large number of real life cases have been prepared during the last decade for teaching purposes. Several of these could, with considerable benefit, be exchanged within the countries of the region for mutual benefit. Far more, however, needs to be done to improve the pedagogical value of these cases to make them more effective instruments of instruction.

CONCLUSION

While rapid administrative growth and expansion has been characteristic of countries of Asia, the process of this growth and expansion has been more a consequence of developmental activity rather than of proper and effective administrative planning. Indeed, administrative strategies as an integral part of developmental planning have been more absent than otherwise, and where they exist, the exercise is somewhat rudimentary. All this goes to suggest that public administration is a forgotten side of development planning. If the administrative systems of these countries had met the new challenges adequately then there need have been no concern. In most countries, however, this neglect has had a telling effect on the performance of many a development programmes and tasks.

Within this general framework, however, there are many redeeming factors. Above all, training activity for civil service has expanded enormously during the years since 1950, especially in the last decade.

Its range and scope has also been widened a great deal. Not only is there a great deal of training for the job, especially technical training, but also orientation training for higher level officers, and executive development programmes, generally up to the middle levels. However, training activity has not kept full pace with the growth of the civil service and large and critical lags are noticeable. First of all, training for the higher levels has not yet developed on a sufficiently organized basis although some of the countries, like Pakistan, the Philippines, and to a lesser extent India, have begun such programmes. The absence of such training activity, especially to bring senior officers up to date, to develop their skills and to make them more aware of themselves and of the national environment have posed several problems, especially for the efficacy of training at the lower levels.

The institutional framework for training has, on the other hand, developed considerably as the scope of training has expanded in recent years. The initial institutional growth was more departmental and geared to the internal requirement of a single agency or department. Over a period of time, as the scope of training activity has grown, inter-departmental and even national institutions have increasingly made their mark. Characteristically, in bulk of the countries of the region, training institutions are within the governmental frameworks. The universities and other academic bodies have had a negligible role to play in training the higher services, except perhaps in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent in Korea. In India, the Institutes of Management and the Indian Institute of Public Administration are now being increasingly involved in the organized training programmes for the civil servant.

A major problem with many of he governmental training institutions in these countries has been their staffing policies. Inadequate professionalization has often times meant poor development of institutional capabilities, especially in terms of the quality of instruction. Nor have the Governments or their concerned agencies released the best of their practitioners to undertake training responsibilities. As a result, several of these institutions have lacked vitality and dynamism necessary to develop the training activity beyond the narrow pale of routine instruction in the classrooms.

Some other problems relate to the quality of training, particularly where it is of a purely technical nature or essentially job-oriented. Generally speaking, the programmes here have been somewhat satisfactory if they are meant for lower levels. In the programmes designed for higher level officers, including the executive development programmes, the limitations in terms of content of training programmes and their methodology have been noted in several countries. The content has often times been regarded as too academic and not sufficiently

relevant to the careers of the individuals trained or to the administrative circumstances of the country. Similarly, the teachnig technology has often been found to be ineffective to develop the necessary knowledge or skills.

This brings in the entire question of training policy. While training has been generally regarded as desirable in several Asian countries, rarely is there an explicit recognition of training as an important instrument of public management of public affairs, followed by a concrete, training policy. There is a semblance of such a framework only in few countries, unlike Pakistan where such policy has been formulated at least for the higher level civil servants. As a result, there is hardly a link between formal training and non-formal training activity or between training and other important personnel matters, such a placement practices, promotion policies, etc.

As compared to training activity, research in public administration, especially policy research, has been even less developed. By and large, there is no recognition in most of the countries of the region of the fact that administrative policy research—both in the substantive developmental sectors and in management technology—are essential activities, especially for the efficacious implementation of development objectives. In the absence of such recognition, the ageing administrative systems with archaic and often unsuited organizational systems and procedures continue to handle tasks which are beyond their immediate or long-term competence. Not only administrative policy but also management technology within public agencies has, therefore, remained static and almost fossilized. Of even greater concern is the fact that personnel skills requited for such policy studies, etc., or what we might call policy planning personnel, are neither encouraged nor developed. The lack of academic research in administrative fields has aggravated this problem further. The attitudes of the universities and other academic bodies treating these areas as out of bounds have not been particularly helpful. However, these are the responsibilities of the government, and unless the initiative is taken by the government, the real benefits of knowledge in this field and the personnel capabilities in the country would not be available for implementing the development plans.

Recently, case research, especially for teaching purposes, has opened several new possibilities. It has brought the academic and teaching staff closer to real-life problem situations. Case studies have also imparted a realistic and effective colour to teaching and training in administration, especially at the higher levels.

In conclusion, public administration, though in an eclectic mood in the Asian countries, is yet in infant stages. Since its rapid development is of considerable import, it is necessary for the countries of

the region to put their resources together by pooling both experience and personnel, to develop a better body of knowledge, and thus aid the development of the policy aspects as well as the technology in public administration and thereby the profession itself. □

'More Advanced' Strategies for 'Less Advanced' Countries: A Study in Administrative Development*

Asim Al-Araji

IMPORTED ADMINISTRATIVE development strategies formulated in the 'more advanced, countries[1] have generally proved to be less

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[1]In terms of copying the more advanced administrative development strategies by the less advanced countries, *see*, for example: Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1974, p. vii, p. xvii, p. 168; Joseph Lapalombara, "Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations", *in* Fred. M. Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers of Development Administration*, Durham, Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1971, pp. 171-227; Ralph Brainbanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth", *in* Fred M. Riggs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 227-247; Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucracy in Developing Countries" *in* Fred M. Riggs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 459-486; Alfred Diamont, "Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes", *in* Fred M. Riggs, (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 486-538; M.J. Esman, "Foreign Aid Not by Bread Alone", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1, January/February 1971, pp. 92-97; M.J. Esman, "The CAG and the Study of Public Administration: A Midterm Appraisal", CAG, *Occasional Papers*, April, 1966; C.T. Goodsell, "The Developmental Planning Myths and the Real World", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 4, July/August 1970, D. Waldo, "Public Administration and Change: Terra Paene Incognita", *in* G. Benveniste and W.F. Ilchman (eds.), *Agents of Change: Professionals in Developing Countries*, New York, Praeger, 1971; C. Legum (ed.), The First United Nations Development Decade and Its Lessons for the 1975, New York, Praeger, 1970; R. Robinson, *Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen-sixties*, Cambridge University Press, 1971; J. Lapalombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development", *in* J. Lapalombara, *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963; L.J. Walinsky, *The Planning and Execution of Economic Development*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1963; U.N., "General Administrative Aspects of Planning", *Administrative Aspects of Planning*, Economic Commission for Latin America, New York, 1969; M.J. Esman and J.D. Montgomery, "System Approaches to Technical Cooperation: The Role of Development Administration", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 29 ,No. 5, September/October 1969; J.C. Honey, *Toward Strategies for Public Administration Development in Latin America*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1968 and Y. Dror, "Systems Analysis and National Modernisation Decisions", *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 13, June 1970.

effective in 'less advanced' countries[2] than in their countries of origin. The common belief in this regard is that technical shortcomings of the less advanced countries are the major reasons for their failure in fully utilising the imported strategies.[3]

Recommendations made in this connection are consequently of a technical nature.[4] Nevertheless, field experimentations in the less advanced countries have proved that these recommendations are not helpful in making the imported strategies less failure proof than they were before.[5]

The goal of the present article is to examine an alternative diagnosis to the reasons of limited effectiveness of the copied strategies, on the basis of the following two propositions:

> Administrative development refers to processes of adapting behavioural norms and patterns (dependent variable), embodying the concerned administrative system, to qualitative and/or quantitative changes in required goals (independent variables) within given cricumstances (contingent variables).[6]
> The level of effectiveness of an administrative development strategy is a function of the level of congruency between the nature (qualitative/quantitative) and patterns (institutionalised/uninstitutionalised) of changes of the required goals of the concerned administrative systems, on one hand, and the characteristics of the given strategy, on the other.

[2]Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, p. viii, p. ix; Fred W. Riggs (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[3]Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; Albert Waterston, *Development Planning: Lessons of Experiences*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 299-333.

[4]Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, pp. x and 1-37: Gerald E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, Illinois, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969, pp. 4, 9 and 12; G.S. Birkhead (ed.), *Administrative Reforms in Pakistan*, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1966, p. 186; Albert Waterston, *op. cit.*, pp. 587-695.

[5]Albert Waterston has described the failure in developing nations in the following way: ". . . an examination of postwar planning history reveals that there have been many more failures than successes in the implementation of development plans. . . What is even more disturbing the situation seems to be worsening instead of improving as countries continue to plan". (*op. cit.*, p. 293). Caiden and Wildavsky have expressed similar idea about failure in developing nations:

"Between thought and action in poor countries there is a fearful symmetry. Experience reveals a convergent evolution", *op. cit.*, p. x.

[6]For other definitions of administrative reform see: for example: Gerald E. Caiden, *op. cit.*, p. 1 and 9; John D. Montgomery, "Sources of Administrative Reform: Problems of Power, and Politics", *CAG*, Bloomington, Ind. 1967, p. 1; Fred W. Riggs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

Based on these two points, the analysis requires an examination of the nature and pattern of changes of goals in the less advanced countries in comparison with the more advanced countries, and an examination of the characteristics of the copied strategies. A comparative analysis of results of the examination too is needed for reaching any possible conclusion.

'INSTITUTIONALISED' AND 'LESS-INSTITUTIONALISED' CHANGES

In order to compare the pattern of changes of goals of the administrative systems of the more advanced countries with the less advanced countries, it is required that variation in their public orders (political, social, and economic), which usully have a major role in shaping these goals, through reciprocal processes of interactions, be pointed out. Variation between patterns of changes of the more advanced public orders and the less advanced public orders can be illustrated in the following two analytical diagrams.[7]

DIAGRAM 1

Patterns of Changes of Public Orders in More Advanced Countries



DIAGRAM 2

Patterns of Changes of Public Orders in Less Advanced Countries



[7]See for example: Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.

The letters A, B, and C in diagram 1 and 2 stand for political, economic, and social public orders. The numbers attached to these letters refer to weight of qualitative and/or quantitative changes while the abstractive and positive signs (—, +) indicate the values of these changes.

Diagram 1 indicates that the qualitative and quantitative changes in the components of public orders maintain a relatively high level of institutionality (regularity and systematisation) through the various analytical periods of time. For example, 'A_2' in the first period becomes 'A_4' in the second period, 'A_6' in the third period, and so on. Similarly, B_2 and C_2. Additionally, qualitative and quantitative changes of these components tend to maintain a relatively high level of regularity and systematisation too. It is noticed in this connection that more than 50 per cent of the total changes is confined within certain system of regularity. In other words, these changes maintain a relatively high level of direction and clarity of goal.

Diagram 1 also indicates that there is a level of congruency among the weights of changes of public orders through every given analytical period of time. Within the first period, for example, the weight of each one of A, B, and C is (2), it turns to (3) in case of positive change, and to (1) in case of negative change.

Diagram 1 illustrates that there is a relatively high level of continuity and integration among changes of public orders during the different analytical periods of time. For example, A_{3+}, B_{3+}, and C_{3+}, which constitute a positive peak of the first period, are themselves constituting the negative peak, (A_{3-}, B_{3-}, and C_{3-}), in the second analytical period. At the same time, the positive peak (A_{5+}, B_{5+}, and C_{5+}) of the second analytical period is the negative peak, (A_{5-}, B_{5-}, and C_{5-}) of the third analytical period, and so on.

Based on the above points, changes of public orders in the more advanced countries are generally characterised by a high level of regularity and systematisation and so are the changes of goals of their administrative systems.[8]

Diagram 2 (less advanced countries) points out that patterns of qualitative and quantitative changes of the various components of public orders tend to maintain a low level of regularity and systematisation.

[8]It should be mentioned that public orders in the more advanced countries are presently showing some signs of irregularity and lack of systematization. See in this connection the following sources for example: Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity*, New York, Harper & Row, 1968; Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulance*, San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1971; George Berkly, *The Administrative Revolution: Notes on the Passing of Organization Man*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1971: John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Age of Uncertainty*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1977.

For example, C_2 in the first analytical period becomes C_6, and then C_3 in the second and third periods, while B_7 of the first period becomes B_4 and then B_2 in the following two periods, and so on. It is to be noticed in this connection that less than 50 per cent of the total changes is confined to certain systems of regularity. In other words, these changes maintain a relatively low level of direction and clarity of goals, unlike in diagram 1.

Additionally, diagram 2 shows that there is no congruency among various changes through any analytical period of time. Weights of A, B, and C, for example, are 4, 7, and 2, and continue their incongruence in case of positive changes (6, 8, and 3) as well as of negative changes (1, 6, and 1).

Qualitative and quantitative changes in diagram 2 do not show a level of continuity any integration among themselves. In other words, weights of changes through any given analytical period of time do not show a clear relationship with changes in the second and third, etc., periods of time, unlike in diagram 1.

Based on these points, changes of public orders in the less advanced countries are generally characterised by a lack of regularity and systematisation and so are the changes of goals of their administrative systems [9]

The differences between the patterns of changes of goals of the administrative systems of the more advanced countries and the less advanced are as in the statement below.

Patterns of Changes of Goals

More Advanced Countries	*Less Advanced Countries*
Long time expansion and low speed of changes.	Limited time expansion and high speed of changes
High level of regularity	Low level of regularity
High level of integration and continuity	Low level of integration and continuity
High level of directness and clarity of goals	Low level of directness and clarity of goals

Therefore, the adoption of strategies originally formulated to fit patterns of changes of the more advanced countries' goals by the less advanced countries will implicitly or explicitly be based on one or more

[9]Fred Riggs' typologies concerning the more advanced and the less advanced countries have some relevancy to the variations among these countries referred to above. Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration" *in* Walliam J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, Ind., 1957, pp. 23-116.

of the following wrong premises:

The possibility of making the clarity of goals as high as in the more advanced countries/the level of clarity of goals of the less advanced countries is similar to the more advanced countries.

The possibility of creating a high level of continuity and integration or changes of goals as in the more advanced countries/there is a high level of continuity and integration among changes of goals in the less advanced countries as in the more advanced countries.

The possiblity of creating a high level of regularity in changes of goals of the less advanced countries similar to the more advanced countries/there is a high level of regularity in changes of goals in the less advanced countries similar to more advanced countries.

The possibility of making reciprocal interactions of public orders with state administrative systems of a high level of regularity and systematisation/the reciprocal interactions of public orders with state administrative systems are of high level of regularity and systemisation as in the more advanced countries.

The adoption of administrative development strategies of the more advanced countries on the basis of some or all of the second parts of the above premises will usually lead to failure by committing the mistake of not diagnosing the right patterns of changes of goals of administrative systems of the less advanced countries. Adopting the same strategies on the basis of one or more of the first of the above premises will generally lead to failure too, for the mistake of overestimating the actual capability of the less advanced countries in regard to the requirements of making the patterns of changes of their goals similar to those of the more advanced countries.

'QUALITATIVE' AND 'QUANTITATIVE' CHANGES

Changes of goals of administrative systems in less developed countries tend to be of a quantitative more than of a qualitative nature, unlike the more advanced countries, for the following probable reasons:

Percentages of population increases in the less advanced countries are generally more than those of the advanced countries. Consequently, the total volume of public demands of the less advanced countries, which presumably constitutes the goals of the state administrative system, will be increasing in higher percentages than in the case of the more advanced countries.

The distinctively weak position of the private sector besides the steadily increasing state intervention in public life in the less advanced

countries makes quantitative changes in their goals relatively more salient than in the more advanced countries.

The fact that a number of the less advanced countries are still working to complete the extension of their regular public services to various communities and territories—a goal that had been generally realised by the more advanced countries a number of years ago—also makes quantitative changes of goals more explicit than in the more advanced countries.

Continuous civic and cultural changes in the more advanced countries and the resulting changes in the number and qualities of varieties of public demands, make their qualitative changes more salient in the less advanced countries.[10]

Continuous scientific and technological development in the more advanced countries makes, in turn, qualitative changes of goals more prominent than in the less advanced countries.[11]

Therefore, the adoption of strategies originally formulated to fit the predominantly qualitative changes of the advanced countries by the less advanced countries will explicitly or implicitly be based on one or more of the following wrong premises:

The possibility of responding to quantitative changes in goals by

[10]See the following sources in terms of the prominance of qualitative changes in the more advanced countries: Warron Bennis, *Changing Organization*, New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1966; Douglas T. Yates and Richard R Nelson (eds.), *Innovation and Implementation in Public Organizations*, Yale, Yale University Press, 1977; Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and the Modern World*, New Jersey, General Learning Press, Morristown, 1976. It should be pointed out that Anthony Downs emphasis in his book (*Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1967, pp. 253-260) on quantitative changes in various administrative systems was with no reference to the predominant ongoing qualitative changes in the more advanced countries. Moreover, he has not analysed influences of technological and scientific continuous development on changes in the more advanced countries in particular.

[11]It is observed that some of the more advanced countries, as a result of the prominance of qualitative changes in their puplic orders and goals, are presently reviewing previous quantitative changes introduced in their administrative systems, besides their extensive emphasis on qualitative changes in present strategies. See in this connection the following sources: Charles Levine, "Organizational Decline and Cutback Management", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 38, July/Aug. 1978, pp. 315-324; Herbert Kaufman, *Are Government Organizations Immortal?* Washington D.C., The Brookings Institutions, 1976; Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Management of Decline", *Change*, June 1975, pp. 8, 9, 64; Marry D. Brewer, "Termination: Hard Choices—Hard Questions", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 38, July/August 1978, pp. 338-344; Barry M. Mitnick, "Deregulation As a Process of Organizational Reduction", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 38, July/August 1978, pp. 350-357; Herbert Kaufman, *The Limits of Organizational Change*, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1971.

qualitative administrative development measures/administrative development requirements of the less advanced countries are mostly of a qualitative nature similar to those of the more advanced countries.

The possibility of making the influences of interactions between the concerned administrative system and its environmental factors of a qualitative nature/these influences are of a predominant qualitative nature.

The adoption of the more advanced strategies by the less advanced countries on the basis of one of the first part of the above mentioned premises will usually lead to failure by committing the mistake on overestimating the actual scientific and technological capability of the less advanced countries in regard to the proposed developmental measures.

Meanwhile the adoption of the same strategy on the basis of one of the second parts of the same premises will generally lead to failure for the mistake of not diagnosing the right nature of the changes of goals of the administrative systems of the less advanced countries.

The possible consequences of the above mentioned cases could be one or more of the following:

Producing not needed varieties of public goods and services and/or introducing certain qualitative changes in presently produced public goods and services which are practically not needed by the whole or by a majority of the society.

Maintaining the case of inequity in distributing the produced public goods and services by exempting certain communities and territories, and by responding to some public needs rather than to the others.

Using public relations and various state mass media to create an artificial and unrealistic image about the nature of changes of public goals, and consequently of the results of the adopted developmental strategies. Creating a non-democratic relationship between the government administrative systems and the public, resulting from the lack of responsiveness to public demand.

Creating a disguised unemployment inside state administrative systems. Additionally, qualitatively oriented developmental strategies usually lead to the prevalence of a chronic problem of unemployment in the less advanced societies.

Complete or partial failure in realising the goals of the state administrative systems.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that the less advanced countries adopt the more

advanced strategies on the basis of one of the following premises:

> The possibility of making changes in the goals of the administrative system of qualitative and institutionalised characteristics, similar to the more advanced countries, through the same processes of administrative development, or
>
> Changes of goals of administrative systems are in fact of qualitative and institutionalised characteristics, similar to those of the more advanced countries.

The failure resulting from the adoption of the first proposition is due to over-estimation of the actual scientific and technological capabilities of the less advanced countries in connection with the requirement of reducing or closing the present gap between the nature and pattern of changes of the more advanced goals and the nature and pattern of the changes of the less advanced goals.

Under the above orientation, goals that cannot be modified easily and quickly in terms of the nature and pattern of their changes, will most likely be neglected. Consequently, state administrative systems will be mostly devoted to goals of the few elite whose goals are relatively closer to the more advanced countries, while the goals of the majority will probably get an insufficient response.

The failure resulting from the adoption of the second premise is due to the denial of the real difference between the nature and pattern of changes of the goals of the less advanced and the more advanced. This orientation will most possibly lead to the adoption of too ambitious goals.

Therefore, the adaptation of the components of the state administrative systems to these goals will most likely be unrealistic and unrewarding. Additionally, the few urban elite, as in the case of the first premise, will probably be the only beneficiaries rather than the majority of the public.

What should be the alternatives for the less advanced countries?

Dropping the adopted advanced strategies and adopting no strategy cannot be an acceptable alternative because it maintains a large amount of unsatisfied public goals at the risk of negligence. The adaptation of the present advanced strategies to local needs of the less advanced countries tends to be an unrealistic alternative too for the following reasons:

> The relatively large differences between the nature and pattern of the changes of goals of the more advanced countries and the changes of goals of the less advanced countries practically make the trial of

developing a home made strategy more feasible than the required adaptation processes.

The limited scientific and technological capabilities of the less advanced countries are most likely to create many obstacles in diagnosing the required adaptation processes, and then for carrying out these processes. Therefore, the trial adaptations of advanced strategies have been usually turned into real situations, to almost the complete adoption of these strategies as they were originally developed.

A relatively better alternative could be the adoption of an *ad hoc* task force type of administrative development measures in response to the various individual public goals. These administrative developmental measures can be managed and coordinated by a central office. Such an alternative can be adopted on a transitional basis until a suitable level of regularity and systematisation can be realised in changes of the present public orders in order to improve the feasibility of adopting better institutionalised administrative development strategies. Under the above alternative, the transition from the proposed *ad hoc* approach to a strategic approach should be geared to the stages of institutionalisation of the present public orders and of goals of the less advanced countries. □

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Index

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